The DOI matches its Crossref record; 208 of the 208 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
Abstract
▪ Abstract For many decades, research in judgment and decision making has examined behavioral violations of rational choice theory. In that framework, rationality is expressed as a single correct decision shared by experimenters and subjects that satisfies internal coherence within a set of preferences and beliefs. Outside of psychology, social scientists are now debating the need to modify rational choice theory with behavioral assumptions. Within psychology, researchers are debating assumptions about errors for many different definitions of rationality. Alternative frameworks are being proposed. These frameworks view decisions as more reasonable and adaptive than previously thought. For example, “rule following.” Rule following, which occurs when a rule or norm is applied to a situation, often minimizes effort and provides satisfying solutions that are “good enough,” though not necessarily the best. When rules are ambiguous, people look for reasons to guide their decisions. They may also let their emotions take charge. This chapter presents recent research on judgment and decision making from traditional and alternative frameworks.
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Cites
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Cited by
Nature and Operation of Attitudes
Ajzen, I. (2001) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.27 · Cited by 4,321
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043 · Cited by 2,913
Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352
Adults' Statistical Literacy: Meanings, Components, Responsibilities
Gal, I. (2002) · International Statistical Review · doi:10.1111/j.1751-5823.2002.tb00336.x · Cited by 1,155
Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions
Tetlock, P. E. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00135-9 · Cited by 915
Metadata
- Authors
- Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., & Cooke, A. D. J.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 1998-02
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 447-477
- ISSN
- 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-2085
- OpenAlex
- W2146072196
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 208
- FWCI
- 1.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.