Robust, low-cost, auditable random number generation for embedded system security
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.
Abstract
This paper presents an architecture for a discrete, high-entropy hardware random number generator. Because it is constructed out of simple hardware components, its operation is transparent and auditable. Using avalanche noise, a non-deterministic physical phenomenon, the circuit is inherently probabilistic and resists adversarial control. Furthermore, because it compares the outputs from two matched noise sources, it rejects environmental disturbances like RF energy and power supply ripple. The resulting hardware produces more than 0.98 bits of entropy per sample, is inexpensive, has a small footprint, and can be disabled to conserve power when not in use.
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1 retracted
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Cited by
Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported
Martins, T., & Oliveira, S. V. G. (2022) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s22208024 · Cited by 45
“…token code must be unique in order to guarantee the integrity of the username, for This token code must be unique in order to guarantee the integrity of the username, for example, a SHA256 of a robust random number generation [33,34]. example, a SHA256 of a robust random number generation [33,34].”
Quality of randomness and node dropout regularization for fitting neural networks
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Matsuoka, S., Ichikawa, S., & Fujieda, N. (2021) · International Journal of Circuit Theory and Applications · doi:10.1002/cta.3046 · Cited by 28
The Tock Embedded Operating System
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Lampert, B., Wahby, R. S., Leonard, S., & Levis, P.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems CD-ROM
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-11-14
- Volume
- 2016
- Pages
- 16-27
- OpenAlex
- W2547930318
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 1.80
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys) (publishedVersion)
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1505728)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- hardware random number generation, avalanche noise, embedded systems security, low-cost hardware, entropy (information theory), power conservation
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