A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 26 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
In the wake of a military coup in February 2021, Myanmar experienced unprecedented levels of Internet censorship. Beginning with haphazard blocking of social media and intermittent Internet connectivity outages, controls proceeded to stricter blocking of websites, the shutdown of cellular data in several networks, and nearly complete disconnection from the Internet every night. In this study, we use diverse datasets and measurement methods to offer a holistic view into the censorship events in Myanmar that occurred since the coup and show how Internet censorship evolved during this time.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper presents a multi-source measurement study of Internet censorship in Myanmar after the February 1, 2021 military coup. Using IODA, Kentik traffic, and OONI measurements, it documents country-wide outages, cellular restrictions, website/social-media blocking, and one Twitter BGP hijack with collateral damage.
## Key findings
- A significant coup-day outage began at 21:00 UTC on Jan. 31 / 03:30 local time on Feb. 1; on IODA BGP data, reachable /24 blocks dropped from 695 to 376, a 46% decrease.
- From Feb. 14 to Apr. 28, Myanmar experienced nightly country-wide outages for 72 nights straight; these began at 18:30 UTC / 01:00 local time and lasted 8 hours on most nights.
- From Mar. 15, cellular connectivity was “heavily restricted,” visible in Kentik traffic but not in IODA; the restrictions were still ongoing as of mid-May 2021.
- OONI data from Feb. 1 to Apr. 30, 2021 showed widespread website/social-media blocking, including DNS, TCP/IP, and HTTP blocking; the paper reports 174 domains had DNS-based blocking in prior 2020 OONI data on Telenor Myanmar.
- On Feb. 5, Campana Mythic (AS136168) announced Twitter’s 104.244.42.0/24 prefix, and the illegitimate route propagated to operators in Singapore and Vietnam, causing collateral damage for Twitter users outside Myanmar.
## Methods
- The study combines three measurement sources: IODA for macroscopic outages, Kentik NetFlow-based aggregated traffic for traffic and cellular connectivity, and OONI Web Connectivity measurements for website/social-media blocking.
- The traffic dataset covers Jan. 30 to May 05, 2021; the OONI web connectivity analysis covers Feb. 1 to Apr. 30, 2021; the BGP analysis uses RouteViews and RIPE RIS data.
- Main analysis is descriptive and comparative: the authors align timelines across datasets, inspect outage timing and duration, classify OONI anomalies as DNS/TCP/IP/HTTP blocking, and trace the BGP hijack and its propagation.
## Limitations
- The paper states that some findings are based on publicly available datasets and a proprietary Kentik dataset; it does not claim direct ground truth from within Myanmar’s networks.
- IODA has limited visibility into cellular networks, which the paper says is why Kentik was needed to observe cellular restrictions.
- Evident from the text: the study’s conclusions are constrained by the measurement windows reported for each dataset (Jan. 30–May 05 for Kentik, Feb. 1–Apr. 30 for OONI), so events outside those periods are not assessed.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
2 Valid · 0 Not valid · 12 Not checked · 78 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“First, the timing of censorship during a coup is consistent with many studies that have shown that Internet censorship is targeted during sensitive political time periods and periods of potential power transitions, such as elections and large-scale protests [23,25,44,47,73].”
§ A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar > 4 DISCUSSION
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [23] 23. Tina Freyburg and Lisa Garbe. 2018. Blocking the bottleneck: Internet shutdowns and ownership at election times in sub-Saharan Africa. International Journal of Communication 12 (2018), 3896-3916.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [25] 25. Anita R Gohdes. 2015. Pulling the plug: Network disruptions and violence in civil conflict. Journal of Peace Research 52, 3 (2015), 352-367. source
- Partly supportedcites [44] 44. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts. 2013. How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression. American Political Science Review (2013), 326-343. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
- Supportedcites [47] 47. Philipp M Lutscher, Nils B Weidmann, Margaret E Roberts, Mattijs Jonker, Alistair King, and Alberto Dainotti. 2020. At home and abroad: The use of denial-of- service attacks during elections in nondemocratic regimes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, 2-3 (2020), 373-401. source
In “A Tool for Censorship,” the paper describes DoS attacks on opposition and news websites around elections and during the 2014 Hong Kong protests. Its Abstract also reports an increase in attacks during election periods in more authoritarian regimes. The citing paper’s comparison with censorship during a coup is its own framing, not a finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [73] 73. Ram Sundara Raman, Prerana Shenoy, Katharina Kohls, and Roya Ensafi. 2020. Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship Observatory. In ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Nightly country-wide Internet connectivity shutdowns occurred continuously for more than two months, normalizing Internet curfews.”
§ A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar > 1 INTRODUCTION
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“While the outage is visible in the BGP and Active Probing data sources-with the number of /24 address blocks in Myanmar reachable on BGP dropping from 695 to 376, a decrease of 46%-it is less evident in the Darknet and Kentik Traffic data sources.”
§ A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar > 3.2 Internet connectivity outages
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Beginning with haphazard blocking of social media and intermittent Internet connectivity outages, controls proceeded to stricter blocking of websites, the shutdown of cellular data in several networks, and nearly complete disconnection from the Internet every night.”
§ A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar > Abstract
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“with the number of /24 address blocks in Myanmar reachable on BGP dropping from 695 to 376, a decrease of 46%”
§ A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar > 3.2 Internet connectivity outages
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Repression in the Digital Age: Surveillance, Censorship, and the Dynamics of State Violence
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Destination Unreachable: Characterizing Internet Outages and Shutdowns
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“Governments have sometimes mandated the complete disconnection of users from the Internet [19, 47], while at other times, they have blocked specific websites [57], social media platforms [6], and circumvention tools [48].”
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“For instance, Padmanabhan et al. (2021) outline the various layers of internet shutdowns and censorship employed by Myanmar in the wake of a military coup that aimed to reverse democratic progresses.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Padmanabhan, R., Filastò, A., Xynou, M., Raman, R. S., Middleton, K., Zhang, M., Madory, D., Roberts, M., & Dainotti, A.
- Affiliations
- University of California San Diego (US)
- University of Michigan (US)
- Kentik
- Venue
- Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2021-08-23
- Pages
- 27-36
- OpenAlex
- W3194927259
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 3.47
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1705024)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Social Sciences › Law › Freedom of Expression and Defamation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Keywords
- internet censorship, Myanmar, 2021 Myanmar military coup, social media blocking, website blocking, online freedom of expression
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