Cited by 615Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in Computing

Manipulating the Byzantine: Optimizing Model Poisoning Attacks and Defenses for Federated Learning

Open access
Shejwalkar, Virat, Houmansadr, Amir·2021·Proceedings 2021 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

Abstract

Federated learning (FL) enables many data owners (e.g., mobile devices) to train a joint ML model (e.g., a nextword prediction classifier) without the need of sharing their private training data.However, FL is known to be susceptible to poisoning attacks by malicious participants (e.g., adversaryowned mobile devices) who aim at hampering the accuracy of the jointly trained model through sending malicious inputs during the federated training process.In this paper, we present a generic framework for model poisoning attacks on FL.We show that our framework leads to poisoning attacks that substantially outperform state-of-the-art model poisoning attacks by large margins.For instance, our attacks result in 1.5× to 60× higher reductions in the accuracy of FL models compared to previously discovered poisoning attacks.Our work demonstrates that existing Byzantine-robust FL algorithms are significantly more susceptible to model poisoning than previously thought.Motivated by this, we design a defense against FL poisoning, called divide-and-conquer (DnC).We demonstrate that DnC outperforms all existing Byzantine-robust FL algorithms in defeating model poisoning attacks, specifically, it is 2.5× to 12× more resilient in our experiments with different datasets and models.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.14722/ndss.2021.24498

Cites

32 of 32 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Supriyo Chakraborty, Prateek Mittal, and Seraphin Calo. Analyzing federated learning through an adversarial lens. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 634-643, 2019.
  2. Sebastian Caldas, Peter Wu, Tian Li, Jakub Konečnỳ, H Brendan McMahan, Virginia Smith, and Ameet Talwalkar. Leaf: A benchmark for federated settings. arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.01097, 2018. · arXiv
  3. Matthew Jagielski, Aline Oprea, Battista Biggio, Chang Liu, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Bo Li. Manipulating machine learning: Poisoning attacks and countermeasures against regression learning. 39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2018.
  4. Peter Kairouz, H Brendan McMahan, Brendan Avent, Aurélien Bellet, Mehdi Bennis, Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Keith Bonawitz, Zachary Charles, Graham Cormode, Rachel Cummings, et al. Advances and open problems in federated learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.04977, 2019. · arXiv
  5. Jakub Konečnỳ, H Brendan McMahan, Felix X Yu, Peter Richtárik, Ananda Theertha Suresh, and Dave Bacon. Federated learning: Strategies for improving communication efficiency. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05492, 2016. · arXiv
  6. Jakub Konečný, H. Brendan McMahan, Felix X. Yu, Peter Richtárik, Ananda Theertha Suresh, and Dave Bacon. Federated learning: Strategies for improving communication efficiency. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05492, 2017. · arXiv
  7. Cong Xie, Sanmi Koyejo, and Indranil Gupta. Fall of empires: Breaking byzantine-tolerant sgd by inner product manipulation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.03936, 2019. · arXiv

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Shejwalkar, V., & Houmansadr, A.
Affiliations
University of Massachusetts Amherst (US)
Corresponding author
Shejwalkar, Virat
Venue
Proceedings 2021 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
Published
2021
OpenAlex
W3138153888
Cited by
615
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 123 · 2025: 183 · 2024: 158 · 2023: 96 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 12
FWCI
35.62
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (1739462)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
federated learning, model poisoning, Byzantine attacks, attack optimization, malicious participants, next-word prediction

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review