Cited by 11Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in Computing

Robust Federated Learning for Ubiquitous Computing through Mitigation of Edge-Case Backdoor Attacks

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Elhattab, Fatima, Bouchenak, Sara, Talbi, Rania, Nitu, Vlad·2022·Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) allows several data owners to train a joint model without sharing their training data. Such a paradigm is useful for better privacy in many ubiquitous computing systems. However, FL is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious participants attempt to inject a backdoor task in the model at training time, along with the main task that the model was initially trained for. Recent works show that FL is particularly vulnerable to edge-case backdoors introduced by data points with unusual out-of-distribution features. Such attacks are among the most difficult to counter, and today's FL defense mechanisms usually fail to tackle them. In this paper, we present ARMOR, a defense mechanism that leverages adversarial learning to uncover edge-case backdoors. In contrast to most of existing FL defenses, ARMOR does not require real data samples and is compatible with secure aggregation, thus, providing better FL privacy protection. ARMOR relies on GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks) to extract data features from model updates, and uses the generated samples to test the activation of potential edge-case backdoors in the model. Our experimental evaluations with three widely used datasets and neural networks show that ARMOR can tackle edge-case backdoors with 95% resilience against attacks, and without hurting model quality.

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  • Defense during the aggregation phase can use a robust aggregator based on statistical methods that calculates statistical features of model updates, including average and median, and selects one or more participants as reference to detect malicious updates.

    “defenders design a robust aggregator based on statistical methods [194], [208]. By calculating the statistical features of model updates, including average and median, one or more participants are selected as the reference to detect the malicious updates [193], [209].”
  • The defender at the post-aggregation stage can handle model poisoning backdoor attacks, including model replacement backdoor attack and weight scaling backdoor attack.

    “The defender at this stage can well handle the model poisoning backdoor attacks, including model replacement backdoor attack [37], [208], [223] and weight scaling backdoor attack [38], [194].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 13

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  2. Gilad Baruch, Moran Baruch, and Yoav Goldberg. 2019. A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learning. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019, NeurIPS 2019, December 8-14, 2019,, Hanna M. Wallach, Hugo Larochelle, Alina Beygelzimer, Florence d'Alché-Buc, Emily B. Fox, and Roman Garnett (Eds.). NIPS, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 8632-8642. https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2019/hash/ec1c59141046cd1866bbbcdfb6ae31d4-Abstract.html
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Cited by

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Authors
Elhattab, F., Bouchenak, S., Talbi, R., & Nitu, V.
Affiliations
  • Laboratoire d'Informatique en Images et Systèmes d'Information (FR)
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
Venue
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies
Published
2022-12-21
Volume
6
Issue
4
Pages
1-27
ISSN
2474-9567 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4315630926
Cited by
11
References
22
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 2
FWCI
0.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive Mobile Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
Funders
Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-17-LCV2-0014, 0014-01, ANR-17)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
federated learning, backdoor attacks, poisoning attacks, adversarial learning, generative adversarial networks, secure aggregation, privacy preservation, armor, out-of-distribution data, attack detection

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