Cited by 15Speech Recognition and SynthesisDigital Media Forensic DetectionMisinformation and Its Impacts

"Better Be Computer or I'm Dumb": A Large-Scale Evaluation of Humans as Audio Deepfake Detectors

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Warren, Kevin, Tucker, Tyler, Crowder, Anna, Olszewski, Daniel, Lu, Allison, Fedele, Caroline, Pasternak, Magdalena, Layton, Seth +3 more·2024·Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Audio deepfakes represent a rising threat to trust in our daily communications. In response to this, the research community has developed a wide array of detection techniques aimed at preventing such attacks from deceiving users. Unfortunately, the creation of these defenses has generally overlooked the most important element of the system - the user themselves. As such, it is not clear whether current mechanisms augment, hinder, or simply contradict human classification of deepfakes. In this paper, we perform the first large-scale user study on deepfake detection. We recruit over 1,200 users and present them with samples from the three most widely-cited deepfake datasets. We then quantitatively compare performance and qualitatively conduct thematic analysis to motivate and understand the reasoning behind user decisions and differences from machine classifications. Our results show that users correctly classify human audio at significantly higher rates than machine learning models, and rely on linguistic features and intuition when performing classification. However, users are also regularly misled by pre-conceptions about the capabilities of generated audio (e.g., that accents and background sounds are indicative of humans). Finally, machine learning models suffer from significantly higher false positive rates, and experience false negatives that humans correctly classify when issues of quality or robotic characteristics are reported. By analyzing user behavior across multiple deepfake datasets, our study demonstrates the need to more tightly compare user and machine learning performance, and to target the latter towards areas where humans are less likely to successfully identify threats.

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  • Successful spoofing attacks are not necessarily implemented using the latest techniques and might not require the highest quality synthetic speech to fool a CM or an ASV system.

    “However, successful spoofing attacks are not necessarily implemented using the latest techniques, and might not even require the highest quality synthetic speech to fool a CM (Warren et al., 2024) or an ASV system (Jung et al., 2024).”

    From ASVspoof 5: Design, collection and validation of resources for spoofing, deepfake, and adversarial attack detection using crowdsourced speech (2026) · cites this paper as Warren et al., 2024

    In the Case (1) analysis (page unavailable), the paper reports that models sometimes missed deepfakes that humans described as robotic or poor quality. This supports the point that high-quality synthetic speech is not always needed to fool the tested detection models. The cited paper does not establish that successful attacks need not use the latest generation techniques; the ASV-system portion is attributed to a different citation. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In a large-scale user study involving over 1200 participants, human overall performance in classifying deepfake audio remains suboptimal in certain scenarios, particularly in complex environments.

    “Another large-scale user study [27] involving over 1200 participants showed that while humans can rely on intuition and linguistic features for classification, their overall performance remains suboptimal in certain scenarios, particularly in complex environments.”

    From Audio Deepfake Detection: What Has Been Achieved and What Lies Ahead (2025) · cites this paper as [27]

    The Introduction reports a study of over 1,200 participants with 73% classification accuracy, and §4.1 reports lower accuracy on some datasets. The paper also says participants rely on linguistic features and intuition (Abstract; Finding 3). It does not establish that performance is particularly suboptimal in complex environments; the tested conditions were samples from three audio-deepfake datasets, and no page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Existing machine learning models have not consistently outperformed human intuition in deepfake audio detection.

    “Furthermore, while existing machine learning models have achieved considerable progress, they have not consistently outperformed human intuition [27].”

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Cites

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Authors
Warren, K., Tucker, T., Crowder, A., Olszewski, D., Lu, A., Fedele, C., Pasternak, M., Layton, S., Butler, K., Gates, C., & Traynor, P.
Affiliations
  • University of Florida (US)
  • Dalhousie University (CA)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2024-12-02
Pages
2696-2710
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4405181098
Cited by
15
References
37
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 7
FWCI
4.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (CNS-1933208, CNS-2206950)
  • Office of Naval Research (ONR-OTA N00014-21-1-2658)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Speech Recognition and Synthesis
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
Keywords
deepfake audio, deepfake detection, user study, human-machine comparison, linguistic features, false positives, deepfake datasets, trust in communication

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