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Mindblind Eyes: An Absence of Spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome
Abstract
Diverting Asperger Deficit: Placement of Asperger syndrome within the family of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) has always been a bit uneasy; although people with Asperger syndrome do exhibit the core impairments in social interaction and communication that are characteristic of ASD, they nevertheless perform well on tests that are thought to assess the ability to mentalize or to possess Theory of Mind skills. One of the classic tests of mentalizing ability is the false-belief task, in which subjects must be able to represent their own beliefs (true) and another's beliefs, which are false because they have not been given complete information, such as not having seen the transfer of a piece of candy from one drawer to another. People with Asperger syndrome succeed at the verbal form of the false-belief task, yet Senju et al. (p. 883 , published online 16 July) show that this is owing entirely to their having learned how to cope with an existing and still demonstrable deficit in an implicit version of the false-belief task. That is, the core impairment is present, but conscious and explicit learning allows them to compensate.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Adults with Asperger syndrome who pass standard verbal false-belief tests showed no spontaneous anticipatory looking toward the location consistent with an actor's false belief, whereas neurotypical adults did. The authors conclude that spontaneous mentalizing is persistently impaired in Asperger syndrome and that explicit task success may reflect compensatory learning.
Key findings
- On the eye-tracking false-belief task, the Asperger group (N = 19) showed no looking bias toward the belief-congruent window (mean DLS = −0.001, t(18) = −0.010, p = .99), while neurotypical adults (N = 17) did (mean = 0.42, t(16) = 2.76, p = .014, Cohen's d = 0.67); the group difference was significant (F(1, 32) = 4.93, p = .003, ηp² = 0.13).
- First-saccade direction: 13 of 17 neurotypical participants looked to the correct location first (p = .049, binomial), versus 8 of 19 Asperger participants (p = .647); this categorical measure did not differentiate the groups (p = .30, Fisher's exact test).
- All participants with Asperger syndrome passed the two standard False Belief Tests, and the groups did not differ on composite Theory of Mind scores or Strange Stories (both t's < 1.61, both p's > .1); groups were similar in age (36.8 vs 39.6 years) and full-scale IQ (115.6 vs 115.3), and differed as expected on the Autism Quotient (34.9 vs 16.5, t(34) = 7.23, p < .001, d = 2.41).
- Fixation duration on the actor's face was shorter in the Asperger group (1.9 s vs 3.1 s; t(34) = −2.48, p = .018, d = 0.827), but DLS did not correlate with face fixation in either group, and fixation time on the windows (2.5 s vs 1.9 s, p = .14) and total time on the five regions of interest (4.8 s vs 5.1 s) did not differ.
Methods
- Design: comparison of adults with Asperger syndrome and neurotypical adults on a nonverbal, eye-tracking version of the Sally-Anne false-belief task adapted from Southgate, Senju & Csibra (2007), alongside standard verbally instructed Theory of Mind tests (including the Sally-Anne task and Strange Stories).
- Sample: 19 adults with Asperger syndrome and 17 neurotypical adults; groups matched on chronological age and verbal, performance, and full-scale IQ (WAIS-III UK); diagnostic status confirmed with ADOS-G and AQ. Written informed consent obtained; study approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee.
- Analysis: Differential Looking Scores (DLS) compiled over a 6-second period, analyzed by ANOVA with follow-up t-tests; direction of first saccade analyzed by binomial and Fisher's exact tests; anticipatory looking during familiarization confirmed for all participants before main analyses.
Limitations
- The paper states no formal limitations section. It addresses the obvious alternative explanation of gaze abnormalities, reporting that the actor's eyes were hidden by a visor, that face fixation did not correlate with DLS, and that window and total region-of-interest fixation times did not differ between groups.
- Evident from the text: the first-saccade measure did not significantly differentiate the groups (p = .30), so the key group difference rests on the continuous DLS measure; sample sizes were small (N = 19 and N = 17).
