Functionally distinct language and Theory of Mind networks are synchronized at rest and during language comprehension
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Communication requires the abilities to generate and interpret utterances and to infer the beliefs, desires, and goals of others (“Theory of Mind”; ToM). These two abilities have been shown to dissociate: individuals with aphasia retain the ability to think about others’ mental states; and individuals with autism are impaired in social reasoning, but their basic language processing is often intact. In line with this evidence from brain disorders, functional MRI (fMRI) studies have shown that linguistic and ToM abilities recruit distinct sets of brain regions. And yet, language is a social tool that allows us to share thoughts with one another. Thus, the language and ToM brain networks must share information despite being implemented in distinct neural circuits. Here, we investigated potential interactions between these networks during naturalistic cognition using functional correlations in fMRI. The networks were functionally defined in individual participants, in terms of preference for sentences over nonwords for language, and for belief inference over physical-event processing for ToM, with both a verbal and a nonverbal paradigm. Although, across experiments, interregion correlations within each network were higher than between-network correlations, we also observed above-baseline synchronization of blood oxygenation level-dependent signal fluctuations between the two networks during rest and story comprehension. This synchronization was functionally specific: neither network was synchronized with the executive control network (functionally defined in terms of preference for a harder over easier version of an executive task). Thus, coordination between the language and ToM networks appears to be an inherent and specific characteristic of their functional architecture. NEW & NOTEWORTHY Humans differ from nonhuman primates in their abilities to communicate linguistically and to infer others’ mental states. Although linguistic and social abilities appear to be interlinked onto- and phylogenetically, they are dissociated in the adult human brain. Yet successful communication requires language and social reasoning to work in concert. Using functional MRI, we show that language regions are synchronized with social regions during rest and language comprehension, pointing to a possible mechanism for internetwork interaction.
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Citations
Cites
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“…on another, possibly complementary, way in which the language and ToM networks could communicate: synchronization of neural fluctuations, after removing the small number of overlapping voxels (e.g., Buckner et al. 2013; Engel et al. 2001; Fries 2005; Fries et al. 2001; Gray and Singer 1989).”
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Background
Cited by
The language network as a natural kind within the broader landscape of the human brain
Fedorenko, E., Ivanova, A. A., & Regev, T. I. (2024) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-024-00802-4 · Cited by 293
Self-citationBroca’s Area Is Not a Natural Kind
Fedorenko, E., & Blank, I. A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.01.001 · Cited by 264
Self-citationThe neurobiology of language beyond single-word processing
Hagoort, P. (2019) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aax0289 · Cited by 255
fMRI reveals language-specific predictive coding during naturalistic sentence comprehension
Shain, C., Blank, I. A., van Schijndel, M., Schuler, W., & Fedorenko, E. (2020) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.107307 · Cited by 215
Self-citationLanguage is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought
Fedorenko, E., Piantadosi, S. T., & Gibson, E. A. F. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07522-w · Cited by 190
“…reasoning 77–79 , formal logical reasoning 80,81 , performing demanding executive function tasks such as working memory or cognitive control tasks 77 , understanding computer code 82,83 , thinking about others’ mental states 84–86 , and making semantic judgments about objects or events 69,70,87 .”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Paunov, A. M., Blank, I. A., & Fedorenko, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Neurophysiology
- Publisher
- American Physiological Society
- Published
- 2019-04-01
- Volume
- 121
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1244-1265
- ISSN
- 0022-3077 (ISSN-L)
- 1522-1598
- OpenAlex
- W2907666841
- Cited by
- 104
- References
- 78
- FWCI
- 6.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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