The impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression in low- and middle-income countries
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 28 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Global prospects for COVID-19 control: Lower-income countries have recognized the potential impact of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) from observing ongoing epidemics. Many have intervened quickly and early with measures to slow viral transmission, which may partly explain the low rates observed so far in these countries. Walker et al. calibrated a global model with country-specific data (see the Perspective by Metcalf et al. ). Despite the potentially protective effects of younger demographics, the closer intergenerational contact, limitations on health care facilities, and frequency of comorbidities in lower-income countries require sustained nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to avoid overwhelming health care capacity. As a result of strict NPIs, the protective effects of immunity will be reduced, and it will be important to improve testing capacity. Ensuring equitable provision of oxygen and—when they are ready—pharmaceutical interventions should be a global priority. Science , this issue p. 413 ; see also p. 368
Overview
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TL;DR
Walker et al. model COVID-19 in low- and middle-income countries using demographic, contact, and health-system data, finding that younger populations reduce per-capita risk but limited health care capacity and quality can offset this advantage. They conclude sustained nonpharmaceutical interventions, especially suppression, are needed to avoid overwhelming health systems, with major testing and oxygen gaps.
Key findings
- In an unmitigated epidemic with R0 = 3.0, attack rates are similar across settings, slightly higher in LICs due to more homogeneous age mixing; assuming the same comorbidity profile and China-level care, lower-income settings have lower per-capita hospitalization, critical care, and mortality because of younger demography.
- Health care capacity is strongly income-graded: LICs have a median 1.28 hospital beds per 1000 population versus 4.68 in HICs; ICU beds are 1.47% of hospital beds in LICs versus 3.30% in HICs. Under mitigation, peak critical care demand exceeds supply by a factor of 30.7 (95% UI 14.7–48.8) in a typical LIC versus 7.8 (95% UI 3.6–13.0) in a typical HIC; LMICs and UMICs show factors of 17.5 and 10.9, respectively.
- Under mitigation, modeled deaths per 1000 population in LICs are 2.1 (95% UI 1.0–3.3) with unlimited HIC-quality care, 4.6 (95% UI 1.4–10.0) with capacity limits, and 6.5 (95% UI 2.7–12.3) with poorer-quality care; in LMICs the corresponding estimates are 2.4 (1.1–3.9), 3.9 (1.5–8.9), and 6.2 (2.8–11.9). Excess deaths due to poorer quality and lack of capacity are 4.4 (1.7–9.0) and 3.8 (1.7–8.0) per 1000 in LICs and LMICs, respectively.
- For R0 = 3.0, optimal mitigation reduces infections by 30–38% (median 33%) and mortality by 19–55% (median 39%); adding enhanced social distancing of elderly individuals raises mortality reduction to 23–67% (median 49%). Proportional mortality reductions are lower in LICs (median 25.3% vs 49.9% in HICs for optimized mitigation including social distancing; 32.6% vs 60.1% with elderly-enhanced distancing). Suppression with a 75% contact reduction gives Rt = 0.75 for R0 = 3.0; to keep ICU demand below capacity, LICs are predicted to spend 77% of an 18-month period in suppression versus 66% in HICs. Prior to suppression, median reported cases per death were 8.6 in LICs, 19.3 in LMICs, and 72.6 in HICs.
Methods
- Collated global demographic projections by age and country and social mixing data by age and country-level income; used a simple SIR model to estimate final attack rates and applied age-specific hospitalization, critical care, and infection fatality ratio estimates, with central R0 = 3.0 (range 2.3–3.5).
- Modeled health care supply using a boosted regression tree with World Bank covariates to predict hospital beds per 1000 population, combined with ICU beds per 100 hospital beds from a systematic review; integrated expert clinical opinion on COVID-19 outcomes under scenarios of unlimited, limited, and limited/no mechanical ventilation/poorer-quality care.
- Used an age-structured SEIR model to explore mitigation (Rt > 1) and suppression (Rt < 1) under health-system capacity constraints, generating 500 parameter sets with 10 stochastic realizations each; reviewed the ACAP COVID-19 Government Response Measures dataset to summarize when countries implemented suppression measures.
Limitations
- Stated: the paper cannot predict exact cases, mortality, or disease burden for any country, and full understanding will only be available retrospectively; it does not quantify wider societal and economic impacts, nor does it address the challenge of intensive suppression in LICs/LMICs where informal labor limits adherence.
