Cited by 62Spam and Phishing DetectionMisinformation and Its ImpactsHate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection

LOBO: Evaluation of Generalization Deficiencies in Twitter Bot Classifiers

Open access
Echeverra, Juan, De Cristofaro, Emiliano, Kourtellis, Nicolas, Leontiadis, Ilias, Stringhini, Gianluca, Zhou, Shi·2018·Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Abstract

Botnets in online social networks are increasingly often affecting the regular flow of discussion, attacking regular users and their posts, spamming them with irrelevant or offensive content, and even manipulating the popularity of messages and accounts. Researchers and cybercriminals are involved in an arms race, and new and updated botnets designed to defeat current detection systems are constantly developed, rendering such detection systems obsolete.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that Twitter bot classifiers trained on single bot classes can achieve high accuracy but fail to generalize to unseen bot classes. It proposes a Leave-One-Botnet-Out (LOBO) evaluation methodology and shows a classifier trained on over 200,000 data points reaches over 97% accuracy yet can drop to less than 1% detection on some unseen botnets.

Key findings

  • A classifier trained on over 200,000 data points achieved over 97% accuracy, but when tested on unseen bot classes via LOBO, it did not generalize well.
  • Some target botnets completely misled the classifier, resulting in less than 1% detection accuracy, meaning 99% of the bots in that class were classified as users.
  • The study collected more than 20 different bot classes and tested on over 1.5 million bots; the data includes some of the largest and most varied collections of bots used in literature.
  • Adding a small portion of certain botnets to training can be enough to fully identify them, allowing a classifier to quickly scale and incrementally consider different and newly revealed bots.

Methods

  • Compiled a botnet dataset aggregating content from a variety of bot datasets, some previously used in research as ground truth, plus a real-user dataset; each account contains a maximum of 3,200 tweets authored or retweeted due to Twitter API limitations.
  • Built a dataset of 20 different botnet types with different purposes and proposed a “Leave-One-Botnet-Out” (LOBO) methodology: train on many diverse bots and test accuracy on bot classes with behaviors never seen before by the classifiers.
  • Trained a Twitter bot classifier using a small number of commonly used features and evaluated its expected generalization by selectively leaving bot classes and behaviors out of the training data.

Limitations

  • The paper states that datasets are constrained by Twitter’s API limitations, with each account containing a maximum of 3,200 tweets authored or retweeted.
  • The paper states that machine-learning detection systems require example bot datasets that often contain biases; training on a single botnet can cause the system to overfit to that botnet’s idiosyncrasies rather than learn general bot characteristics.
  • Evident from the provided text: the excerpt ends in the datasets section, so the full experimental setup, feature list, and detailed results are not available here.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3274694.3274738

Cites

43 of 43 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 1 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingnone given
    § 3. Boston University

    The data used to train and test the classifier includes some of the largest and most varied collections of bots used in literature.

    “includes some of the largest and most varied collections of bots used in literature.”
    • Also stated in: § INTRODUCTION · plain
      “Collects and combines the biggest and broadest botnet library to date”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § 3. Boston University

    The theoretically sound classifier does not generalize well to unseen bot classes.

    “highlighting that it does not generalize well to unseen bot classes.”
    • Also stated in: § INTRODUCTION · plain
      “even this bot-detection system that has been trained with a variety of bots is incapable of detecting new bot families that were never observed before.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § INTRODUCTION

    The study tests on over 1.5 million bots.

    “testing on over 1.5 million bots.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § 3. Boston University

    A Twitter bot classifier trained on a single bot dataset (over 200,000 data points) achieves over 97% accuracy.

    “over 200,000 data points and show that it achieves over 97% accuracy”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § INTRODUCTION

    When bot classes are mixed equitably in a single dataset, the prediction power of the same classifier drops significantly.

    “when we mix bot classes equitably in a single dataset”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 3
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § INTRODUCTION

    Some target botnets completely mislead the classifier, resulting in less than 1% detection accuracy, meaning 99% of the bots in that class were classified as users.

    “less than 1% detection accuracy, meaning 99% of the bots in that class were”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 3. Boston University

    The proposed methodology is empirically robust, using bot classes of varying sizes and characteristics and reaching similar results.

    “We show that this methodology is empirically robust, using bot classes of varying sizes and characteristics and reaching similar results”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § INTRODUCTION

    Bot detection is an inherently adversarial problem, and once a defense mechanism is known, adversaries can modify their modus operandi and avoid detection.

    “bot detection is an inherently adversarial problem, and once a defense mechanism is known, adversaries can modify their modus operandi and avoid detection [41].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [41] source

      Not checked in the free run.

3 of 3
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Botnets in online social networks increasingly affect the regular flow of discussion, attack regular users and their posts, spam them with irrelevant or offensive content, and manipulate the popularity of messages and accounts.

    “even manipulating the popularity of messages and accounts.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Researchers and cybercriminals are involved in an arms race, and new and updated botnets designed to defeat current detection systems are constantly developed, rendering such detection systems obsolete.

    “Researchers and cybercriminals are involved in an arms race, and new and updated botnets designed to defeat current detection systems are constantly developed, rendering such detection systems obsolete.”
2 of 2

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Dataset described as having both more than 20 and exactly 20 bot types

    Minor

    The introduction says the collected dataset contains more than 20 bot classes, while Section 3.1 describes the dataset as having 20 botnet types.

1 of 1

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

3 of the 46 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. S. Narang . Green Coffee and Spam: Elaborate spam operation on Twitter uses nearly 750,000 accounts. https://symc.ly/2Cp7CJ5 , 2017 . S. Narang. Green Coffee and Spam: Elaborate spam operation on Twitter uses nearly 750,000 accounts. https://symc.ly/2Cp7CJ5, 2017.

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Authors
Echeverra, J., De Cristofaro, E., Kourtellis, N., Leontiadis, I., Stringhini, G., & Zhou, S.
Affiliations
  • University College London
  • Telefonica Research and Development (ES)
  • Telefonica Research
  • Boston University (US)
  • University College London (GB)
Venue
Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Publisher
ACM
Published
2018-12-03
Pages
137-146
ISSN
1063-9527 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2892724803
Cited by
61
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 2
FWCI
4.32
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (publishedVersion)
  • OpenBU (Boston University) (submittedVersion)
  • Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
European Commission (HORIZON2020, 691025)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection
Keywords
botnets, social networking sites, bot detection, spam, offensive content, cybercrime, arms race

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