CoChat

Security Challenges in Control Network Protocols: A Survey

Volkova, Anna, Niedermeier, Michael, Basmadjian, Robert, de Meer, Hermann · 2019 · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Cited by 114

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

With the ongoing adoption of remotely communicating and interacting control systems harbored by critical infrastructures, the potential attack surface of such systems also increases drastically. Therefore, not only the need for standardized and manufacturer-agnostic control system communication protocols has grown, but also the requirement to protect those control systems' communication. There have already been numerous security analyses of different control system communication protocols; yet, these have not been combined with each other sufficiently, mainly due to three reasons: First, the life cycles of such protocols are usually much longer than those of other Internet and communication technologies, therefore legacy protocols are often not considered in current security analyses. Second, the usage of certain control system communication protocols is usually restricted to a particular infrastructure domain, which leads to an isolated view on them. Third, with the accelerating pace at which both control system communication protocols and threats against them develop, existing surveys are aging at an increased rate, making their re-investigation a necessity. In this paper, a comprehensive survey on the security of the most important control system communication protocols, namely Modbus, OPC UA, TASE.2, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 60870-5-104, and IEC 61850 is performed. To achieve comparability, a common test methodology based on attacks exploiting well-known control system protocol vulnerabilities is created for all protocols. In addition, the effectiveness of the related security standard IEC 62351 is analyzed by a pre- and post-IEC 62351 comparison.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/comst.2018.2872114

Cites

12 of 12 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 12 references

Research works printed but not linked: 54

  1. kerkers, 2018, A tool for gererating automata of IEC60870-5-104 implementations, Proc 19th Int GI/ITG Conf Meas Model Eval Comput Syst, 1
  2. wright, 2016, Limitations of IEC 62351-3’s public key management, Proc IEEE 24th Int Conf Netw Protocols (ICNP), 1
  3. 10.2172/792866 · DOI
  4. 10.1109/ISGT.2014.6816375 · DOI
  5. rodofile, 2015, Real-time and interactive attacks on DNP3 critical infrastructure using scapy, Proc 13th Aust Inf Security Conf, 67
  6. 10.1109/ICIEA.2010.5514836 · doi:10.1109/iciea.2010.5514836
  7. ádámkó, 2018, Proposal of a secure Modbus RTU communication with Adi Shamir’s secret sharing method, Int J Electron Telecommun, 64, 107
  8. 10.1109/PES.2008.4596147 · DOI
  9. 10.1007/978-3-319-66402-6_23 · DOI
  10. 10.1109/ANTS.2016.7947865 · doi:10.1109/ants.2016.7947865
  11. 10.1109/TPWRD.2010.2043122 · DOI
  12. 10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.2 · DOI
  13. nagarajan, 2010, A generic role based access control model for wind power systems, J Wireless Mobile Netw Ubiquitous Comput Dependable Appl, 1, 35
  14. hohlbaum, 2010, Cyber security practical considerations for implementing IEC 62351, Proc Protect Autom Control World Conf
  15. 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2016.7778772 · DOI
  16. 10.1049/cp.2012.1831 · DOI · Paper page
  17. 10.1109/ICIW.2010.28 · DOI
  18. knapp, 2014, Industrial Network Security Securing Critical Infrastructure Networks for Smart Grid SCADA and Other Industrial Control Systems
  19. 10.1145/1132026.1132027 · DOI · Paper page
  20. 10.1109/MSP.2011.151 · doi:10.1109/msp.2011.151
  21. 10.3390/en5104091 · DOI
  22. 10.1109/HICSS.2007.48 · DOI
  23. east, 2009, A Taxonomy of Attacks on the DNP3 Protocol, 67
  24. 10.1007/s40012-013-0013-5 · DOI
  25. lee, 2014, Simulated attack on DNP3 protocol in SCADA system, Proc 31th Symp Cryptography Inf Security, 1
  26. rrushi, 2012, SCADA Protocol Vulnerabilities, 150
  27. maynard, 2014, Towards understanding man-in-the-middle attacks on IEC 60870-5-104 SCADA networks, Proc 2nd Int Symp ICS SCADA Cyber Security Res (BCS), 30
  28. 10.1109/ICMCIS.2015.7158687 · DOI
  29. stevens, 2013, New collision attacks on SHA-1 based on optimal joint local-collision analysis, Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2013, 245, 10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_15 · DOI
  30. 10.1109/TPWRD.2010.2050076 · DOI · Paper page
  31. 2010, STI Graduate Student Research as part of the Information Security Reading Room
  32. 10.1109/ICSGCE.2016.7876027 · DOI
  33. 10.1016/j.adhoc.2009.04.012 · DOI
  34. 10.1109/TSMCA.2010.2048028 · DOI · Paper page
  35. piètre-cambacédés, 2008, Cryptographic key management for SCADA systems-issues and perspectives, Proc IEEE Int Conf Inf Secur Assurance (ISA), 156
  36. saxena, 2011, Public Key Cryptography Based Approach for Securing SCADA Communications, 56
  37. 10.1109/PSCE.2009.4840174 · DOI
  38. johnson, 2010, Survey of SCADA security challenges and potential attack vectors, Proc Internet Technol Secured Trans Conf, 1
  39. 10.1109/ICIMU.2014.7066594 · DOI · Paper page
  40. alsiherov, 2010, Research trend on secure SCADA network technology and methods, WSEAS Trans Syst Control, 5, 635
  41. robinson, 2013, The SCADA threat landscape, Proc 1st Int Symp ICS SCADA Cyber Security Res (BCS), 30
  42. 10.1109/CPRE.2016.7914914 · DOI
  43. 10.1109/ICAT.2013.6684065 · DOI
  44. krotofil, 2013, Industrial control systems security: What is happening?, Proc IEEE Int Conf Ind Informatics, 670
  45. 10.1109/SSIC.2015.7245330 · DOI · Paper page
  46. 2008, Polish Teen Derails Tram after Hacking Train Network
  47. morris, 2013, Industrial control system cyber attacks, Proc of the 1st Int Symp for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research ICS-CSR, 22
  48. 10.1109/MSP.2015.47 · DOI
  49. 10.1109/ICCCYB.2010.5491317 · doi:10.1109/icccyb.2010.5491317
  50. kang, 2009, Compartmentalization of protocols in SCADA communication, Int J Adv Sci Technol, 8, 27
  51. 2012, IEEE Std 1815-2012 (Revision of IEEE Std 1815-2010) - Redline, IEEE Std 1815-2012 (Revision of IEEE Std 1815-2010) - Redline 1815-2012, 1
  52. 10.1109/IBSS.2015.7456631 · DOI
  53. 10.1109/ETFA.2015.7301457 · DOI
  54. kush, 2014, Poisoned GOOSE: Exploiting the GOOSE protocol, Proc Aust Inf Security Conf, 17

Cited by

See all 114

Metadata

Authors
Volkova, A., Niedermeier, M., Basmadjian, R., & de Meer, H.
Venue
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Published
2019
Volume
21
Issue
1
Pages
619-639
ISSN
  • 1553-877X (ISSN-L)
  • 2373-745X
OpenAlex
W2893861039
Cited by
114
References
12
FWCI
5.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Security Challenges in Control Network Protocols: A Survey. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/comst.2018.2872114
The paper
Volkova, A., Niedermeier, M., Basmadjian, R., & de Meer, H. (2019). Security Challenges in Control Network Protocols: A Survey. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials. https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2018.2872114

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.