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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 65 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 75 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

How many FIDO protocols are needed? Analysing the technology, security and compliance

Open access
Angelogianni, Anna, Politis, Ilias, Xenakis, Christos · 2024 · ACM Computing Surveys

Abstract

To overcome the security vulnerabilities caused by weak passwords, thus bridge the gap between user friendly interfaces and advanced security features, the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) alliance defined a number of authentication protocols. The existing literature leverages all versions of the FIDO protocols, without indicating the reasons behind the choice of each individual FIDO protocol (i.e., U2F, UAF, FIDO2). Inevitably, the question “which protocol is more suitable per case” becomes significant. To provide an answer to the previous question, this article performs a thorough comparative analysis on the different protocol specifications and their technological and market support, to identify whether any protocol has become obsolete. To reach to a conclusion, the proposed approach (i) explores the existing literature, (ii) analyses the specifications released by the FIDO Alliance, elaborating on the security characteristics, (iii) inspects the technical adoption by the industry and (iv) investigates the compliance of the FIDO with standards, regulations and other identity verification protocols. Our results indicate that FIDO2 is the most widely adopted solution; however, U2F remains supported by numerous web services as a two-factor authentication (2FA) choice, while UAF continues to be utilised in mobile clients seeking to offer the Transaction Confirmation feature.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This survey compares the FIDO protocol family across technology, security, compliance, and real-world adoption to answer whether one protocol has become the clear default. The paper finds that FIDO2 is the most broadly supported and popular, but U2F and especially UAF still have meaningful roles in some deployments.

## Key findings

  • The literature and adoption review point to FIDO2 as the most common protocol in research and practice; the paper reports 580 public repositories for FIDO2/WebAuthn, 786 for U2F, 81 for UAF, and 122 for CTAP2 on GitHub.
  • U2F remains widely used as a two-factor option, while FIDO2 supports both 2FA and passwordless authentication; the paper says several services have moved from U2F to FIDO2, but U2F is not yet marked legacy.
  • UAF is less broadly supported, but the paper argues it is still relevant for mobile apps, especially where Transaction Confirmation is needed; it also highlights UAF use in banking and health-related services.
  • The paper reports that all major browsers support FIDO2 and U2F, and that FIDO2/U2F have broader operating-system support than UAF; in its survey, FIDO2 and U2F were supported by all major desktop OSs, while UAF lacked comparable OS support.

## Methods

  • The paper is a comparative survey and technical review of U2F, UAF, and FIDO2/WebAuthn/CTAP2, combining specification analysis, security analysis, and compliance review.
  • It performs a literature review, examines FIDO Alliance specifications and message flows, and surveys adoption across open-source projects, operating systems, browsers, websites, and mobile applications.
  • For adoption, it uses GitHub repository searches and keyword-based/manual inspection of websites and Android apps; the mobile app survey spans November 2020 to April 2022.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that its website and mobile application findings are indicative rather than definitive, because reverse engineering can be blocked by obfuscation and other anti-analysis measures, and some services hide authentication details behind login steps.
  • The authors note that the mobile-app study is constrained by the available sample and by platform support, and they explicitly say a broader time window would be needed for a more precise trend on UAF decline.
  • Evident from the text: the open-source counts and web/mobile adoption results depend on keyword-based searches and manual checks, so protocols or implementations that are not clearly named may be missed.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3654661

Cites

65 of 65 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 48 Not valid · 61 Not checked · 223 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 17