- Stated: durable immunity to reinfection remains uncertain; all symptomatic cases are assumed to seek care; hospital stay durations are based on UK data and likely shorter in LIC/LMIC settings, making results conservative; HIC ICU capacity estimates are drawn almost exclusively from a review of Asian countries and may not reflect HICs worldwide; health care quality estimates rely on expert clinical opinion with likely heterogeneity not captured.
- Evident: the model does not specify the combinations of NPIs needed to achieve contact reductions, and it does not include pharmaceutical interventions except through an assumed 18-month time window; income-stratified representative settings and contact surveys may not capture within-country heterogeneity.
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, this single peak relies upon the assumption that recovery from infection confers durable immunity to reinfection, which has yet to be conclusively demonstrated (16).”
§ The impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression in low- and middle-income countries > Mitigation and suppression strategies for low- and middle-income countries
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [16] Altmann D. M., Douek D. C., Boyton R. J., What policy makers need to know about COVID-19 protective immunity. Lancet 395, 1527– 1529 (2020). 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30985-5 32353328 PMC7185915 source
Our copy of Altmann et al. states directly that protection after recovery is unresolved: reinfection reports from China and South Korea are 'anecdotal' and 'should be regarded with caution' because PCR-negative 'recovered' individuals might have harboured persistent virus, with virus sequencing still needed to resolve the issue (reinfection passage). It also says 'There is no certainty as to the immunological correlates of antiviral protection or the proportion of the population who must attain them, making it impossible to identify a point when this level of immunity has been reached' (lockdown-exit passage), and on duration that the best estimate from related coronaviruses is that immunity 'might wane', with studies of just over 1 year 'of little reassurance' given possible waves in 3–4 years ('How long is immunity to COVID-19 likely to last?'). The 'single peak under optimal mitigation' framing is the citing paper's own model and is not attributed to this source; the clause the citation supports — that durable immunity to reinfection after recovery has yet to be conclusively demonstrated — is stated in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The experience in countries to date has emphasized the intense pressure that a COVID-19 epidemic places on national health systems, with demand for intensive care beds and mechanical ventilators rapidly outstripping their availability, even in relatively highly resourced settings (2).”
§ The impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression in low- and middle-income countries > Abstract
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [2] Remuzzi A., Remuzzi G., COVID-19 and Italy: What next? Lancet 395, 1225– 1228 (2020). 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30627-9 32178769 PMC7102589 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Modelling predictions section forecasts that Italy’s intensive-care capacity would be reached within days, and the Conclusion describes enormous pressure in Lombardy and an urgent plan to provide 5,000 more ventilators. The paper supports the pressure on a relatively well-resourced health system, but it presents demand exceeding capacity chiefly as a prediction, not an established outcome across countries; it also does not establish that ventilator demand had already outstripped availability. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“However, as has been observed, HICs and UMICs are likely to be able to put in place surge capacity to limit any impact on mortality (19–21).”
§ The impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression in low- and middle-income countries > Mitigation and suppression strategies for low- and middle-income countries
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [19] Carenzo L., Costantini E., Greco M., Barra F. L., Rendiniello V., Mainetti M., Bui R., Zanella A., Grasselli G., Lagioia M., Protti A., Cecconi M., Hospital surge capacity in a tertiary emergency referral centre during the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy. Anaesthesia 75, 928– 934 (2020). 10.1111/anae.15072 32246838 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Critical care area operations section (page unavailable) describes a Milan hospital expanding its ICU and ward capacity during the outbreak. It does not assess whether HICs and UMICs generally can do so, or whether surge capacity limits mortality. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Partly supportedcites [20] A. Zangrillo et al, Fast reshaping of intensive care unit facilities in a large metropolitan hospital in Milan, Italy: facing the COVID-19 pandemic emergency. Crit. Care Resusc. (2020); www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32227819. PMC10692483 32227819 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The ‘Increasing intensive care unit and general ward capacity’ section (page not provided) documents a Milan hospital’s rapid expansion of ICU capacity to 72 beds. It does not assess whether HICs and UMICs generally can do so or whether surge capacity limits mortality. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not checked yetcites [21] Litton E., Bucci T., Chavan S., Ho Y. Y., Holley A., Howard G., Huckson S., Kwong P., Millar J., Nguyen N., Secombe P., Ziegenfuss M., Pilcher D., Surge capacity of intensive care units in case of acute increase in demand caused by COVID-19 in Australia. Med. J. Aust. 212, 463– 467 (2020). 10.5694/mja2.50596 32306408 PMC7264562 source
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Once the number of new infections drops to a manageable level, it is likely that more widespread testing and isolation of cases coupled with contact tracing can help to prevent a resurgence of transmission, as has been observed in countries such as South Korea (26–28).”
