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Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification

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Signorelli, Camilo Miguel, Szczotka, Joanna, Prentner, Robert·2021·Neuroscience of Consciousness
DOI 10.1093/nc/niab021PMC PMC8396118
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Abstract

Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their ‘explanatory profiles’. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

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Cited by

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Authors
Signorelli, C. M., Szczotka, J., & Prentner, R.
Affiliations
  • Inserm (FR)
  • Jagiellonian University (PL)
  • University of California, Irvine (US)
Corresponding author
Signorelli, Camilo Miguel
ORCID
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2021-01-01
Volume
2021
Issue
2
Pages
niab021-niab021
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1093/nc/niab021
PMC
PMC8396118
OpenAlex
W3165547626
Cited by
91
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 5
FWCI
2.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • CONICYT (CONICYT PFCHA/DOCTORADO BECAS CHILE/2016 - 72170507)
  • Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education’s Diamond (DI2016 020046)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
consciousness model, axiomatic model, experimental predictions

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