The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Classification of Insider Threat Detection Techniques
Abstract
Most insider attacks done by people who have the knowledge and technical know-how of launching such attacks. This topic has long been studied and many detection techniques were proposed to deal with insider threats. This short paper summarized and classified insider threat detection techniques based on strategies used for detection.
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In the citing paper
“NLP techniques are applied across multiple domains for insider threat detection, processing unstructured data from emails, chats, access logs, and metadata to enable proactive identification, addressing RQ1's focus on diverse data sources.”
From A systematic review on insider threat detection using natural language processing (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“RQ3's metric synthesis (e.g., >94% accuracy [25]) aligns with Yuan and Wu [9] vulnerability scans [30].”
From A systematic review on insider threat detection using natural language processing (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
Citations
Cites
A requires/provides model for computer attacks
Templeton, S. J., & Levitt, K. (2001) · Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms · doi:10.1145/366173.366187 · Cited by 373 · cited 1×
“However, Templeton and Levitt [42] proposed “requires/provides” model based on attack trees [43] which can be used to defend against insider attacks, though such methods rely heavily on the defenders’ capabilities and knowledge of the environment.”
BackgroundHoneypots: catching the insider threat
Spitzner, L. (2004) · 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2003. Proceedings. · doi:10.1109/csac.2003.1254322 · Cited by 364 · cited 2×
“Decoy Documents and Honeypot techniques were used to lure and identify malicious users [11-14].”
BackgroundMethodBridging the Gap: A Pragmatic Approach to Generating Insider Threat Data
Glasser, J., & Lindauer, B. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.37 · Cited by 344 · cited 1×
“Glasser and Lindauer [40] stated that despite many incidents of insider attacks, organizations are reluctant to share incident data to the scientific community because of legal, business or other litigation issues.”
BackgroundA framework for understanding and predicting insider attacks
Schultz, E. E. (2002) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/s0167-4048(02)01009-x · Cited by 324 · cited 1×
“Attack Related Behaviors & Symptoms of attackers before the launch of an attack [15-16] Physical behavior indicators[17] Psychological characteristics & personality [18-21] Use of case studies and real-world insider attacker symptoms [22] Personality indicators & language usage in text &official…”
BackgroundA Survey of Insider Attack Detection Research
Salem, M. B., Hershkop, S., & Stolfo, S. J. (2008) · Advances in Information Security · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-77322-3_5 · Cited by 280 · cited 1×
“Some researchers [1] classified insiders into two categories – “masqueraders” and “traitors” based on the access right available and the knowledge possessed of the target systems/networks.”
BackgroundInsider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Keeney, M., Kowalski, E. M., Cappelli, D. M., Moore, A. P., Shimeall, T. J., & Rogers, S. (2005) · Cited by 213
Understanding Insider Threat: A Framework for Characterising Attacks
Nurse, J. R. C., Buckley, O., Legg, P. A., Goldsmith, M., Creese, S., Wright, G. R. T., & Whitty, M. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.38 · Cited by 212
Baiting Inside Attackers Using Decoy Documents
Bowen, B. M., Hershkop, S., Keromytis, A. D., & Stolfo, S. J. (2009) · Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-05284-2_4 · Cited by 193 · cited 2×
“Others [11–12] propose the use of honeypots and decoy concepts to trap and detect malicious insiders.”
BackgroundMethodJakšić, M. M. (2007) · Electrochimica Acta · doi:10.1016/j.electacta.2007.09.034 · Cited by 153
Detecting insider threats in a real corporate database of computer usage activity
Senator, T. E., Goldberg, H. G., Memory, A., Young, W. T., Rees, B., Pierce, R., Huang, D., Reardon, M., Bader, D. A., Chow, E., et al. (2013) · ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) · doi:10.1145/2487575.2488213 · Cited by 136 · cited 1×
“Ensemble Based unsupervised technique [2] and used Structural and Semantic Information of an organization [10].”
