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A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar

Open access
Padmanabhan, Ramakrishna, Filastò, Arturo, Xynou, Maria, Raman, Ram Sundara, Middleton, Kennedy, Zhang, Mingwei, Madory, Doug, Roberts, Molly, Dainotti, Alberto · 2021 · Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 26 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

In the wake of a military coup in February 2021, Myanmar experienced unprecedented levels of Internet censorship. Beginning with haphazard blocking of social media and intermittent Internet connectivity outages, controls proceeded to stricter blocking of websites, the shutdown of cellular data in several networks, and nearly complete disconnection from the Internet every night. In this study, we use diverse datasets and measurement methods to offer a holistic view into the censorship events in Myanmar that occurred since the coup and show how Internet censorship evolved during this time.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper presents a multi-source measurement study of Internet censorship in Myanmar after the February 1, 2021 military coup. Using IODA, Kentik traffic, and OONI measurements, it documents country-wide outages, cellular restrictions, website/social-media blocking, and one Twitter BGP hijack with collateral damage.

## Key findings

  • A significant coup-day outage began at 21:00 UTC on Jan. 31 / 03:30 local time on Feb. 1; on IODA BGP data, reachable /24 blocks dropped from 695 to 376, a 46% decrease.
  • From Feb. 14 to Apr. 28, Myanmar experienced nightly country-wide outages for 72 nights straight; these began at 18:30 UTC / 01:00 local time and lasted 8 hours on most nights.
  • From Mar. 15, cellular connectivity was “heavily restricted,” visible in Kentik traffic but not in IODA; the restrictions were still ongoing as of mid-May 2021.
  • OONI data from Feb. 1 to Apr. 30, 2021 showed widespread website/social-media blocking, including DNS, TCP/IP, and HTTP blocking; the paper reports 174 domains had DNS-based blocking in prior 2020 OONI data on Telenor Myanmar.
  • On Feb. 5, Campana Mythic (AS136168) announced Twitter’s 104.244.42.0/24 prefix, and the illegitimate route propagated to operators in Singapore and Vietnam, causing collateral damage for Twitter users outside Myanmar.

## Methods

  • The study combines three measurement sources: IODA for macroscopic outages, Kentik NetFlow-based aggregated traffic for traffic and cellular connectivity, and OONI Web Connectivity measurements for website/social-media blocking.
  • The traffic dataset covers Jan. 30 to May 05, 2021; the OONI web connectivity analysis covers Feb. 1 to Apr. 30, 2021; the BGP analysis uses RouteViews and RIPE RIS data.
  • Main analysis is descriptive and comparative: the authors align timelines across datasets, inspect outage timing and duration, classify OONI anomalies as DNS/TCP/IP/HTTP blocking, and trace the BGP hijack and its propagation.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that some findings are based on publicly available datasets and a proprietary Kentik dataset; it does not claim direct ground truth from within Myanmar’s networks.
  • IODA has limited visibility into cellular networks, which the paper says is why Kentik was needed to observe cellular restrictions.
  • Evident from the text: the study’s conclusions are constrained by the measurement windows reported for each dataset (Jan. 30–May 05 for Kentik, Feb. 1–Apr. 30 for OONI), so events outside those periods are not assessed.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3473604.3474562

