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Seeing isn't Believing: Towards More Robust Adversarial Attack Against Real World Object Detectors

Zhao, Yue, Zhu, Hong, Liang, Ruigang, Shen, Qintao, Zhang, Shengzhi, Chen, Kai · 2019 · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Cited by 164

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Recently Adversarial Examples (AEs) that deceive deep learning models have been a topic of intense research interest. Compared with the AEs in the digital space, the physical adversarial attack is considered as a more severe threat to the applications like face recognition in authentication, objection detection in autonomous driving cars, etc. In particular, deceiving the object detectors practically, is more challenging since the relative position between the object and the detector may keep changing. Existing works attacking object detectors are still very limited in various scenarios, e.g., varying distance and angles, etc. In this paper, we presented systematic solutions to build robust and practical AEs against real world object detectors. Particularly, for Hiding Attack (HA), we proposed thefeature-interference reinforcement (FIR) method and theenhanced realistic constraints generation (ERG) to enhance robustness, and for Appearing Attack (AA), we proposed thenested-AE, which combines two AEs together to attack object detectors in both long and short distance. We also designed diverse styles of AEs to make AA more surreptitious. Evaluation results show that our AEs can attack the state-of-the-art real-time object detectors (i.e., YOLO V3 and faster-RCNN) at the success rate up to 92.4% with varying distance from 1m to 25m and angles from -60º to 60º. Our AEs are also demonstrated to be highly transferable, capable of attacking another three state-of-the-art black-box models with high success rate.

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Metadata

Authors
Zhao, Y., Zhu, H., Liang, R., Shen, Q., Zhang, S., & Chen, K.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2019-11-06
Pages
1989-2004
OpenAlex
W2984260944
Cited by
164
References
17
FWCI
6.41
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Seeing isn't Believing: Towards More Robust Adversarial Attack Against Real World Object Detectors. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3319535.3354259
The paper
Zhao, Y., Zhu, H., Liang, R., Shen, Q., Zhang, S., & Chen, K. (2019). Seeing isn't Believing: Towards More Robust Adversarial Attack Against Real World Object Detectors. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354259

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