The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What is it Like to be a Group Agent?
Open accessAbstract
The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness (pace Schwitzgebel ). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much‐discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency
Bratman, M. E. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625190 · Cited by 1,496
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (2003) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0203-119 · Cited by 1,492
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001 · Cited by 1,344
Self-citationFrom the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 · Cited by 1,128
The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View
Tuomela, R. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.001.0001 · Cited by 840 · cited 1×
“A rich literature analyses this phenomenon (see, e.g., Gilbert 1989; Searle 1995; Bratman 1999, 2014; Tuomela 2007).”
BackgroundShared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together
Bratman, M. E. (2014) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199897933.001.0001 · Cited by 707
Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents
Tuomela, R. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199978267.001.0001 · Cited by 469
Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y · Cited by 227 · cited 2×
“As Knobe and Prinz (2007) report, participants in an empirical study were much less willing to attribute conscious mental states to groups than they were willing to attribute intentions without conscious feelings to them.4 An alternative view is that we should not rule out the idea of group…”
Background
Cited by
Guerrero, L. E., Castillo, L. F., Arango-López, J., & Moreira, F. (2025) · Neural Computing and Applications · doi:10.1007/s00521-023-08328-z · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- List, C.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-07-28
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 295-319
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W920882175
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 21.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What is it Like to be a Group Agent? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/nous.12162
- The paper
- List, C. (2018). What is it Like to be a Group Agent? Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12162
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.