MethodTowards a Theory of Insider Threat Assessment
Chinchani, R., Iyer, A., Ngo, H. Q., & Upadhyaya, S. (2005) · International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/dsn.2005.94 · Cited by 135 · cited 2×
“Chinchani et al, [27] presented a theory on insider threat assessment by modeling a user’s view of the organization and capabilities.”
BackgroundAn Insider Threat Prediction Model
Kandias, M., Mylonas, A., Virvilis, N., Theocharidou, M., & Gritzalis, D. A. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15152-1_3 · Cited by 133 · cited 2×
“Attack Related Behaviors & Symptoms of attackers before the launch of an attack [15-16] Physical behavior indicators[17] Psychological characteristics & personality [18-21] Use of case studies and real-world insider attacker symptoms [22] Personality indicators & language usage in text &official…”
BackgroundGreitzer, F. L., & Frincke, D. A. (2010) · Advances in information security · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-7133-3_5 · Cited by 133 · cited 2×
“Greitzer et al. [21-22] used these adversarial model to predict insiders using a combination of psychological indicators and anomalies in system usage.”
BackgroundMethodDetecting insider threats by monitoring system call activity
Nguyen, N., Reiher, P. L., & Kuenning, G. (2004) · IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop (IAW) · doi:10.1109/smcsia.2003.1232400 · Cited by 127 · cited 1×
“Several detection techniques such as workflow of documents [29], system call analysis [30, 31], graph-based analysis [36, 37], signatures [32] and threat specification languages [38, 39] have also been studied to predict insider attacks.”
Methodelicit: A System for Detecting Insiders Who Violate Need-to-Know
Maloof, M. A., & Stephens, G. D. (2007) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74320-0_8 · Cited by 101 · cited 2×
“Similarly there are various rule based techniques [8, 9] were developed to detect insider attacks by monitoring network activities while using specific application in an organization.”
BackgroundMulti-Domain Information Fusion for Insider Threat Detection
Eldardiry, H., Bart, E., Liu, J., Hanley, J., Price, B., & Brdiczka, O. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.14 · Cited by 100 · cited 1×
“Eldardiry et al. [35] stated that current detection techniques are too domain specific and do not consider that the behavior monitoring data are inconclusive which result in false negatives.”
BackgroundComparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis
Band, S. R., Cappelli, D. M., Fischer, L. F., Moore, A. P., Shaw, E. D., & Trzeciak, R. F. (2006) · Figshare · doi:10.1184/r1/6572663 · Cited by 99
Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis
Band, S. R., Cappelli, D. M., Fischer, L. F., et al. (2006) · Figshare · doi:10.1184/r1/6572663.v1 · Cited by 98
Analysis and Detection of Malicious Insiders
Maybury, M. T., Chase, P., Cheikes, B. A., Brackney, D., Matzner, S., Hetherington, T., Wood, B. J., Sibley, C., Marin, J., & Longstaff, T. (2005) · Cited by 94
We have met the enemy and he is us
Bishop, M., Engle, S. J., Peisert, S., Whalen, S., & Gates, C. E. (2008) · New Security Paradigms Workshop · doi:10.1145/1595676.1595678 · Cited by 93 · cited 1×
“Other researchers [49, 50] extended this concept by abstracting generalized attributes of people and data and using them with role based access control systems.”
BackgroundDecoy Document Deployment for Effective Masquerade Attack Detection
Salem, M. B., & Stolfo, S. J. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22424-9_3 · Cited by 89 · cited 1×
“Others [11–12] propose the use of honeypots and decoy concepts to trap and detect malicious insiders.”
BackgroundIdentifying At-Risk Employees: Modeling Psychosocial Precursors of Potential Insider Threats
Greitzer, F. L., Kangas, L. J., Noonan, C. F., Dalton, A. C., & Hohimer, R. E. (2012) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2012.309 · Cited by 85 · cited 2×
“Greitzer et al. [21-22] used these adversarial model to predict insiders using a combination of psychological indicators and anomalies in system usage.”
BackgroundMethodEspionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001
Herbig, K. L., & Wiskoff, M. F. (2002) · doi:10.21236/ada411004 · Cited by 81
A Bayesian Network Model for Predicting Insider Threats
Axelrad, E. T., Sticha, P. J., Brdiczka, O., & Shen, J. (2013) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.35 · Cited by 79 · cited 2×
“…indicators & language usage in text &official documentation [23-24] Processes and artifacts used & accessed: Analyzed insider threats by using Fault Tolerance Analysis [25] Modeling adversarial behavior & predict attacks: Constructed a Bayesian Model & include environmental features as well [26].”
BackgroundMethodA comparison of system call feature representations for insider threat detection
Liu, A.-W., Martin, C., Hetherington, T., & Matzner, S. (2005) · IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop (IAW) · doi:10.1109/iaw.2005.1495972 · Cited by 74 · cited 1×
“Several detection techniques such as workflow of documents [29], system call analysis [30, 31], graph-based analysis [36, 37], signatures [32] and threat specification languages [38, 39] have also been studied to predict insider attacks.”
MethodA trust-and-risk aware RBAC framework: tackling insider threat
Baracaldo, N., & Joshi, J. B. D. (2012) · ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT) · doi:10.1145/2295136.2295168 · Cited by 63 · cited 1×
“Extended Access Control that adaptively changes access/privilege of a user depending on risk [47-48] Extended Access Control based on abstraction of generalized attributes of data and people Process Control to dissuade insiders Mandatory Auditing of user activity of up to 60 days [51] Streamlining…”
BackgroundInsider Threat Identification by Process Analysis
Bishop, M., Conboy, H. M., Phan, H., Simidchieva, B. I., Avrunin, G. S., Clarke, L. A., Osterweil, L. J., & Peisert, S. (2014) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.40 · Cited by 48 · cited 2×
“…indicators & language usage in text &official documentation [23-24] Processes and artifacts used & accessed: Analyzed insider threats by using Fault Tolerance Analysis [25] Modeling adversarial behavior & predict attacks: Constructed a Bayesian Model & include environmental features as well [26].”
BackgroundMethodPsychosocial Modeling of Insider Threat Risk Based on Behavioral and Word Use Analysis
Greitzer, Kangas, Noonan, Brown, & Ferryman (2013) · e-Service Journal · doi:10.2979/eservicej.9.1.106 · Cited by 47
Lost in Translation: Improving Decoy Documents via Automated Translation
Voris, J., Boggs, N., & Stolfo, S. J. (2012) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2012.20 · Cited by 41 · cited 1×
“Voris et al. [13] and Spitzner [14] further studied the effectiveness of decoys and honeypots in detecting insider attacks.”
BackgroundA Risk Management Approach to the “Insider Threat”
Bishop, M., Engle, S. J., Frincke, D. A., Gates, C. E., Greitzer, F. L., Peisert, S., & Whalen, S. (2010) · Advances in information security · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-7133-3_6 · Cited by 41 · cited 2×
“Some researchers [46–48] incorporated risk assessment into an extended access control system in order to adaptively alter the privilege escalation of a user depending on the observed risk.”
BackgroundPredicting Insider Threat Risks through Linguistic Analysis of Electronic Communication
Brown, C. R., Watkins, A., & Greitzer, F. L. (2013) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2013.453 · Cited by 40 · cited 2×
“…[18-21] Use of case studies and real-world insider attacker symptoms [22] Personality indicators & language usage in text &official documentation [23-24] Processes and artifacts used & accessed: Analyzed insider threats by using Fault Tolerance Analysis [25] Modeling adversarial behavior &…”
BackgroundMethodInsider Threat Detection Using Graph-Based Approaches
Eberle, W., & Holder, L. B. (2009) · Cybersecurity Applications & Technology Conference for Homeland Security (CATCH) · doi:10.1109/catch.2009.7 · Cited by 39 · cited 2×
“Several detection techniques such as workflow of documents [29], system call analysis [30, 31], graph-based analysis [36, 37], signatures [32] and threat specification languages [38, 39] have also been studied to predict insider attacks.”
