The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Using ARM trustzone to build a trusted language runtime for mobile applications
Abstract
This paper presents the design, implementation, and evaluation of the Trusted Language Runtime (TLR), a system that protects the confidentiality and integrity of .NET mobile applications from OS security breaches. TLR enables separating an application's security-sensitive logic from the rest of the application, and isolates it from the OS and other apps. TLR provides runtime support for the secure component based on a .NET implementation for embedded devices. TLR reduces the TCB of an open source .NET implementation by a factor of $78$ with a tolerable performance cost. The main benefit of the TLR is to bring the developer benefits of managed code to trusted computing. With the TLR, developers can build their trusted components with the productivity benefits of modern high level languages, such as strong typing and garbage collection.
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Citations
Cites
TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., Jung, J., McDaniel, P. D., & Sheth, A. N. (2010) · doi:10.5555/1924943.1924971 · Cited by 2,238
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Myers, A. C. (1999) · Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/292540.292561 · Cited by 1,034 · cited 1×
“These systems expose a partitioning interface at the level of the programming language, and enforce this separation by using a runtime [30], or the OS itself [17].”
BackgroundBrickell, E., Camenisch, J., & Chen, L. (2004) · Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1030083.1030103 · Cited by 935 · cited 1×
“An alternative design borrows ideas from group signatures (similar to TPM Direct Anonymous Attestation [16]).”
Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1165389.945464 · Cited by 887
Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization
McCune, J. M., Parno, B. J., Perrig, A., Reiter, M. K., & Isozaki, H. (2008) · Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008 · doi:10.1145/1352592.1352625 · Cited by 640 · cited 2×
“To improve this situation, the research community has studied the design of trusted computing systems with small TCBs. Flicker [28] and TrustVisor [29] provide confiden-tiality and integrity protection of application code and data while depending on a small TCB.”
BackgroundMethodArchitectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
Thekkath, D. L. C., Mitchell, M., Lincoln, P., Boneh, D., Mitchell, J., & Horowitz, M. (2000) · ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News · doi:10.1145/378995.379237 · Cited by 597
TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation
McCune, J. M., Li, Y., Qu, N., Zhou, Z., Datta, A., Gligor, V., & Perrig, A. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.17 · Cited by 541 · cited 3×
“2 [29], and a setup based on Mono v2.”
BackgroundMethodChen, X., Garfinkel, T., Lewis, E. C., Subrahmanyam, P., Waldspurger, C. A., Boneh, D., Dwoskin, J., & Ports, D. R. K. (2008) · Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/1346281.1346284 · Cited by 415 · cited 1×
“In the first generation of these systems, the trusted kernel consisted of a full blown Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) as in Terra [21], Proxos [37], and Overshadow [18].”
MethodTerra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003) · Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/945445.945464 · Cited by 408 · cited 2×
“In the first generation of these systems, the trusted kernel consisted of a full blown Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) as in Terra [21], Proxos [37], and Overshadow [18].”
MethodNOVA: a microhypervisor-based secure virtualization architecture
Steinberg, U., & Kauer, B. (2010) · Proceedings of the 5th European conference on Computer systems · doi:10.1145/1755913.1755935 · Cited by 313
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing
Suh, G. E., Clarke, D., Gassend, B., van Dijk, M., & Devadas, S. (2003) · Proceedings of the 17th annual international conference on Supercomputing · doi:10.1145/782814.782838 · Cited by 302 · cited 1×
“Some previous systems such as XOM [26] and AEGIS [36] require specific hardware that is not yet available on commodity processors.”
MethodSecure web applications via automatic partitioning
Chong, S., Liu, J., Myers, A. C., Qi, X., Vikram, K., Zheng, L., & Zheng, X. (2007) · Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/1294261.1294265 · Cited by 244 · cited 1×
“This partitioning technique is similar to privilege separation [17] and to partitioning of applications for improved security in distributed systems [19].”
User-Driven Access Control: Rethinking Permission Granting in Modern Operating Systems
Roesner, F., Kohno, T., Moshchuk, A., Parno, B., Wang, H. J., & Cowan, C. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.24 · Cited by 213 · cited 1×
“…have paid considerable attention to protecting personal user data (e.g., address book, user photos, password information, GPS location) and preventing its unauthorized access and leakage by proposing novel techniques, such as new access control mechanisms [33] and information flow analysis [20].”
