How can we construct a science of consciousness?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter gives an overview of the projects facing a science of consciousness. Such a science must integrate third‐person data about behavior and brain processes with first‐person data about conscious experience. Empirical projects for integrating these data include those of contrasting conscious and unconscious processes, investigating the contents of consciousness, finding neural correlates of consciousness, and eventually inferring underlying principles connecting consciousness with physical processes. These projects are discussed with reference to current experimental research on consciousness. Some obstacles that a science of consciousness faces are also discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Sensations and Brain Processes
Smart, J. J. C. (1959) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182164 · Cited by 1,584
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (2003) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0203-119 · Cited by 1,492
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574 · cited 2×
“Chalmers 2002 ). But for many purposes, the science of consciousness can remain neutral on”
BackgroundSelf-citationLutz, A., Lachaux, J.-P., Martinerie, J., & Varela, F. J. (2002) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.032658199 · Cited by 503 · cited 1×
“on binocular rivalry in monkeys (e.g., Logothetis 1998; Leopold, Maier and Logothetis 2003).”
BackgroundSingle units and conscious vision
The American Association for Research into Nervous and Mental Diseases, & Logothetis, N. K. (1998) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.1998.0333 · Cited by 375
Single-neuron correlates of subjective vision in the human medial temporal lobe
Kreiman, G., Fried, I., & Koch, C. (2002) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.072194099 · Cited by 253 · cited 1×
“measurements on human surgical patients (e.g., Kreiman, Fried and Koch 2002 ), but there are”
Method
Cited by
Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194
“Realists propose that consciousness really exists as a distinct property, and the job of science is to understand how it is generated (e.g. Chalmers, 2004).”
BackgroundThe unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., Hess, K., & Herzog, M. H. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.04.002 · Cited by 140
Dynamic functional connectivity and brain metastability during altered states of consciousness
Cavanna, F., Vilas, M. G., Palmucci, M., & Tagliazucchi, E. (2018) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.09.065 · Cited by 137
“The divergence between a thirdperson perspective functionalist account and a first-person perspective phenomenological account does not imply that both models of consciousness are mutually contradictory (Chalmers, 2013; Tagliazucchi, 2017).”
BackgroundExplanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification
Signorelli, C. M., Szczotka, J., & Prentner, R. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab021 · Cited by 91
“Chalmers latermade the case for ‘panpsychism’ (Strawson 2006; Chalmers 2013a; Goff 2019), the view that consciousness is ubiquitous in nature and serves as the irreducible ‘intrinsic nature’ that grounds physical properties.”
BackgroundMethodThe conductor model of consciousness, our neuromorphic twins, and the human-AI deal
Benitez, F., Pennartz, C., & Senn, W. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/gbzd6 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Venue
- Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-11
- Volume
- 1303
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 25-35
- ISSN
- 0077-8923 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-6632
- OpenAlex
- W2102619491
- Cited by
- 145
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 10.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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