BackgroundMethodRole-Based Profile Analysis for Scalable and Accurate Insider-Anomaly Detection
Park, J. S., & Giordano, J. V. (2006) · IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference · doi:10.1109/.2006.1629440 · Cited by 38 · cited 2×
“Parkand Giordano [7], on the other hand, monitored user behavior and analyze to verify if behavior is as expected.”
BackgroundDetecting Unknown Insider Threat Scenarios
Young, W. T., Memory, A., Goldberg, H. G., & Senator, T. E. (2014) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.42 · Cited by 35 · cited 1×
“Ensemble Based unsupervised technique [2] and used Structural and Semantic Information of an organization [10].”
MethodCase Studies of an Insider Framework
Bishop, M., Engle, S. J., Peisert, S., Whalen, S., & Gates, C. E. (2009) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2009.104 · Cited by 35
Applying role based access control and genetic algorithms to insider threat detection
Hu, N., Bradford, P. G., & Liu, J. (2006) · ACM Southeast Regional Conference (ACMSE) · doi:10.1145/1185448.1185638 · Cited by 33 · cited 2×
“Role-based access control methods [6] were used for creating rules of abnormal behavior for each role.”
BackgroundMethodWeak models for insider threat detection
Thompson, P. (2004) · Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE · doi:10.1117/12.548178 · Cited by 33 · cited 1×
“[3].”
Towards an insider threat prediction specification language
Magklaras, G., Furnell, S., & Brooke, P. J. (2006) · Information Management & Computer Security · doi:10.1108/09685220610690826 · Cited by 32 · cited 1×
“Several detection techniques such as workflow of documents [29], system call analysis [30, 31], graph-based analysis [36, 37], signatures [32] and threat specification languages [38, 39] have also been studied to predict insider attacks.”
MethodA Layered Approach to Insider Threat Detection and Proactive Forensics
Bradford, P. G., & Hu, N. (2005) · Cited by 31
Applying graph-based anomaly detection approaches to the discovery of insider threats
Eberle, W., & Holder, L. B. (2009) · IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) · doi:10.1109/isi.2009.5137304 · Cited by 30 · cited 1×
“Several detection techniques such as workflow of documents [29], system call analysis [30, 31], graph-based analysis [36, 37], signatures [32] and threat specification languages [38, 39] have also been studied to predict insider attacks.”
MethodInsider Threat Program Best Practices
Guido, M., & Brooks, M. W. (2013) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2013.279 · Cited by 28 · cited 2×
“…changes access/privilege of a user depending on risk [47-48] Extended Access Control based on abstraction of generalized attributes of data and people Process Control to dissuade insiders Mandatory Auditing of user activity of up to 60 days [51] Streamlining and improving Incidence response [52]”
BackgroundInsider Threat Analysis Using Information-Centric Modeling
Ha, D. T., Upadhyaya, S., Ngo, H. Q., Pramanik, S., Chinchani, R., & Mathew, S. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-73742-3_4 · Cited by 26 · cited 1×
“…[27] Organizational Structure & Workflow: To predict what characteristics cause security violations by system call analysis and signature [28-32] Improving defense of the network A “Requires/Provides” model based on Attack Trees Capability Acquisition Graph to strengthen Network Defenses [44-45]”
MethodCombining Generated Data Models with Formal Invalidation for Insider Threat Analysis
Kammüller, F., & Probst, C. W. (2014) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.45 · Cited by 26
Masquerade Attack Detection Using a Search-Behavior Modeling Approach
Salem, M. B., & Stolfo, S. J. (2009) · doi:10.7916/d8x63tsv · Cited by 24 · cited 1×
“Commands used by “masqueraders” for searching: Used one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) for modelling [4].”
MethodMethods and Metrics for Evaluating Analytic Insider Threat Tools
Greitzer, F. L., & Ferryman, T. A. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.34 · Cited by 22 · cited 1×
“…incorporating key factors of insider attacks in their implementation such as, organizational structure, user psychology and personality, etc. Greitzer and Ferryman [41] indicated that there exists a “capability gap” in measuring the success of detection or assessment models in these technologies.”
