A Survey of IIoT Protocols: A Measure of Vulnerability Risk Analysis Based on CVSS
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is present in many participants from the energy, health, manufacturing, transport, and public sectors. Many factors catalyze IIoT, such as robotics, artificial intelligence, and intelligent decentralized manufacturing. However, the convergence between IT, OT, and IoT environments involves the integration of heterogeneous technologies through protocols, standards, and buses. However, this integration brings with it security risks. To avoid the security risks, especially when systems in different environments interact, it is important and urgent to create an early consensus among the stakeholders on the IIoT security. The default Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) offers a mechanism to measure the severity of an asset's vulnerability and therefore a way to characterize the risk. However, CVSS by default has two drawbacks. On the one hand, to carry out a risk analysis, it is necessary to have additional metrics to the one established by CVSSv3.1. On the other hand, this index has been used mostly in IT environments and although there are numerous efforts to develop a model that suits industrial environments, there is no established proposal. Therefore, we first propose a survey of the main 33 protocols, standards, and buses used in an IIoT environment. This survey will focus on the security of each one. The second part of our study consists of the creation of a framework to characterize risk in industrial environments, i.e., to solve both problems of the CVSS index. To this end, we created the Vulnerability Analysis Framework (VAF), which is a methodology that allows the analysis of 1,363 vulnerabilities to establish a measure to describe the risk in IIoT environments.
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Citations
Cites
A Survey on 5G Networks for the Internet of Things: Communication Technologies and Challenges
Akpakwu, G. A., Silva, B. J., Hancke, G. P., & Abu-Mahfouz, A. M. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2017.2779844 · Cited by 1,293
A survey on LPWA technology: LoRa and NB-IoT
Sinha, R. S., Wei, Y., & Hwang, S.-H. (2017) · ICT Express · doi:10.1016/j.icte.2017.03.004 · Cited by 1,020 · cited 6×
“From EPS optimization of the CIoT user plane, IP and non-IP data can be transmitted by radio carriers through SGW and PGW to the application server.”
InfluentialChoice of effective messaging protocols for IoT systems: MQTT, CoAP, AMQP and HTTP
Naik, N. (2017) · 2017 IEEE International Systems Engineering Symposium (ISSE) · doi:10.1109/syseng.2017.8088251 · Cited by 727
A Role-Based Access Control Model in Modbus SCADA Systems. A Centralized Model Approach
Figueroa-Lorenzo, S., Añorga, J., & Arrizabalaga, S. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19204455 · Cited by 58 · cited 1×
“In addition, Reference [207], addresses the security problems of the Modbus protocol, through a new secure version of a RBAC model, which takes advantage of the authentication provided by TLS, as well as granting authorization of the client on the server, as well as of the Modbus frame.”
Self-citation
Cited by
Shen, S., Xie, L., Zhang, Y., Wu, G., Zhang, H., & Yu, S. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2023.3307956 · Cited by 119
Sverko, M., Grbac, T. G., & Mikuc, M. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3211288 · Cited by 71
Saurabh, K., Gajjala, D., Kaipa, K., Vyas, R., Vyas, O. P., & Khondoker, R. (2024) · Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering · doi:10.1007/s13369-023-08600-3 · Cited by 11
Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments
Akinsanya, A. (2026) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-8846670/v1 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Figueroa-Lorenzo, S., Añorga, J., & Arrizabalaga, S.
- Venue
- ACM Computing Surveys
- Published
- 2020-04-26
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-53
- ISSN
- 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7341
- OpenAlex
- W3023951208
- Cited by
- 89
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 5.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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