The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
Abstract
We study k-resilient Nash equilibria, joint strategies where no member of a coalition C of size up to k can do better, even if the whole coalition defects. We show that such k-resilient Nash equilibria exist for secret sharing and multiparty computation, provided that players prefer to get the information than not to get it. Our results hold even if there are only 2 players, so we can do multiparty computation with only two rational agents. We extend our results so that they hold even in the presence of up to t players with "unexpected" utilities. Finally, we show that our techniques can be used to simulate games with mediators by games without mediators.
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Cites
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Cited by
Game theory meets network security and privacy
Manshaei, M. H., Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Bacşar, T., & Hubaux, J.-P. (2013) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 · Cited by 808
A Vademecum on Blockchain Technologies: When, Which, and How
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Secure Multiparty Computations on Bitcoin
Andrychowicz, M., Dziembowski, S., Malinowski, D., & Mazurek, L. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.35 · Cited by 345
Metadata
- Authors
- Abraham, I., Dolev, D., Gonen, R., & Halpern, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2006-07-23
- Pages
- 53-62
- OpenAlex
- W2077734015
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 15.13
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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