- Evident from the text: the authors note the contrast with neurotypical two-year-olds on the same task is "striking," but the study did not itself test children, and the compensatory-learning account is offered as a suggestion ("more boldly, we suggest") rather than directly demonstrated.
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In the paper
“However, the first saccade, which represents a broad categorical response, did not differentiate significantly between the groups ( p = .30, Fisher's exact-test, two-tailed).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Follow-up t-tests revealed that the neurotypical group scored significantly above zero (mean = 0.42, t (16) = 2.76, p = .014, Cohen's d = 0.67, t-test), meaning that they showed a significant bias towards the correct target, in line with the actor's false belief.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Importantly, the correlation between DLS and the duration of face fixation was not significant in either the Asperger or neurotypical group.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the duration of fixations to the actor's face were significantly shorter in the Asperger group (mean: 1.9s) than in the neurotypical group (mean: 3.1s) ( t (34) = -2.48, p = .018, Cohen's d = 0.827, t-test).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We found that the participants with Asperger syndrome performed as did neurotypical adults on verbally instructed versions of a variety of standard Theory of mind (ToM) tests, including the previously described Sally-Anne Task.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · p. 4 · boosted
“Crucially all participants with Asperger syndrome passed the two standard False Belief Tests.”
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · p. 4 · boosted
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“research has shown that autistic individuals can theorise about other minds, and this ability is dependent on cognitive ability (Bowler 1992), task demands (Peterson et al. 2013) and whether automatic or conscious Theory of Mind is being tested (Senju et al. 2009).”
From Experiences of autism acceptance and mental health in autistic adults (2018) · cites this paper as Senju et al. 2009
In the citing paper
“there is evidence that although some may fail to spontaneously use ToM, a significant proportion of children and adults with ASD do demonstrate an ability to represent others’ mental states in standard and advanced false belief tasks (FBTs) [89].”
From The social motivation theory of autism (2012) · cites this paper as [89]
In the citing paper
“While high functioning adults with ASD do not spontaneously attribute mental states (as assessed in their looking times), they display control-like performances in verbally instructed versions of the FBT [89].”
From The social motivation theory of autism (2012) · cites this paper as [89]
Statistics that don’t add up
Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“F (1, 32) = 4.93, p = .003”
Reported p = .003 · recomputed p = .034
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Doesn’t add upF(1, 32) = 4.93reported p = .003 · recomputed p = .034
“F (1, 32) = 4.93, p = .003”
- Consistentt(16) = 2.76reported p = .014 · recomputed p = .014
“t (16) = 2.76, p = .014”
- Consistentt(18) = -0.01reported p = .99 · recomputed p = .992
“t (18) = -.010, p = .99”
- Consistentt(34) = -2.48reported p = .018 · recomputed p = .018
“t (34) = -2.48, p = .018”
- Consistentt(34) = 1.53reported p = .14 · recomputed p = .135
“t (34) = 1.53, p = .14”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.
Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Senju, A., Southgate, V., White, S., & Frith, U.
- Affiliations
- University of London (GB)
- University College London (GB)
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK.
- Corresponding author
- Senju, Atsushi
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2009-08-14
- Volume
- 325
- Issue
- 5942
- Pages
- 883-885
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2100214887
- Semantic Scholar
- 1083df0cb6dd9cf163f6962ea4b99dec7cc09793
- Cited by
- 769
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 35 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 51 · 2018: 52 · 2017: 64 · 2016: 41 · 2015: 49 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 61 · 2012: 38
- FWCI
- 15.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- BIROn (Birkbeck, University of London) (acceptedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Medical Research Council (RES-063-27-0207, G0701484)
- Economic and Social Research Council (RES-063-27-0207, ES/E003273/1, ES/G007322/1)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Keywords
- Asperger syndrome, theory of mind, mentalization, false belief tasks, autism spectrum disorder, implicit learning, social cognition, compensatory learning
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Aged, Female, Fixation, Ocular, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Learning, Male, Mental Processes, Middle Aged, Psychological Tests, Psychological Theory, Saccades, Asperger Syndrome, Comprehension, Young Adult
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