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PreprintCited by 2Media Influence and PoliticsPolitical Conflict and GovernanceGame Theory and Applications

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Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup

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Boleslavsky, Raphael, Shadmehr, Mehdi, Sonin, Konstantin·2018·SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.3251019
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Abstract

Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore him after a palace coup. In choosing media freedom, the leader trades off these conflicting effects. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime change global game, and media freedom is a ruler’s instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler’s favor to being against him. This introduces convexities in the ruler’s Bayesian persuasion problem, causing him to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.

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Metadata

Authors
Boleslavsky, R., Shadmehr, M., & Sonin, K.
Affiliations
  • University of Miami (US)
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
ORCID
Venue
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2018
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.3251019
OpenAlex
W3123696858
Cited by
2
References
48
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2021: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
freedom of the press, palace coup, popular protest, regime change, Bayesian persuasion, information asymmetry, global games, political communication, informed citizens

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2139/ssrn.3251019
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Boleslavsky, R., Shadmehr, M., & Sonin, K. (2018). Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3251019