The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Composite Backdoor Attack for Deep Neural Network by Mixing Existing Benign Features
Abstract
With the prevalent use of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in many applications, security of these networks is of importance. Pre-trained DNNs may contain backdoors that are injected through poisoned training. These trojaned models perform well when regular inputs are provided, but misclassify to a target output label when the input is stamped with a unique pattern called trojan trigger. Recently various backdoor detection and mitigation systems for DNN based AI applications have been proposed. However, many of them are limited to trojan attacks that require a specific patch trigger. In this paper, we introduce composite attack, a more flexible and stealthy trojan attack that eludes backdoor scanners using trojan triggers composed from existing benign features of multiple labels. We show that a neural network with a composed backdoor can achieve accuracy comparable to its original version on benign data and misclassifies when the composite trigger is present in the input. Our experiments on 7 different tasks show that this attack poses a severe threat. We evaluate our attack with two state-of-the-art backdoor scanners. The results show none of the injected backdoors can be detected by either scanner. We also study in details why the scanners are not effective. In the end, we discuss the essence of our attack and propose possible defense.
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Cites
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Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik, Z. B., & Swami, A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3052973.3053009 · Cited by 3,495
Universal Adversarial Perturbations
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Trojaning Attack on Neural Networks
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Cited by
Li, Y., Jiang, Y., Li, Z., & Xia, S.-T. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems · doi:10.1109/tnnls.2022.3182979 · Cited by 682
Invisible Backdoor Attack with Sample-Specific Triggers
Li, Y., Li, Y., Wu, B., Li, L., He, R., & Lyu, S. (2021) · 2021 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV) · doi:10.1109/iccv48922.2021.01615 · Cited by 423
A Comprehensive Survey on Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures in Machine Learning
Tian, Z., Cui, L., Liang, J., & Yu, S. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3551636 · Cited by 271
Wild Patterns Reloaded: A Survey of Machine Learning Security against Training Data Poisoning
Cinà, A. E., Grosse, K., Demontis, A., Vascon, S., Zellinger, W., Moser, B. A., Oprea, A., Biggio, B., Pelillo, M., & Roli, F. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3585385 · Cited by 152
Hidden Backdoors in Human-Centric Language Models
Li, S., Liu, H., Dong, T., Zhao, B. Z. H., Xue, M., Zhu, H., & Lu, J. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3460120.3484576 · Cited by 119
Metadata
- Authors
- Lin, J., Xu, L., Liu, Y., & Zhang, X.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-10-30
- Pages
- 113-131
- OpenAlex
- W3106646114
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 8.77
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lin, J., Xu, L., Liu, Y., & Zhang, X. (2020). Composite Backdoor Attack for Deep Neural Network by Mixing Existing Benign Features. Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3423362
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