CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 2,038Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationSocial Power and Status Dynamics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Antisocial Punishment Across Societies

Herrmann, Benedikt, Thöni, Christian, Gächter, Simon·2008·Science
DOI 10.1126/science.1153808
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people who behave prosocially. Our evidence comes from public goods experiments that we conducted in 16 comparable participant pools around the world. However, there is a huge cross-societal variation. Some participant pools punished the high contributors as much as they punished the low contributors, whereas in others people only punished low contributors. In some participant pools, antisocial punishment was strong enough to remove the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. We also show that weak norms of civic cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a country are significant predictors of antisocial punishment. Our results show that punishment opportunities are socially beneficial only if complemented by strong social norms of cooperation.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1126/science.1153808

Cites

38 of 38 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. 10.1257/000282803321455359 · DOI
  2. D. Kaufmann A. Kraay M. Mastruzzi World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999979
  3. B. Monin, Int. Rev. Soc. Psychol.20, 53 (2007).
  4. A. Dixit Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Economic Governance (Princeton Univ. Press Princeton NJ 2004).
  5. All authors contributed equally to this work. The authors thank various workshop audiences in particular the Arts and Humanities Research Council workshops Culture and the Mind in Sheffield and I. Bohnet R. Boyd S. Burks E. Fehr U. Fischbacher D. Gambetta H. Gintis G. Grimalda J. Henrich P. Richerson B. Rockenbach R. Sapolsky and R. Zeckhauser for helpful discussions. We are grateful for financial support from the University of Nottingham the Grundlagenforschungsfonds at the University of St. Gallen the Latsis Foundation (Geneva) and the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). This paper is part of the MacArthur Foundation Network on Economic Environments and the Evolution of Individual Preferences and Social Norms.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 801–900 of 1,000

Related

See all

Metadata

Authors
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S.
Affiliations
  • University of Nottingham (GB)
  • Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham, School of Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK.
ORCID
Herrmann, Benedikt
Venue
Science
Publisher
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Published
2008-03-07
Volume
319
Issue
5868
Pages
1362-1367
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
DOI
10.1126/science.1153808
OpenAlex
W2137709071
Cited by
2,038
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 52 · 2025: 101 · 2024: 120 · 2023: 129 · 2022: 126 · 2021: 129 · 2020: 108 · 2019: 127 · 2018: 100 · 2017: 127 · 2016: 112 · 2015: 142 · 2014: 140 · 2013: 124 · 2012: 118
FWCI
264.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (acceptedVersion)
  • Digital Commons - USU (Utah State University) (submittedVersion)
  • Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
antisocial punishment, prosocial behavior, public goods game, cross-cultural variation, cooperation, rule of law, social norms
MeSH terms
Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Emotions, Games, Experimental, Humans, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Social Behavior, Social Control, Formal

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review