Robust, low-cost, auditable random number generation for embedded system security
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.
Abstract
This paper presents an architecture for a discrete, high-entropy hardware random number generator. Because it is constructed out of simple hardware components, its operation is transparent and auditable. Using avalanche noise, a non-deterministic physical phenomenon, the circuit is inherently probabilistic and resists adversarial control. Furthermore, because it compares the outputs from two matched noise sources, it rejects environmental disturbances like RF energy and power supply ripple. The resulting hardware produces more than 0.98 bits of entropy per sample, is inexpensive, has a small footprint, and can be disabled to conserve power when not in use.
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1 retracted
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Cited by
Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported
Martins, T., & Oliveira, S. V. G. (2022) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s22208024 · Cited by 45
“…token code must be unique in order to guarantee the integrity of the username, for This token code must be unique in order to guarantee the integrity of the username, for example, a SHA256 of a robust random number generation [33,34]. example, a SHA256 of a robust random number generation [33,34].”
Quality of randomness and node dropout regularization for fitting neural networks
Koivu, A., Kakko, J., Mäntyniemi, S., & Sairanen, M. (2022) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2022.117938 · Cited by 40
Nano-Intrinsic True Random Number Generation: A Device to Data Study
Kim, J., Nili, H., Truong, N. D., Ahmed, T., Yang, J., Jeong, D. S., Sriram, S., Ranasinghe, D. C., Ippolito, S. J., Chun, H., et al. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I Regular Papers · doi:10.1109/tcsi.2019.2895045 · Cited by 33
“Noise amplification, temperature (in case of thermal noise), and dependency on process variation are a few factors that could potentially make TRNGs predictable through creating undesirable bias in the output bit-stream, therefore, making the system vulnerable to a range of attacks [24].”
BackgroundA true random number generator that utilizes thermal noise in a programmable system‐on‐chip (PSoC)
Matsuoka, S., Ichikawa, S., & Fujieda, N. (2021) · International Journal of Circuit Theory and Applications · doi:10.1002/cta.3046 · Cited by 28
The Tock Embedded Operating System
Levy, A. A., Campbell, B., Ghena, B., Giffin, D. B., Leonard, S., Pannuto, P., Dutta, P., & Levis, P. A. (2017) · ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys) · doi:10.1145/3131672.3136988 · Cited by 27
Self-citationExploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating True Random Numbers
Talukder, B. M. S. B., Kerns, J., Ray, B., Morris, T., & Rahman, M. T. (2019) · International Conference on Consumer Electronics · doi:10.1109/icce.2019.8662060 · Cited by 30
“True random number generator (TRNG) plays a vital role in cryptography for trusted execution and trusted communications [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].”
BackgroundA Hardware Trojan Attack on FPGA-Based Cryptographic Key Generation: Impact and Detection
Govindan, V., Chakraborty, R. S., Santikellur, P., & Chaudhary, A. K. (2018) · Journal of Hardware and Systems Security · doi:10.1007/s41635-018-0042-5 · Cited by 18
“As mentioned in [24], the hardware RNGs (or TRNGs) can be decomposed into four categories: (a) circuits integrated on processors and systems-on-chip (SoCs); (b) commercial RNG used as “add-on” peripheral devices; (c) True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) design for FPGAs; and (d) discrete…”
BackgroundSecuCode: Intrinsic PUF Entangled Secure Wireless Code Dissemination for Computational RFID Devices
Su, Y., Gao, Y., Chesser, M., Kavehei, O., Sample, A. P., & Ranasinghe, D. C. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2019.2934438 · Cited by 18
LWR-based Quantum-Safe Pseudo-Random Number Generator
Pandit, A. A., Kumar, A., & Mishra, A. (2023) · Journal of Information Security and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2023.103431 · Cited by 23
Sensor-Based Entropy Source Analysis and Validation for Use in IoT Environments
Răstoceanu, F., Rughinis, R. V., Ciocîrlan, Ș.-D., & Enache, M. F. (2021) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics10101173 · Cited by 12
“Usually, hardware sources of entropy are based on the unstable behavior of electronic circuits [23], or logic gates in the case of FPGA devices [24–26].”
BackgroundRAVA: An Open Hardware True Random Number Generator Based on Avalanche Noise
Guerrer, G. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3327325 · Cited by 10
“Various TRNG designs based on tunneling and avalanche noise have been explored in the literature, as evidenced by [12], [13], [14], [15], and [16].”
BackgroundPragmatic authenticated key agreement for IEEE Std 802.15.6
Khan, H., Dowling, B., & Martin, K. M. (2021) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-021-00570-7 · Cited by 10
“We recommend the approach outlined in [18].”
Min-entropy estimation for semiconductor superlattice true random number generators
Liu, J., Xie, J., Lu, C., Wu, H., Ding, P., Chen, X., & Feng, H. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-06815-2 · Cited by 9
“The TRNG system generally is composed of the three fundamental components: entropy source, entropy harvester, and entropy extraction 39 .”
