Guilty Artificial Minds: Folk Attributions of Mens Rea and Culpability to Artificially Intelligent Agents
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook.
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Citations
Cites
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“In a survey of 2,399 participants, Gray, Gray and Wegner found that a social robot was perceived to have more mental capacities (self-control, emotion recognition, planning, communication and thought) than chimps, dogs, babies and frogs [38].”
BackgroundThe responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata
Matthias, A. (2004) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-004-3422-1 · Cited by 1,101 · cited 1×
“A question that naturally arises is this: Who is morally responsible when things go wrong? There might, in fact, arise situations where nobody is to blame for harmful outcomes produced by AI-driven, autonomous systems, a phenomenon that has been discussed under the label of “responsibility gaps” [1], [7]–[13].”
BackgroundMind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387 · Cited by 1,008 · cited 1×
“This raises two questions: First , do people tend to attribute mental 2 Gray, Young, and Waytz, for instance, argue that “mind perception is the essence of moral judgment” [33, p. 101].”
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Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Affective computing: challenges
Picard, R. W. (2003) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/s1071-5819(03)00052-1 · Cited by 978
People are averse to machines making moral decisions.
Bigman, Y. E., & Gray, K. (2018) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003 · Cited by 738 · cited 4×
“Bigman and Gray trace this connection back, philosophically, to Hume and Kant, via considerations of autonomy [34].”
BackgroundInfluentialMalle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
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“Despite the fact that there are good reasons against mentalizing AI systems [72]–[74], we found that participants do mentalize both artificial and group agents.”
BackgroundSacrifice One For the Good of Many?: People Apply Different Moral Norms to Human and Robot Agents
Malle, B. F., Scheutz, M., Arnold, T., Voiklis, J., & Cusimano, C. (2015) · Proceedings of the Tenth Annual ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction · doi:10.1145/2696454.2696458 · Cited by 246 · cited 4×
“For instance, in some of the studies mentioned above, participants blamed humans more than artificial agents for actions (at least in trolley cases), whereas for omissions, artificial agents were blamed more than humans [2], [26], [27], [31].”
BackgroundResultInfluentialNyholm, S. (2018) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-017-9943-x · Cited by 242 · cited 1×
“Still, there is broad agreement with Sparrow’s empirical hunch concerning the absurdity of blaming robots [10], [14], [15], [17].”
BackgroundRobots, law and the retribution gap
Danaher, J. (2016) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-016-9403-3 · Cited by 192
The Rhetoric and Reality of Anthropomorphism in Artificial Intelligence
Watson, D. (2019) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-019-09506-6 · Cited by 148
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Racism, responsibility and autonomy in HCI: Testing perceptions of an AI agent
Hong, J.-W., & Williams, D. (2019) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2019.06.012 · Cited by 69
Cited by
Inie, N., Druga, S., Zukerman, P., & Bender, E. M. (2024) · The 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3630106.3659040 · Cited by 39
“When probabilistic automation systems are perceived as autonomous agents, it raises complex questions about accountability [4, 21, 48].”
BackgroundAnthis, J. R., Pauketat, J. V. T., Ladak, A., & Manoli, A. (2025) · Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3706598.3713329 · Cited by 24
“…and human-robot interaction (HRI) literatures that “computers are social actors” (CASA) [73, 122]; are perceived as having their own minds [58, 152, 164, 169, 175]; and can be perceived as moral patients or subjects with their own welfare [48, 66, 82, 107, 130] and as moral agents worthy of…”
Anthis, J. R., Pauketat, J. V. T., Ladak, A., & Manoli, A. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.08867 · Cited by 24
The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One
Manoli, A., Pauketat, J. V. T., & Anthis, J. R. (2025) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3711083 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Stuart, M. T., & Kneer, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction
- Published
- 2021-10-13
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- CSCW2
- Pages
- 1-27
- ISSN
- 2573-0142 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3205553525
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 3.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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