Cited by 48Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsAcademic and Historical Perspectives in PsychologyPhilosophy and History of Science

How to Explain Behavior?

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Gigerenzer, Gerd·2020·Topics in Cognitive Science

Abstract

Unlike behaviorism, cognitive psychology relies on mental concepts to explain behavior. Yet mental processes are not directly observable and multiple explanations are possible, which poses a challenge for finding a useful framework. In this article, I distinguish three new frameworks for explanations that emerged after the cognitive revolution. The first is called tools‐to‐theories : Psychologists' new tools for data analysis, such as computers and statistics, are turned into theories of mind. The second proposes as‐if theories: Expected utility theory and Bayesian statistics are turned into theories of mind, describing an optimal solution of a problem but not its psychological process. The third studies the adaptive toolbox (formal models of heuristics) that describes mental processes in situations of uncertainty where an optimal solution is unknown. Depending on which framework researchers choose, they will model behavior in either situations of risk or of uncertainty, and construct models of cognitive processes or not. The frameworks also determine what questions are asked and what kind of data are generated. What all three frameworks have in common, however, is a clear preference for formal models rather than explanations by general dichotomies or mere verbal concepts. The frameworks have considerable potential to inform each other and to generate points of integration.

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  • The mathematization of neuroscience reflects broader trends across the sciences, where quantitative approaches tend to displace qualitative ones regardless of explanatory adequacy.

    “This “mathematization” of neuroscience reflects broader trends across the sciences, where quantitative approaches tend to displace qualitative ones, regardless of their explanatory adequacy (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer 2020).”

    From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Gigerenzer 2020

    Section 4.1 (‘Bayesian brains’; page unavailable) describes quantitative models of cognitive processes, including their neural underpinnings. Section 3.2 (‘Mind as computer’; page unavailable) describes analytical tools shaping theories in other fields and questions whether mathematical sophistication solves genuine problems. The paper does not establish the broader claim that quantitative approaches tend to displace qualitative ones across the sciences regardless of explanatory adequacy. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Skinner's verbal behavior. Language Sciences, 35, 26-58.
  2. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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Authors
Gigerenzer, G.
Affiliations
Max Planck Society (DE)
Corresponding author
Gigerenzer, Gerd
Venue
Topics in Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2019-11-06
Volume
12
Issue
4
Pages
1363-1381
ISSN
  • 1756-8757 (ISSN-L)
  • 1756-8765
OpenAlex
W2985815064
Cited by
48
References
80
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 5
FWCI
4.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Topics in Cognitive Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
explanation of behavior, cognitive revolution, theory of mind, expected utility theory, Bayesian analysis, adaptive toolbox, heuristics, formal models, risk and uncertainty, cognitive processes, behaviorism
MeSH terms
Heuristics, Bayes Theorem, Cognition, Humans

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