§ The impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression in low- and middle-income countries > Suppression and longer-term exit strategies
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [26] Consulate General of the Republic of Korea, “Flattening the curve on COVID-19 - How Korea responded to a pandemic using ICT” (2020); http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us-houston-en/brd/m_5573/view.do?seq=759765.
- Partly supportedcites [27] COVID-19 National Emergency Response Center, Epidemiology & Case Management Team, Korea Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Contact Transmission of COVID-19 in South Korea: Novel Investigation Techniques for Tracing Contacts. Osong Public Health Res. Perspect. 11, 60–63 (2020). PMC7045882 32149043 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction describes contact management as a strategy to minimize additional transmission, and the Results describe tracing contacts and using quarantine or isolation in South Korea (pages not provided). The paper does not address more widespread testing, a threshold at which new infections become manageable, or an observed prevention of resurgence; the Discussion says the effectiveness of its monitoring methods still needs evaluation. (LLM, conf=0.87)
- Could not verifycites [28] Ainslie K. E. C., Walters C. E., Fu H., Bhatia S., Wang H., Xi X., Baguelin M., Bhatt S., Boonyasiri A., Boyd O., Cattarino L., Ciavarella C., Cucunuba Z., Cuomo-Dannenburg G., Dighe A., Dorigatti I., van Elsland S. L., FitzJohn R., Gaythorpe K., Ghani A. C., Green W., Hamlet A., Hinsley W., Imai N., Jorgensen D., Knock E., Laydon D., Nedjati-Gilani G., Okell L. C., Siveroni I., Thompson H. A., Unwin H. J. T., Verity R., Vollmer M., Walker P. G. T., Wang Y., Watson O. J., Whittaker C., Winskill P., Donnelly C. A., Ferguson N. M., Riley S., Evidence of initial success for China exiting COVID-19 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and Discussion describe containment in China and the relationship between movement and transmission. The Methods mention testing to define reported cases, but no passage addresses whether testing, isolation and contact tracing prevent resurgence or reports that outcome in South Korea. Searches for South Korea and for testing, isolation and contact tracing found no supporting passage. (LLM, conf=0.74)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“suppression will always have the greatest impact on COVID-related morbidity and mortality”
§ The impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression in low- and middle-income countries > Conclusions
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [31] A. B. Hogan, B. Jewell, E. Sherrard-Smith, J. Vesga, O. J. Watson, C. Whittaker, et al., Report 19: The Potential Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic on HIV, TB and Malaria in Low-and Middle-Income Countries; 10.25561/78670. 10.25561/78670
- Could not verifycites [32] Korenromp E. L., Lives saved from malaria prevention in Africa—Evidence to sustain cost-effective gains. Malar. J. 11, 94 (2012). 10.1186/1475-2875-11-94 22455309 PMC3373378 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Korenromp (2012) is entirely about malaria-prevention impact estimates with the Lives Saved Tool (ITN/LLIN coverage, ACT case management, IRS) in sub-Saharan Africa; no passage addresses SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 or a 'suppression' strategy's relative impact on morbidity and mortality. Searches for 'suppression ... greatest impact on morbidity and mortality' and for 'coronavirus / influenza / pandemic / transmission reduction' returned only the Discussion (pp. on mortality measurement, dynamic transmission modelling, and the 2000 counterfactual) and reference-list entries. Since the paper neither states nor contradicts the claim, the attribution cannot be checked against this source. (LLM, conf=0.78)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“This variation can be explained by a combination of factors including policies enacted by governments to encourage mask use and reduce social interaction,48, 49, 50 presence of escape variants, testing and contact tracing capacity,51, 52 previous exposure to other coronaviruses,53 baseline patterns of social interaction, and more.”
From Estimating global, regional, and national daily and cumulative infections with SARS-CoV-2 through Nov 14, 2021: a statistical analysis (2022) · cites this paper as [48]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“The effect of COVID-19 on healthcare infrastructure in LMICs, however, is arguably more extreme due to the health system capacity and deeper dependency on families for support of PwD (Walker et al., 2020).”
