Beyond Single‐Level Accounts: The Role of Cognitive Architectures in Cognitive Scientific Explanation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We consider approaches to explanation within the cognitive sciences that begin with Marr's computational level (e.g., purely Bayesian accounts of cognitive phenomena) or Marr's implementational level (e.g., reductionist accounts of cognitive phenomena based only on neural‐level evidence) and argue that each is subject to fundamental limitations which impair their ability to provide adequate explanations of cognitive phenomena. For this reason, it is argued, explanation cannot proceed at either level without tight coupling to the algorithmic and representation level. Even at this level, however, we argue that additional constraints relating to the decomposition of the cognitive system into a set of interacting subfunctions (i.e., a cognitive architecture) are required. Integrated cognitive architectures that permit abstract specification of the functions of components and that make contact with the neural level provide a powerful bridge for linking the algorithmic and representational level to both the computational level and the implementational level.
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Cites
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“…Neuroscience ∗ We are grateful to three anonymous reviewers for insightful and constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. and several distinct multi-level accounts of cognitive scientific explanation have been proposed (e.g., Chomsky, 1965; Cummins, 1983; Marr, 1982; Newell, 1982).”
How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?
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Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
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“Indeed, Bowers and Davis characterise many such accounts as “just-so” theories, a view consistent with that developed by Marcus and E. Davis (2013). 2 ∇”
Rational approximations to rational models: alternative algorithms for category learning
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Human Symbol Manipulation Within an Integrated Cognitive Architecture
Anderson, J. R. (2005) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0000_22 · Cited by 253 · cited 3×
“This led to a separation in the cognitive architecture between the goal buffer for control state knowledge and an ‘imaginal’ buffer for problem state knowledge (Anderson, 2005).”
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“For example, over the last decade Anderson and his colleagues have attempted to map the core modules of the ACT-R cognitive architecture onto brain regions via fMRI data relating to the BOLD response (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Anderson et al., 2003; Qin et al., 2003, 2004).”
Cited by
Neuroscience Needs Behavior: Correcting a Reductionist Bias
Krakauer, J. W., Ghazanfar, A. A., Gomez-Marin, A., MacIver, M. A., & Poeppel, D. (2017) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.12.041 · Cited by 1,358
“readily apparent that it is very hard to infer themapping between the behavior of a system and its lower-level properties by only looking at the lower-level properties (Badre et al., 2015; Carandini, 2012; Cooper and Peebles, 2015; Gomez-Marin et al., 2014).”
InfluentialThe Algorithmic Level Is the Bridge Between Computation and Brain
Love, B. C. (2015) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12131 · Cited by 82
Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020) · Culture, Mind, and Brain · doi:10.1017/9781108695374.010 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R. P., & Peebles, D.
- Venue
- Topics in Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-02-28
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 243-258
- ISSN
- 1756-8757 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-8765
- OpenAlex
- W2136116661
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 21.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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