The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
This paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance. The paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two-period term limits. This model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems. We also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous. The main ideas in the model are confronted with data on U.S. governors.
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Cites
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Cited by
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.1759 · Cited by 646
Blanes i Vidal, J., Draca, M., & Fons-Rosen, C. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3731 · Cited by 639
Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
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Self-citationA “Selection Model” of Political Representation*
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A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
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Metadata
- Authors
- Besley, T.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-05-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 193-215
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W1553761632
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 16.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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