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Cited by 15Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsSocial and Intergroup PsychologyPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Masters of suspicion: A Bayesian decision model of motivated political reasoning

Open access
Rigoli, Francesco·2021·Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
DOI 10.1111/jtsb.12274
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Abstract

Motivated reasoning occurs when judgements subserve motives that go beyond accuracy seeking. Substantial evidence indicates that motivated political reasoning is ubiquitous. This is hard to reconcile with computational theories (following Marr's terminology, theories describing the fundamental principles underlying a cognitive process) like Bayesian inference, because these rely on accuracy maximization. Hence, motivated political reasoning is often interpreted as violating computational principles. Here we propose a different view by offering a computational account of motivated political reasoning which relies on the notion of Bayesian decision (instead of Bayesian inference). The key idea is that utility maximization, and not accuracy maximization, drives political thinking. This implies that agents will tend to endorse judgements that serve their instrumental goals even when evidence in support is poor (though agents will still believe their judgements are the most accurate). In this framework, motivated political reasoning is not interpreted as violating computational principles, although its nature is now conceived as pragmatic (i.e., serving instrumental goals) rather than epistemic (i.e., seeking understanding). The paper presents a mathematical description of the theory and shows how this can help interpreting important phenomena in political psychology such contextual priming, stereotyping, and displaced aggression.

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  • Once groups are ideologically polarized, their members may engage in 'normal' or 'cold' cognitive processes, possibly including Bayesian updating, to maintain or exacerbate motivated differences in beliefs, opinions and values.

    “Once groups are ideologically polarized (that is, extreme), their members may engage in ‘normal’ or ‘cold’ cognitive processes, possibly including Bayesian updating, to maintain or exacerbate motivated differences in beliefs, opinions and values61,102–105.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [105]

    Section 3 describes a Bayesian decision model in which prior beliefs and evidence contribute to motivated political beliefs, while §3.2 explains how people may give greater weight to sources aligned with their ideology. This supports the possibility that ordinary computational processes sustain differences in political beliefs. The cited paper does not specifically establish that these processes maintain or exacerbate differences once groups have become ideologically extreme or polarized. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Gramsci, A. (1971). Prison notebooks volume. Columbia University Press.
  2. - RIGOLI Mastro, D. (2009). Racial/ethnic stereotyping and the media. In R. L. Nabi, & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Handbook of Media Processes and Effects (pp. 377-391). Sage Press.
  3. Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, 25, 1-65. Academic Press.

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Authors
Rigoli, F.
Affiliations
University of London (GB)
Corresponding author
Rigoli, Francesco
ORCID
Rigoli, Francesco
Venue
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2021-03-09
Volume
51
Issue
3
Pages
350-370
ISSN
  • 0021-8308 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-5914
DOI
10.1111/jtsb.12274
OpenAlex
W3133858850
Cited by
15
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 2
FWCI
2.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • City Research Online (City University London) (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
motivated reasoning, political reasoning, Bayesian decision model, utility maximization, instrumental goals, contextual priming, stereotyping, displaced aggression, political psychology

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