Cited by 209Electronic Health Records SystemsPatient Safety and Medication ErrorsMedical Coding and Health Information

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 50 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

An analysis of electronic health record-related patient safety concerns

Open access
Meeks, Derek W, Smith, Michael W, Taylor, Lesley, Sittig, Dean F, Scott, Jean M, Singh, Hardeep·2014·Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association

Abstract

OBJECTIVE: A recent Institute of Medicine report called for attention to safety issues related to electronic health records (EHRs). We analyzed EHR-related safety concerns reported within a large, integrated healthcare system. METHODS: The Informatics Patient Safety Office of the Veterans Health Administration (VA) maintains a non-punitive, voluntary reporting system to collect and investigate EHR-related safety concerns (ie, adverse events, potential events, and near misses). We analyzed completed investigations using an eight-dimension sociotechnical conceptual model that accounted for both technical and non-technical dimensions of safety. Using the framework analysis approach to qualitative data, we identified emergent and recurring safety concerns common to multiple reports. RESULTS: We extracted 100 consecutive, unique, closed investigations between August 2009 and May 2013 from 344 reported incidents. Seventy-four involved unsafe technology and 25 involved unsafe use of technology. A majority (70%) involved two or more model dimensions. Most often, non-technical dimensions such as workflow, policies, and personnel interacted in a complex fashion with technical dimensions such as software/hardware, content, and user interface to produce safety concerns. Most (94%) safety concerns related to either unmet data-display needs in the EHR (ie, displayed information available to the end user failed to reduce uncertainty or led to increased potential for patient harm), software upgrades or modifications, data transmission between components of the EHR, or 'hidden dependencies' within the EHR. DISCUSSION: EHR-related safety concerns involving both unsafe technology and unsafe use of technology persist long after 'go-live' and despite the sophisticated EHR infrastructure represented in our data source. Currently, few healthcare institutions have reporting and analysis capabilities similar to the VA. CONCLUSIONS: Because EHR-related safety concerns have complex sociotechnical origins, institutions with long-standing as well as recent EHR implementations should build a robust infrastructure to monitor and learn from them.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Analysis of 100 closed VA investigations of EHR-related safety concerns found that most involved unsafe technology and complex interactions across sociotechnical dimensions. Four recurring concern types accounted for 94% of incidents, showing that EHR safety concerns persist long after go-live even in a mature EHR system.

Key findings

  • Of 100 consecutive, unique, closed investigations from August 2009 to May 2013, 74 involved unsafe technology (phase 1), 25 involved unsafe use of technology (phase 2), and 1 involved lack of monitoring (phase 3); 70% involved two or more sociotechnical model dimensions.
  • Four concern types accounted for 94% of incidents: unmet display needs (n=36), software modifications/upgrades (n=24), system–system interface failures (n=17), and hidden dependencies in distributed systems (n=17).
  • The most commonly involved sociotechnical dimensions were hardware/software (76), clinical content (38), workflow/communication (35), human–computer interface (29), and people (20).
  • Incidents came from 55 unique VA facilities; IPS safety scores were low for 48 investigations, intermediate for 38, and high for 14.

Methods

  • Retrospective qualitative analysis of completed EHR-related safety investigations from the Veterans Health Administration Informatics Patient Safety Office, using 100 consecutive unique closed investigations extracted from 344 reported incidents.
  • Used framework analysis guided by Sittig and Singh’s eight-dimension sociotechnical model and three EHR safety phases; two authors independently indexed concerns, resolving discrepancies by consensus.
  • Coded narrative investigation reports in Atlas.ti V.6.2 and arranged data in Microsoft Excel; no inter-rater reliability was reported because the aim was descriptive.

Limitations

  • The paper states all incidents involved the same EHR within a single, albeit very large, healthcare system; findings may not generalize to institutions with different organizational characteristics, EHR infrastructure, or reporting mechanisms.
  • The paper states the data ranged from unsafe conditions to patient harm, did not analyze additional patient outcome data, and that reporting captures fewer than 10% of medical errors, so prevalence rates cannot be calculated.
  • The paper notes self-reported data may be limited by recall bias or reporter knowledge; evident from the text, the retrospective voluntary reporting system and exclusion of duplicate or comingled-record concerns may underrepresent the full universe of EHR-related safety concerns.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1136/amiajnl-2013-002578

Cites

60 of 60 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

36 Own result · 19 Not checked yet · 15 Own interpretation · 11 Own method · 7 No basis given

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 26
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 20
39 of 39
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Currently, few healthcare institutions have reporting and analysis capabilities similar to the VA.

    “Currently, few healthcare institutions have reporting and analysis capabilities similar to the VA.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Few healthcare systems have robust reporting and analytic infrastructure similar to the VA's Informatics Patient Safety Office.

    “However, few healthcare systems have robust reporting and analytic infrastructure similar to the VA's IPS.”
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Citations

Cites

Show all 60 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Institute of Medicine (IOM). Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Safer Care. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2012.

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Metadata

Authors
Meeks, D. W., Smith, M. W., Taylor, L., Sittig, D. F., Scott, J. M., & Singh, H.
Affiliations
  • Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center (US)
  • United States Department of Veterans Affairs (US)
  • Memorial Hermann (US)
Corresponding author
Singh, Hardeep
Venue
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Published
2014-11
Volume
21
Issue
6
Pages
1053-1059
ISSN
  • 1067-5027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1527-974X
OpenAlex
W2148595420
Cited by
207
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 30 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 2
FWCI
46.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc-nd
Locations
  • Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (14-274, CIN13-413, USA 14-274)
  • Office of Research and Development (CIN 13-413)
  • Health Services Research and Development (CIN 13‐413, CRE12-033, USA 14-274)
  • Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (R01HS022087)
  • U.S. Public Health Service (T32HP10031)
  • Center for Innovations in Quality, Effectiveness and Safety (CIN 13–413, 13–413)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Patient Safety and Medication Errors
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Medical Coding and Health Information
Keywords
electronic health records, patient safety, socio-technical model, near misses, software upgrade, data transmission, hidden dependencies, workflow, EHR implementation, safety reporting, Veterans Health Administration
MeSH terms
Humans, Retrospective Studies, United States, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Errors, Workflow, Electronic Health Records, Patient Safety

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