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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 29 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Mindblind Eyes: An Absence of Spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome

Senju, Atsushi, Southgate, Victoria, White, Sarah, Frith, Uta · 2009 · Science

Abstract

Diverting Asperger Deficit: Placement of Asperger syndrome within the family of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) has always been a bit uneasy; although people with Asperger syndrome do exhibit the core impairments in social interaction and communication that are characteristic of ASD, they nevertheless perform well on tests that are thought to assess the ability to mentalize or to possess Theory of Mind skills. One of the classic tests of mentalizing ability is the false-belief task, in which subjects must be able to represent their own beliefs (true) and another's beliefs, which are false because they have not been given complete information, such as not having seen the transfer of a piece of candy from one drawer to another. People with Asperger syndrome succeed at the verbal form of the false-belief task, yet Senju et al. (p. 883 , published online 16 July) show that this is owing entirely to their having learned how to cope with an existing and still demonstrable deficit in an implicit version of the false-belief task. That is, the core impairment is present, but conscious and explicit learning allows them to compensate.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Adults with Asperger syndrome who pass standard verbal false-belief tests showed no spontaneous anticipatory looking toward the location consistent with an actor's false belief, whereas neurotypical adults did. The authors conclude that spontaneous mentalizing is persistently impaired in Asperger syndrome and that explicit task success may reflect compensatory learning.

Key findings

  • On the eye-tracking false-belief task, the Asperger group (N = 19) showed no looking bias toward the belief-congruent window (mean DLS = −0.001, t(18) = −0.010, p = .99), while neurotypical adults (N = 17) did (mean = 0.42, t(16) = 2.76, p = .014, Cohen's d = 0.67); the group difference was significant (F(1, 32) = 4.93, p = .003, ηp² = 0.13).
  • First-saccade direction: 13 of 17 neurotypical participants looked to the correct location first (p = .049, binomial), versus 8 of 19 Asperger participants (p = .647); this categorical measure did not differentiate the groups (p = .30, Fisher's exact test).
  • All participants with Asperger syndrome passed the two standard False Belief Tests, and the groups did not differ on composite Theory of Mind scores or Strange Stories (both t's < 1.61, both p's > .1); groups were similar in age (36.8 vs 39.6 years) and full-scale IQ (115.6 vs 115.3), and differed as expected on the Autism Quotient (34.9 vs 16.5, t(34) = 7.23, p < .001, d = 2.41).
  • Fixation duration on the actor's face was shorter in the Asperger group (1.9 s vs 3.1 s; t(34) = −2.48, p = .018, d = 0.827), but DLS did not correlate with face fixation in either group, and fixation time on the windows (2.5 s vs 1.9 s, p = .14) and total time on the five regions of interest (4.8 s vs 5.1 s) did not differ.

Methods

  • Design: comparison of adults with Asperger syndrome and neurotypical adults on a nonverbal, eye-tracking version of the Sally-Anne false-belief task adapted from Southgate, Senju & Csibra (2007), alongside standard verbally instructed Theory of Mind tests (including the Sally-Anne task and Strange Stories).
  • Sample: 19 adults with Asperger syndrome and 17 neurotypical adults; groups matched on chronological age and verbal, performance, and full-scale IQ (WAIS-III UK); diagnostic status confirmed with ADOS-G and AQ. Written informed consent obtained; study approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee.
  • Analysis: Differential Looking Scores (DLS) compiled over a 6-second period, analyzed by ANOVA with follow-up t-tests; direction of first saccade analyzed by binomial and Fisher's exact tests; anticipatory looking during familiarization confirmed for all participants before main analyses.

Limitations

  • The paper states no formal limitations section. It addresses the obvious alternative explanation of gaze abnormalities, reporting that the actor's eyes were hidden by a visor, that face fixation did not correlate with DLS, and that window and total region-of-interest fixation times did not differ between groups.
  • Evident from the text: the first-saccade measure did not significantly differentiate the groups (p = .30), so the key group difference rests on the continuous DLS measure; sample sizes were small (N = 19 and N = 17).
  • Evident from the text: the authors note the contrast with neurotypical two-year-olds on the same task is "striking," but the study did not itself test children, and the compensatory-learning account is offered as a suggestion ("more boldly, we suggest") rather than directly demonstrated.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1126/science.1176170

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

5 tests recomputed · 0 with the reported and recomputed p on opposite sides of .05

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Statistics that don’t add up

Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.

1 of 1

Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 32) = 4.93reported p = .003 · recomputed p = .034

    “F (1, 32) = 4.93, p = .003”

  • Consistentt(16) = 2.76reported p = .014 · recomputed p = .014

    “t (16) = 2.76, p = .014”

  • Consistentt(18) = -0.01reported p = .99 · recomputed p = .992

    “t (18) = -.010, p = .99”

  • Consistentt(34) = -2.48reported p = .018 · recomputed p = .018

    “t (34) = -2.48, p = .018”

  • Consistentt(34) = 1.53reported p = .14 · recomputed p = .135

    “t (34) = 1.53, p = .14”

5 of 5

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Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.

Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. U. Frith Autism: Explaining the Enigma (Blackwell Oxford ed. 2 2003).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Senju, A., Southgate, V., White, S., & Frith, U.
Affiliations
  • University of London (GB)
  • University College London (GB)
  • Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK.
Corresponding author
Senju, Atsushi
Venue
Science
Published
2009-08-14
Volume
325
Issue
5942
Pages
883-885
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W2100214887
Cited by
769
References
27
Citations by year
2026: 35 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 51 · 2018: 52 · 2017: 64 · 2016: 41 · 2015: 49 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 61 · 2012: 38
FWCI
15.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • BIROn (Birkbeck, University of London) (acceptedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Medical Research Council (RES-063-27-0207, G0701484)
  • Economic and Social Research Council (RES-063-27-0207, ES/E003273/1, ES/G007322/1)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
Keywords
Asperger syndrome, theory of mind, mentalization, false belief tasks, autism spectrum disorder, implicit learning, social cognition, compensatory learning
MeSH terms
Adult, Aged, Female, Fixation, Ocular, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Learning, Male, Mental Processes, Middle Aged, Psychological Tests, Psychological Theory, Saccades, Asperger Syndrome, Comprehension, Young Adult

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