Cites

39 of 39 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 Timeline of censorship events in Myanmar.
Figure 1 Timeline of censorship events in Myanmar.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 2 IODA and Kentik data show Internet connectivity outages on Feb. 1 and Feb. 6., in the first week after the coup.
Figure 2 IODA and Kentik data show Internet connectivity outages on Feb. 1 and Feb. 6., in the first week after the coup.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 3 Traffic data from Kentik show that cellular traffic has reduced considerably from Mar. 15th.
Figure 3 Traffic data from Kentik show that cellular traffic has reduced considerably from Mar. 15th.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 4 Blocking of websites in Myanmar from Feb. to Apr. 2021 based on OONI measurements. The bars (left Y-axis) show the percentage of measurements with specific results on a particular day; the circles show the total measurements on that day (Log scale, right Y-axis). The size of the circles shows the number of distinct ASes that produced measurements on that day. Measurements to social media websites and circumvention tool websites faced high rates of TCP/IP and DNS blocking.
Figure 4 Blocking of websites in Myanmar from Feb. to Apr. 2021 based on OONI measurements. The bars (left Y-axis) show the percentage of measurements with specific results on a particular day; the circles show the total measurements on that day (Log scale, right Y-axis). The size of the circles shows the number of distinct ASes that produced measurements on that day. Measurements to social media websites and circumvention tool websites faced high rates of TCP/IP and DNS blocking.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 5 Collateral damage to Twitter users outside Myanmar as a result of the BGP hijack event affecting Twitter's address space. The figure shows Twitter traffic observed by Kentik from different source ASes (indicated by different colors) that was being routed towards Campana Mythic (AS136168).
Figure 5 Collateral damage to Twitter users outside Myanmar as a result of the BGP hijack event affecting Twitter's address space. The figure shows Twitter traffic observed by Kentik from different source ASes (indicated by different colors) that was being routed towards Campana Mythic (AS136168).CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 6 IODA's BGP signals show the differences in timing and extent of the Internet connectivity outage that occurred on Feb. 1 (the day of the coup). While some ASes observed an initial drop in connectivity at 21:00 UTC on Jan 31, others experienced an outage just after midnight UTC on Feb 1. These timing differences are also visible when examining the outages' end-times. Further, a few ASes experienced only minor outages during this period.
Figure 6 IODA's BGP signals show the differences in timing and extent of the Internet connectivity outage that occurred on Feb. 1 (the day of the coup). While some ASes observed an initial drop in connectivity at 21:00 UTC on Jan 31, others experienced an outage just after midnight UTC on Feb 1. These timing differences are also visible when examining the outages' end-times. Further, a few ASes experienced only minor outages during this period.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 7 Nightly Internet outages and cellular restrictions. From February 14 to April 28, complete Internet connectivity outages occurred every night in Myanmar. In this figure, we use data from IODA and Kentik to show a two week period where these nightly outages occurred. In the "Kentik Traffic" curve-which shows the traffic seen by Kentik for all ASes in Myanmar aggregated together-we observe a significant reduction after March 15; this reduction corresponds with the beginning of cellular data restrictions that have been in place from March 15 onward. In Figure 3, we break down the traffic by individual ASes and show that cellular ASes, in particular, observed a massive reduction in traffic from March 15.
Figure 7 Nightly Internet outages and cellular restrictions. From February 14 to April 28, complete Internet connectivity outages occurred every night in Myanmar. In this figure, we use data from IODA and Kentik to show a two week period where these nightly outages occurred. In the "Kentik Traffic" curve-which shows the traffic seen by Kentik for all ASes in Myanmar aggregated together-we observe a significant reduction after March 15; this reduction corresponds with the beginning of cellular data restrictions that have been in place from March 15 onward. In Figure 3, we break down the traffic by individual ASes and show that cellular ASes, in particular, observed a massive reduction in traffic from March 15.CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. 10.1145/2068816.2068818 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Arturo Filastò and Jacob Appelbaum . 2012 . OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference. In 2nd USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI 12) . Arturo Filastò and Jacob Appelbaum. 2012. OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference. In 2nd USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI 12).
  3. Anonymous Group . 2021 . Tweet: Anonymous encourages the use of OONI for monitoring censorship in Myanmar. https://web.archive.org/web/20210701134156/https://twitter.com/YourAnonCentral/status/1359777805131677699?s=20 Anonymous Group. 2021. Tweet: Anonymous encourages the use of OONI for monitoring censorship in Myanmar. https://web.archive.org/web/20210701134156/https://twitter.com/YourAnonCentral/status/1359777805131677699?s=20
  4. Telenor Group . 2020. Internet services restricted in Myanmar townships (Updated 12 May 2020 ). https://web.archive.org/web/20210510032911/https://www.telenor.com/internet-services-restricted-in-five-townships-in-myanmar-03-february-2020/ Telenor Group. 2020. Internet services restricted in Myanmar townships (Updated 12 May 2020). https://web.archive.org/web/20210510032911/https://www.telenor.com/internet-services-restricted-in-five-townships-in-myanmar-03-february-2020/
  5. Telenor Group . 2021 . Tweet: Telenor announces that cellular restrictions have been in place since March 15. https://web.archive.org/web/20210513080349/https://twitter.com/TelenorGroup/status/1372097178676641793 Telenor Group. 2021. Tweet: Telenor announces that cellular restrictions have been in place since March 15. https://web.archive.org/web/20210513080349/https://twitter.com/TelenorGroup/status/1372097178676641793
  6. Freedom House . 2020 . Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2020 Country Report | Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2020 Freedom House. 2020. Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2020 Country Report | Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2020
  7. OpenNet Initiative . 2004. Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2004 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210702013116/https://opennet.net/studies/saudi OpenNet Initiative. 2004. Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2004. https://web.archive.org/web/20210702013116/https://opennet.net/studies/saudi
  8. Amnesty International . 2021 . Myanmar: New internet blackout "heinous and reckless". https://web.archive.org/web/20210702012636/https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/myanmar-new-internet-blackout/ Amnesty International. 2021. Myanmar: New internet blackout "heinous and reckless". https://web.archive.org/web/20210702012636/https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/myanmar-new-internet-blackout/
  9. Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI). 2021. OONI web connectivity measurements for Myanmar from February 1st to April 30th 2021 . https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-05-01&since=2021-02-01&probe_cc=MM&test_name=web_connectivity/ Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI). 2021. OONI web connectivity measurements for Myanmar from February 1st to April 30th 2021. https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-05-01&since=2021-02-01&probe_cc=MM&test_name=web_connectivity/
  10. Stephanie Wang and Shishir Nagaraja. 2007. Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma. https://web.archive.org/web/20210701131103/https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Bulletin_Burma_2007.pdf Stephanie Wang and Shishir Nagaraja. 2007. Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma. https://web.archive.org/web/20210701131103/https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Bulletin_Burma_2007.pdf

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Padmanabhan, R., Filastò, A., Xynou, M., Raman, R. S., Middleton, K., Zhang, M., Madory, D., Roberts, M., & Dainotti, A.
Affiliations
  • University of California San Diego (US)
  • University of Michigan (US)
  • Kentik
Venue
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet
Publisher
ACM
Published
2021-08-23
Pages
27-36
OpenAlex
W3194927259
Cited by
40
References
34
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 2
FWCI
3.47
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Funders
National Science Foundation (1705024)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
  • Social Sciences › Law › Freedom of Expression and Defamation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
Keywords
internet censorship, Myanmar, 2021 Myanmar military coup, social media blocking, website blocking, online freedom of expression

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