  1. BalDirk Balfanz, Alexei Czeskis, Jeff Hodges, J. C. Jones, Michael B. Jones, Akshay Kumar, Angelo Liao, Rolf Lindemann, and Emil Lundberg. [n.d.]. Web Authentication: An API for Accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1. Technical Report.
  2. Stéphane Ciolino, Simon Parkin, and Paul Dunphy. 2019. Of two minds about two-factor: Understanding everyday FIDO U2F usability through device comparison and experience sampling. In Proceedings of the 15th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2019). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2019/presentation/ciolino
  3. Sanchari Das, Andrew Dingman, and L. Jean Camp. 2018. Why johnny doesn’t use two factor a two-phase usability study of the FIDO U2F security key. In Proceedings of the Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Sarah Meiklejohn and Kazue Sako (Eds.), Springer, Berlin, 160–179.
  4. Florian M. Farke, Lennart Lorenz, Theodor Schnitzler, Philipp Markert, and Markus Dürmuth. 2020. “You still use the password after all” – Exploring FIDO2 Security Keys in a Small Company. In Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2020). USENIX Association, 19–35. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2020/presentation/farke
  5. Alex Gaynor. 2021. Quantifying Memory Unsafety and Reactions to It. USENIX Association.
  6. Athanasios Vasileios Grammatopoulos, Ilias Politis, and Christos Xenakis. 2022. Blind software-assisted conformance and security assessment of FIDO2/WebAuthn implementations. Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications 13, 2 (2022), 96–127.
  7. Galen Hunt George Letey and Edmund B. Nightingale. [n.d.]. The Seven Properties of Highly Secured Devices. Retrieved March 5 2021 from https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/uploads/prod/2020/11/Seven-Properties-of-Highly-Secured-Devices-2nd-Edition-R1.pdf
  8. Johannes Kunke, Stephan Wiefling, Markus Ullmann, and Luigi Lo Iacono. 2021. Evaluation of account recovery strategies with fido2-based passwordless authentication. In Proceedings of the Open Identity Summit 2021, Copenhagen, Denmark, Juni 1-2, 2021(LNI, Vol. P-312). Heiko Roßnagel, Christian H. Schunck, and Sebastian Mödersheim (Eds.), Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V., 59–70.
  9. Leona Lassak, Annika Hildebrandt, Maximilian Golla, and Blase Ur. 2021. “It’s stored, hopefully, on an encrypted server’’: Mitigating users’ misconceptions about FIDO2 biometric WebAuthn. In Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21). USENIX Association, 91–108. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/lassak
  10. Kevin Lee, Benjamin Kaiser, Jonathan Mayer, and Arvind Narayanan. 2020. An empirical study of wireless carrier authentication for SIM swaps. In Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2020). USENIX Association, 61–79. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2020/presentation/lee
  11. Daniel Moghimi, Berk Sunar, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Nadia Heninger. 2020. TPM-FAIL: TPM meets timing and lattice attacks. In Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20). USENIX Association, 2057–2073. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/moghimi-tpm
  12. Kentrell Owens, Olabode Anise, Amanda Krauss, and Blase Ur. 2021. User perceptions of the usability and security of smartphones as FIDO2 roaming authenticators. In Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2021). USENIX Association, 57–76. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2021/presentation/owens
  13. G. Patat and M. Sabt. 2020. Please remember me: Security analysis of U2F remember me implementations in the wild. In Proceedings of the 18ème Symposium sur la sécurité des Technologies de l’information et des Communications (SSTIC). Rennes, France.
  14. Ken Reese, Trevor Smith, Jonathan Dutson, Jonathan Armknecht, Jacob Cameron, and Kent Seamons. 2019. A usability study of five two-factor authentication methods. In Proceedings of the 15th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2019). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 357–370. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2019/presentation/reese
  15. Thomas Roche, Victor Lomné, Camille Mutschler, and Laurent Imbert. 2021. A side journey to titan. In Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21). USENIX Association, 231–248. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/roche
  16. Enis Ulqinaku Hala Assal AbdelRahman Abdou Sonia Chiasson and Srdjan Capkun. 2021. Is Real-time phishing eliminated with FIDO? Social engineering downgrade attacks against FIDO protocols. In 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security’21). USENIX Association 3811–3828. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/ulqinaku
  17. Daniel Votipka, Kelsey R. Fulton, James Parker, Matthew Hou, Michelle L. Mazurek, and Michael Hicks. 2020. Understanding security mistakes developers make: Qualitative analysis from Build It, Break It, Fix It. In Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20). USENIX Association, 109–126. Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/votipka-understanding

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Angelogianni, A., Politis, I., & Xenakis, C.
Affiliations
  • University of Piraeus (GR)
  • InQbit Innovations SRL, Bucharest Romania
Venue
ACM Computing Surveys
Published
2024-04-26
Volume
56
Issue
8
Pages
1-51
ISSN
  • 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-7341
OpenAlex
W4393224639
Cited by
16
References
64
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 1
FWCI
5.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM Computing Surveys (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Signal Processing › Biometric Identification and Security
Keywords
FIDO2, two-factor authentication, password security, protocol adoption, security standards compliance, identity verification, transaction confirmation

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