Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. We develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible parametric model. We find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance. Our analysis contributes to a recent literature based on static data that has problems distinguishing between moral hazard and selection and dealing with dynamic features of actual insurance contracts. Methodologically, this paper builds on and extends the literature on state dependence and heterogeneity in event-history data.
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Citations
Cites
Weak Convergence and Empirical Processes
van der Vaart, A. W., & Wellner, J. A. (1996) · Springer Series in Statistics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-2545-2 · Cited by 5,014
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
Chiappori, P., & Salanie, B. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262111 · Cited by 1,013
Self-citationAsymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696362 · Cited by 411 · cited 2×
“For instance, Holly et al. (1998) and Cardon and Hendel (1998) estimate structural models of health insurance, while Chiappori, Durand, and Geoffard (1998) and Dionne, Maurice, Pinquet, and Vanasse (2001) exploit “natural experiments” in which a new regulation exogenously changes incentives.”
BackgroundAutomobile insurance ratemaking in the presence of asymmetrical information
Dionne, G., & Vanasse, C. (1992) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.3950070204 · Cited by 173 · cited 2×
“Puelz and Snow (1994), Dionne and Vanasse (1992), Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997, 2000), Dionne, Gourie´roux, and Vanasse (1999, 2001), and Richaudeau (1999), to name only a few, analyze car-insurance contracts, whereas Holly, Gardiol, Domenighetti, and Bisig (1998), Chiappori, Durand, and Geoffard…”
Background
Cited by
Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice
Cohen, A., & Einav, L. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 · Cited by 708
Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India
Giné, X., Townsend, R., & Vickery, J. (2008) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhn015 · Cited by 516
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices*
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., & Cullen, M. R. (2010) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.877 · Cited by 452
Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P. (2010) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01337.x · Cited by 418
Metadata
- Authors
- Abbring, J. H., Chiappori, P.-A., & Pinquet, J.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-06-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 767-820
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W2109589799
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 8.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Abbring, J. H., Chiappori, P.-A., & Pinquet, J. (2003). Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322493159
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