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Cited by 290

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence

Besley, Timothy·2004·Journal of the European Economic Association
DOI 10.1162/154247604323067925
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Abstract

Abstract This paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance. The paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two-period term limits. This model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems. We also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous. The main ideas in the model are confronted with data on U.S. governors.

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Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Besley, T.
Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2004-05-01
Volume
2
Issue
2-3
Pages
193-215
ISSN
  • 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
  • 1542-4774
DOI
10.1162/154247604323067925
OpenAlex
W1553761632
Cited by
290
References
33
FWCI
16.59
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/154247604323067925
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Besley, T. (2004). Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323067925

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.