The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
FruitChains: A Fair Blockchain
Abstract
Nakamoto's famous blockchain protocol enables achieving consensus in a so-called permissionless setting---anyone can join (or leave) the protocol execution, and the protocol instructions do not depend on the identities of the players. His ingenious protocol prevents "sybil attacks" (where an adversary spawns any number of new players) by relying on computational puzzles (a.k.a. "moderately hard functions") introduced by Dwork and Naor (Crypto'92). Recent work by Garay et al (EuroCrypt'15) and Pass et al (manuscript, 2016) demonstrate that this protocol provably achieves consistency and liveness assuming a) honest players control a majority of the computational power in the network, b) the puzzle-hardness is appropriately set as a function of the maximum network delay and the total computational power of the network, and c) the computational puzzle is modeled as a random oracle. Assuming honest participation, however, is a strong assumption, especially in a setting where honest players are expected to perform a lot of work (to solve the computational puzzles). In Nakamoto's Bitcoin application of the blockchain protocol, players are incentivized to solve these puzzles by receiving rewards for every "block" (of transactions) they contribute to the blockchain. An elegant work by Eyal and Sirer (FinancialCrypt'14), strengthening and formalizing an earlier attack discussed on the Bitcoin forum, demonstrates that a coalition controlling even a minority fraction of the computational power in the network can gain (close to) 2 times its "fair share" of the rewards (and transaction fees) by deviating from the protocol instructions. In contrast, in a fair protocol, one would expect that players controlling a φ fraction of the computational resources to reap a φ fraction of the rewards.
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Citations
Cites
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
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Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol
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Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail
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Analysis of the Blockchain Protocol in Asynchronous Networks
Pass, R., Seeman, L., & Shelat, A. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56614-6_22 · Cited by 613
Self-citationStubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack
Nayak, K., Kumar, S., Miller, A., & Shi, E. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.32 · Cited by 481
Self-citationOptimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin
Sapirshtein, A., Sompolinsky, Y., & Zohar, A. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_30 · Cited by 477
On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward
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Inclusive Block Chain Protocols
Lewenberg, Y., Sompolinsky, Y., & Zohar, A. (2015) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_33 · Cited by 308
Kiayias, A., Koutsoupias, E., Kyropoulou, M., & Tselekounis, Y. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation · doi:10.1145/2940716.2940773 · Cited by 234
Snow White: Provably Secure Proofs of Stake.Preprint
Bentov, I., Pass, R., & Shi, E. (2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 197
Self-citationSpeed-Security Tradeoffs in Blockchain ProtocolsPreprint
Kiayias, A., & Panagiotakos, G. (2015) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 130
Secure Computation Without Authentication
Barak, B., Canetti, R., Lindell, Y., Pass, R., & Rabin, T. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11535218_22 · Cited by 107
Self-citationAlgorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation
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Self-citationOn Trees, Chains and Fast Transactions in the Blockchain.Preprint
Kiayias, A., & Panagiotakos, G. (2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25283-0 · Cited by 51
Cited by
Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol
Kiayias, A., Russell, A., David, B., & Oliynykov, R. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_12 · Cited by 1,459
Security and Privacy on Blockchain
Zhang, R., Xue, R., & Liu, L. (2020) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3316481 · Cited by 959
Future challenges on the use of blockchain for food traceability analysis
Galvez, J. F., Mejuto, J. C., & Simal-Gandara, J. (2018) · TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry · doi:10.1016/j.trac.2018.08.011 · Cited by 921
A Survey of Distributed Consensus Protocols for Blockchain Networks
Xiao, Y., Zhang, N., Lou, W., & Hou, Y. T. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.2969706 · Cited by 841
Analysis of the Blockchain Protocol in Asynchronous Networks
Pass, R., Seeman, L., & Shelat, A. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56614-6_22 · Cited by 613
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Pass, R., & Shi, E.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2017-07-25
- Pages
- 315-324
- OpenAlex
- W2738891482
- Cited by
- 307
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 29.01
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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