From Robotic Telemedicine for Mental Health: A Multimodal Approach to Improve Human-Robot Engagement (2021) · cites this paper as Walker et al., 2020
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“| Worldwide | 121 | 24/03 (08/03–19/04) | 6.01 (0–449.24) | 0 (0–10.447) | 50 | 45.8 (5.1–325.2) |”
§ The impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression in low- and middle-income countries > Suppression and longer-term exit strategies
Reported 50 · recomputed 49
Citations
Cites
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A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker)
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Inferring the effectiveness of government interventions against COVID-19
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Metadata
- Authors
- Walker, P. G. T., Whittaker, C., Watson, O. J., Baguelin, M., Winskill, P., Hamlet, A., Djafaara, B. A., Cucunubá, Z., Olivera Mesa, D., Green, W., Thompson, H., Nayagam, S., Ainslie, K. E. C., Bhatia, S., Bhatt, S., Boonyasiri, A., Boyd, O., Brazeau, N. F., Cattarino, L., Cuomo-Dannenburg, G., Dighe, A., Donnelly, C. A., Dorigatti, I., van Elsland, S. L., FitzJohn, R., Fu, H., Gaythorpe, K. A. M., Geidelberg, L., Grassly, N., Haw, D., Hayes, S., Hinsley, W., Imai, N., Jorgensen, D., Knock, E., Laydon, D., Mishra, S., Nedjati-Gilani, G., Okell, L. C., Unwin, H. J., Verity, R., Vollmer, M., Walters, C. E., Wang, H., Wang, Y., Xi, X., Lalloo, D. G., Ferguson, N. M., & Ghani, A. C.
- Affiliations
- Imperial College London (GB)
- Brown University (US)
- London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (GB)
- MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London, London, UK.
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Walker, Patrick G. T.
- Whittaker, Charles
- Watson, Oliver J.
- Ferguson, Neil M.
- Ghani, Azra C.
- ORCID
- Walker, Patrick G. T.
- Whittaker, Charles
- Watson, Oliver J.
- Baguelin, Marc
- Winskill, Peter
- Hamlet, Arran
- Djafaara, Bimandra A.
- Cucunubá, Zulma
- Olivera Mesa, Daniela
- Green, Will
- Thompson, Hayley
- Nayagam, Shevanthi
- Ainslie, Kylie E. C.
- Bhatia, Sangeeta
- Bhatt, Samir
- Boonyasiri, Adhiratha
- Boyd, Olivia
- Brazeau, Nicholas F.
- Cattarino, Lorenzo
- Cuomo-Dannenburg, Gina
- Dighe, Amy
- Donnelly, Christl A.
- Dorigatti, Ilaria
- FitzJohn, Rich
- Fu, Han
- Gaythorpe, Katy A. M.
- Geidelberg, Lily
- Grassly, Nicholas
- Haw, David
- Hayes, Sarah
- Hinsley, Wes
- Imai, Natsuko
- Jorgensen, David
- Knock, Edward
- Laydon, Daniel
- Mishra, Swapnil
- Nedjati-Gilani, Gemma
- Okell, Lucy C.
- Unwin, H. Juliette
- Verity, Robert
- Vollmer, Michaela
- Walters, Caroline E.
- Wang, Haowei
- Wang, Yuanrong
- Xi, Xiaoyue
- Lalloo, David G.
- Ferguson, Neil M.
- Ghani, Azra C.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2020-07-24
- Volume
- 369
- Issue
- 6502
- Pages
- 413-422
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC7292504
- OpenAlex
- W3035706118
- Semantic Scholar
- 4f2e1c57a649d91d0b3322bc76c3ae8cdebc08a3
- Cited by
- 993
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 69 · 2023: 122 · 2022: 215 · 2021: 281 · 2020: 245
- FWCI
- 34.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (publishedVersion)
- LSTM Online Archive (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine) (acceptedVersion)
- LSHTM Research Online (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) (acceptedVersion)
- Spiral (Imperial College London) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Wellcome (221350/Z/20/Z)
- Medical Research Council
- National Institute for Health Research
- Community Jameel
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Modeling and Simulation › COVID-19 epidemiological studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › COVID-19 Prevention and Impact
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Infectious Diseases › SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 Research
- Keywords
- COVID-19 pandemic, low- and middle-income countries, mitigation measures, suppression strategy, health system capacity, excess mortality, intergenerational interaction, disease severity, contact patterns, age structure, quality of care, pandemic response
- MeSH terms
- COVID-19, Developing Countries, Humans, Patient Acceptance of Health Care, Pneumonia, Viral, Poverty, Public Health, Global Health, Coronavirus Infections, Pandemics
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