BackgroundPrivtrans : automatically partitioning programs for privilege separation
Brumley, D., & Song, D. X. (2018) · Figshare · doi:10.1184/r1/6469172 · Cited by 209
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
Thekkath, D. L. C., Mitchell, M., Lincoln, P., Boneh, D., Mitchell, J., & Horowitz, M. (2000) · Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/378993.379237 · Cited by 176
Splitting interfaces: making trust between applications and operating systems configurable
Ta-Min, R., Litty, L., & Lie, D. (2006) · TSpace (University of Toronto) · doi:10.5555/1298455.1298482 · Cited by 173
Memoir: Practical State Continuity for Protected Modules
Parno, B. J., Lorch, J. R., Douceur, J. R., Mickens, J. W., & McCune, J. M. (2011) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2011.38 · Cited by 133
Software abstractions for trusted sensors
Liu, H., Saroiu, S., Wolman, A., & Raj, H. (2012) · International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/2307636.2307670 · Cited by 122 · cited 1×
“One system uses TrustZone to implement trusted sensors [27], which enable mobile apps to obtain guarantees of authenticity and integrity of sensor readings.”
MethodSelf-citationAzab, A. M., Ning, P., & Zhang, X. (2011) · Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2046707.2046752 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“Currently, the state of the art consists of tiny kernels implemented using late launch technology as in Flicker [28], hardware virtualization as in TrustVisor [29], and the handler code of the System Management Mode (SMM) as in SICE [15].”
MethodHypponen, M. (2006) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican1106-70 · Cited by 114 · cited 1×
“As a result, mobile applications have emerged recently with questionable practices [20] as well as outright malware [24].”
BackgroundOn-board credentials with open provisioning
Kostiainen, K., Ekberg, J.-E., Asokan, N., & Rantala, A. E. (2009) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/1533057.1533074 · Cited by 110 · cited 1×
“For ARM TrustZone, the closest piece of work to TLR is Nokia’s OnBoard Credentials (ObC) [25].”
MethodThe Nizza Secure-System Architecture
Härtig, H., Hohmuth, M., Feske, N., Helmuth, C., Lackorzyński, A., Mehnert, F., & Peter, M. (2006) · International Conference on Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing (CollaborateCom) · doi:10.1109/colcom.2005.1651218 · Cited by 89 · cited 1×
“Researchers also proposed systems based on microkernels, as in Nizza [23] and Nova [35].”
MethodTrusted language runtime (TLR)
Santos, N., Raj, H., Saroiu, S., & Wolman, A. (2011) · IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA) · doi:10.1145/2184489.2184495 · Cited by 33 · cited 1×
“Although we presented the basic TLR design in an earlier workshop paper [34], this paper goes beyond the original TLR proposal and makes the following contributions.”
MethodSelf-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Porting the . NET Micro Framework . Microsoft Technical White Paper , 2007 . http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/netframework/bb267253.aspx. Porting the .NET Micro Framework. Microsoft Technical White Paper, 2007. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/netframework/bb267253.aspx.
- ARM. ARMSecurity Technology -- Building a Secure System using TrustZone Technology . ARM Technical White Paper , 2009 . http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.prd29-genc-009492c/PRD29-GENC-009492C_trustzone_security_whitepaper.pdf. ARM. ARMSecurity Technology -- Building a Secure System using TrustZone Technology. ARM Technical White Paper, 2009. http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.prd29-genc-009492c/PRD29-GENC-009492C_trustzone_security_whitepaper.pdf.
- T. C. Group . TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2 , Revision 130 , 2006 . T. C. Group. TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 130, 2006.
Cited by
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.45 · Cited by 713
“targets small, secure applications or application fragments that are especially written for a small-TCB environment [38], [37], [35], [45].”
BackgroundTrusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not
Sabt, M., Achemlal, M., & Bouabdallah, A. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA · doi:10.1109/trustcom.2015.357 · Cited by 724
“In the literature, we identify three models of communication: (1) GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [26]; (2) secure RPC (Remote Procedure Call) of Trusted Language Runtime [6]; and (3) real-time RPC of SafeG [27].”
BackgroundMethodSCONE: secure Linux containers with Intel SGX
(2016) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/3026877.3026930 · Cited by 582
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
Baumann, A., Peinado, M., & Hunt, G. (2015) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/2799647 · Cited by 463
Demystifying Arm TrustZone: A Comprehensive Survey
Pinto, S., & Santos, N. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3291047 · Cited by 505
“In the first case, the trusted program implements a basic set of OS functions to manage multiple TEE instances each of them hosting a particular application [96].”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Santos, N., Raj, H., Saroiu, S., & Wolman, A.
- Affiliations
- Instituto de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computadores Investigação e Desenvolvimento (PT)
- Microsoft (United States) (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2014-02-24
- Pages
- 67-80
- OpenAlex
- W2014517322
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 8
- FWCI
- 15.70
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Logic, programming, and type systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Real-Time Systems Scheduling
- Keywords
- ARM TrustZone, trusted computing, mobile application, .NET, trusted execution environments, trusted computing base, confidentiality and integrity, managed code, embedded devices, garbage collection, strong typing
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