BackgroundNano-Intrinsic True Random Number GenerationPreprint
Kim, J., Ahmed, T., Nili, H., Truong, N. D., Yang, J., Jeong, D. S., Sriram, S., Ranasinghe, D. C., & Kavehei, O. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1701.06020 · Cited by 7
“…temperature (in case of thermal noise), and dependency on process variation are a few factors that could potentially make TRNGs predictable through creating undesirable bias towards 0 or 1 in the output bit stream, therefore, making the system more vulnerable to a range of attacks [13].”
Experimental demonstration of scalable quantum key distribution over a thousand kilometersPreprint
Aliev, A., Statiev, V., Zarubin, I., Kirsanov, N. S., Strizhak, D., Bezruchenko, A., Osicheva, A., Smirnov, A., Yarovikov, M., Kodukhov, A., et al. (2023) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-3259005/v1 · Cited by 7
A pseudo-random signal generator based on 2D memristor Logistic map
Xu, B., Wang, Y., Zou, S., Bai, L., Chen, K., & Zhao, J. (2024) · IEEE International Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference · doi:10.1109/i2mtc60896.2024.10561165 · Cited by 3
Mind your indices! Index hijacking attacks on collaborative unpooling autoencoder systems
Lee, K., Yun, J., Jin, J., Han, J. Y., & Ko, J. (2024) · Internet of Things · doi:10.1016/j.iot.2024.101462 · Cited by 3
A Fair, Traceable, Auditable and Participatory Randomization Tool for Legal SystemsPreprint
Silva, M. V. M., Junior, M. A. S., Pfeiffer, R. A. C., & Stern, J. M. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2006.02956 · Cited by 2
“Some solutions in the literature rely on on the concept of “open hardware”, so anyone with technical enough background can (at a given time) examine and evaluate the internal circuit and components of the hardware responsible for generating randomness [14].”
BackgroundQuantum Electronic Generator of Random Numbers for Information Security in Automatic Control Systems
Мансурович, А. Ф., Andrianov, S. N., & Soloviev, A. (2019) · International Russian Automation Conference (RusAutoCon) · doi:10.1109/rusautocon.2019.8867682 · Cited by 1
“The magnitude of noise voltage at the electronic diode breakdown [24] constituted 160 mV at application of 12 V voltage at input.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialDu, H., & Chen, S. (2020) · International Conference on Smart Systems and Inventive Technology (ICSSIT) · doi:10.1109/icssit48917.2020.9214277 · Cited by 1
“Hence, we should follow the listed primary procedures [17-18].”
BackgroundAnálisis y evaluación experimental del circuito generador de números aleatorios Lampert Circuit
Rodríguez, A., Domingo, J. M., López, G., García, C. R.-M., López, Á., & Hernandez-Castro, J. C. (2021) · Colección Jornadas y congresos · doi:10.18239/jornadas_2021.34.57 · Cited by 1
Colloidal particles as noise source for random number generation
Scholz, A. S., Arya, P., & Aghassi‐Hagmann, J. (2024) · AIP Advances · doi:10.1063/5.0223329 · Cited by 1
In-Field Quantum-Protected Control-Based Key Distribution with a Lossy Urban Fiber Link
Statiev, V., Ashurov, A., Semenov, V. M., Kozliuk, D., Zemlyanov, V. V., Kodukhov, A., Pastushenko, V. A., Vinokur, V. M., & Pflitsch, M. (2025) · Quantum Reports · doi:10.3390/quantum7020016 · Cited by 2
“[25,26].”
The Zener diode: generating gamma-ray statistics without the gamma rays
Bensky, T. (2021) · Physics Education · doi:10.1088/1361-6552/ac12a8
“In this work, we begin with the circuit shown in figure 1, which was motivated by work done in the area of developing a hardware random number generator [3].”
MethodPseudo Random Binary Sequence using Lattice-based Hard Problem for Quantum Key Distribution
Pandit, A. A., & Mishra, A. (2023) · IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST) · doi:10.1109/iccst59048.2023.10474268
Generation of Random Numbers on a Microcontroller Platform
Sanlı, M. (2024) · Uluslararası mühendislik araştırma ve geliştirme dergisi · doi:10.29137/umagd.1392479
Probability-Theoretical Models of Physical Random Number Generators
Bogdanov, D. S., Logachev, A. S., & Олегович, М. В. (2024) · Automatic Control and Computer Sciences · doi:10.3103/s0146411624700962
The internet of things : securing devices and user data
Nobakht, M. (2019) · UNSWorks (University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia) · doi:10.26190/unsworks/3702 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Lampert, B., Wahby, R. S., Leonard, S., & Levis, P.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems CD-ROM
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-11-14
- Volume
- 2016
- Pages
- 16-27
- OpenAlex
- W2547930318
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 1.80
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys) (publishedVersion)
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1505728)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- hardware random number generation, avalanche noise, embedded systems security, low-cost hardware, entropy (information theory), power conservation
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