BackgroundDetecting sensitive data exfiltration by an insider attack
Liu, Y., Corbett, C., Chiang, K., Archibald, R., Mukherjee, B., & Ghosal, D. (2008) · Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop · doi:10.1145/1413140.1413159 · Cited by 20 · cited 2×
“Several detection techniques such as workflow of documents [29], system call analysis [30, 31], graph-based analysis [36, 37], signatures [32] and threat specification languages [38, 39] have also been studied to predict insider attacks.”
MethodInsider abuse comprehension through capability acquisition graphs
Mathew, S., Upadhyaya, S., Ha, D. T., & Ngo, H. Q. (2008) · Cited by 18
Dynamic, Flexible, and Optimistic Access Control
Peisert, S., & Bishop, M. (2013) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 9
Context-Aware Insider Threat Detection
Memory, A., Goldberg, H. G., & Senator, T. E. (2013) · National Conference on Artificial Intelligence · Cited by 8
Ard, J. B., Bishop, M., Gates, C. E., & Sun, M. X. (2013) · New Security Paradigms Workshop · doi:10.1145/2535813.2535825 · Cited by 5 · cited 1×
“Several detection techniques such as workflow of documents [29], system call analysis [30, 31], graph-based analysis [36, 37], signatures [32] and threat specification languages [38, 39] have also been studied to predict insider attacks.”
MethodThe justification of a pattern for detecting intellectual property theft by departing insiders
Moore, A. P., McIntire, D., Mundie, D. A., & Zubrow, D. (2012) · doi:10.5555/2821679.2831278 · Cited by 5
Justification of a Pattern for Detecting Intellectual Property Theft by Departing Insiders
Moore, A. P., McIntire, D., Mundie, D. A., & Zubrow, D. (2013) · doi:10.21236/ada610785 · Cited by 5
Mapping Social Media Insider Threat Attack Vectors
Armstrong, C. J. (2013) · Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences · doi:10.1109/hicss.2013.392 · Cited by 2 · cited 1×
“Armstrong [33] uses the concepts of Technology, Process and People (TPP) triangle to propose a technique of using social medium data for detecting rouge insiders.”
Method
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Cited by
IoT Elements, Layered Architectures and Security Issues: A Comprehensive Survey
Burhan, M., Rehman, R. A., Khan, B., & Kim, B.-S. (2018) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s18092796 · Cited by 518
“It is a very different and complex attack that requires different mechanisms to prevent the threat [47,48].”
BackgroundDeep learning for insider threat detection: Review, challenges and opportunities
Yuan, S., & Wu, X. (2021) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2021.102221 · Cited by 271
Homoliak, I., Toffalini, F., Guarnizo, J., Elovici, Y., & Ochoa, M. (2020) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3303771 · Cited by 255
“…deal with either categorization of heterogeneous studies [Azaria et al. 2014; Hunker and Probst 2011; Ophoff et al. 2014] or homogeneous studies that are constrained to detection approaches [Bertacchini and Fierens 2008; Gheyas and Abdallah 2016; Salem et al. 2008; Sanzgiri and Dasgupta 2016].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialInternet of Things: Evolution and technologies from a security perspective
Ande, R., Adebisi, B., Hammoudeh, M., & Saleem, J. (2020) · Sustainable Cities and Society · doi:10.1016/j.scs.2019.101728 · Cited by 177
“[106] Ameya Sanzgiri and Dipankar Dasgupta.”
BackgroundSecuring Healthcare Systems Integrated With IoT
Boopathi, S. (2023) · Advances in healthcare information systems and administration book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-6684-6894-4.ch010 · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- Sanzgiri, A., & Dasgupta, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Memphis (US)
- ORCID
- Dasgupta, Dipankar
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-04-05
- Pages
- 1-4
- OpenAlex
- W2315113356
- Semantic Scholar
- d580c24b9601e240d0161fbc47c7075bbe2fc59d
- Cited by
- 68
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 5.66
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference (CISRC) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Keywords
- insider threat detection, insider attacks, detection methods, insider threats
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