The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Robust Are Probabilistic Models of Higher-Level Cognition?
Abstract
An increasingly popular theory holds that the mind should be viewed as a near-optimal or rational engine of probabilistic inference, in domains as diverse as word learning, pragmatics, naive physics, and predictions of the future. We argue that this view, often identified with Bayesian models of inference, is markedly less promising than widely believed, and is undermined by post hoc practices that merit wholesale reevaluation. We also show that the common equation between probabilistic and rational or optimal is not justified.
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“The risk here is the unchecked proliferation of “just-so stories”—post hoc narratives crafted to explain observed phenomena without generating risky, testable predictions that could potentially disconfirm the theory (Gigerenzer 1998; Marcus and Davis 2013).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Marcus and Davis 2013
In the citing paper
“What appears to support the hypothesis may instead reflect the descriptive flexibility of the models rather than evidence of mechanistic reality (Marcus and Davis 2013; Rasmussen and Eliasmith 2013).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Marcus and Davis 2013
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810 · cited 2×
“…of each of these possibilities, ranging from the underfitting of exponentials (Timmers & Wagenaar, 1977), to probability matching (West & Stanovich, 2003), to many of the cognitive errors reviewed by psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983).”
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results.
Rosenthal, R. (1979) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.638 · Cited by 9,068 · cited 1×
“) The larger concern is that the probabilistic-cognition literature as a whole may disproportionately report successes, a problem akin to Rosenthal’s (1979) file-drawer problem, which would lead to a distorted perception of the applicability of the approach.”
BackgroundOn the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322655392 · Cited by 5,377 · cited 4×
“…of each of these possibilities, ranging from the underfitting of exponentials (Timmers & Wagenaar, 1977), to probability matching (West & Stanovich, 2003), to many of the cognitive errors reviewed by psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process
Ross, L. (1977) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60357-3 · Cited by 4,170
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991 · cited 1×
“…of each of these possibilities, ranging from the underfitting of exponentials (Timmers & Wagenaar, 1977), to probability matching (West & Stanovich, 2003), to many of the cognitive errors reviewed by psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983).”
BackgroundReview of personality and social psychology
Davies, M. (1983) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/0191-8869(83)90072-7 · Cited by 3,365
Jacob, F. (1977) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.860134 · Cited by 2,690 · cited 2×
“Evolution does not invariably lead to solutions that are optimal ( Jacob, 1977; Marcus, 2008), and optimality cannot be presumed in advance of empirical investigation.”
How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.102.4.684 · Cited by 2,127
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- 10.1037/0033-295x.102.4.684 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.4.684 · Paper page
- Ramarajan D., 2012, Does preschoolers’ evidence selection support word learning?
Cited by
Probabilistic machine learning and artificial intelligence
Ghahramani, Z. (2015) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature14541 · Cited by 1,995
“…foundation for rationality in artificial intelligence systems, but also as a model for normative behaviour in humans and animals 15–18 (but see refs 19, 20 for a discussion), and much research is devoted to understanding how neural circuitry may be implementing Bayesian inference 21,22 .”
BackgroundKarr, J. E., Areshenkoff, C. N., Rast, P., Hofer, S. M., Iverson, G. L., & Garcia-Barrera, M. A. (2018) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000160 · Cited by 637
From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
Allen, M., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5 · Cited by 386
“For example, we are notoriously poor at folk-psychological physics judgements, and our explicit judgements in this domain are typically incorrect or biased (rather than being Bayes-optimal Bowers and Davis 2012; Marcus and Davis 2013).”
BackgroundSuboptimality in perceptual decision making
Rahnev, D., & Denison, R. N. (2018) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x18000936 · Cited by 342
Logic, probability, and human reasoning
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Khemlani, S. S., & Goodwin, G. P. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.006 · Cited by 227
Metadata
- Authors
- Marcus, G. F., & Davis, E.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Marcus, Gary F.
- ORCID
- Davis, Ernest
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-10-01
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 2351-2360
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2106478918
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 15
- FWCI
- 16.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- Bayesian models of cognition, probabilistic inference, rationality, optimal inference, higher-level cognition, post hoc reasoning, word learning, pragmatics, naive physics, prediction
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Humans, Models, Psychological, Models, Statistical, Executive Function
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.