The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality
Abstract
Salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay. These agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices, influence the timing of customer purchases, and vary effort over their firms' fiscal years. This paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents' focusing on performance over the fiscal year. Most notably, in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle, manufacturing firms' sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year, and lower at the beginning, than they are in the middle. Further evidence is found in fiscal-year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal-year effects.
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Citations
Cites
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The Effect of Sales Incentives on Business SeasonalityPreprint
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Self-citation
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9 · Cited by 1,567
Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India
Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/659655 · Cited by 823
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.163914 · Cited by 681
Performance standards in incentive contracts
Murphy, K. J. (2000) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00013-1 · Cited by 549
Metadata
- Authors
- Oyer, P.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-02-01
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 149-185
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2145626126
- Cited by
- 369
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 10.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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