Eluding Secure Aggregation in Federated Learning via Model Inconsistency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Secure aggregation is a cryptographic protocol that securely computes the aggregation of its inputs. It is pivotal in keeping model updates private in federated learning. Indeed, the use of secure aggregation prevents the server from learning the value and the source of the individual model updates provided by the users, hampering inference and data attribution attacks.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Wang, Y., Su, Z., Guo, S., Dai, M., Luan, T. H., & Liu, Y. (2023) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2023.3263909 · Cited by 357
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“Privacy-preserving machine learning techniques such as federated learning [24,25] and secure model aggregation [26] allow for training machine learning models on distributed edge devices without exposing raw data.”
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“Top Security [49] ◦ • ◦ ◦ [42] ◦ ◦ • • [39] ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ [50] • ◦ ◦ ◦ [51] • • ◦ ◦ [52] ◦ ◦ ◦ • [53] ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ [54] • ◦ ◦ ◦ [55] • • ◦ ◦ [56] ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ [35] • • ◦ ◦ [57] ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ [58] ◦ ◦ ◦ • [59] • • ◦ ◦”
Zhao, J., Bagchi, S., Avestimehr, S., Chan, K., Chaterji, S., Dimitriadis, D., Li, J., Li, N., Nourian, A., & Roth, H. (2025) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3724113 · Cited by 63
Metadata
- Authors
- Pasquini, D., Francati, D., & Ateniese, G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2022-11-07
- Pages
- 2429-2443
- OpenAlex
- W3212079419
- Cited by
- 104
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 13.78
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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