I Did It: Unconscious Expectation of Sensory Consequences Modulates the Experience of Self-agency and Its Functional Signature
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The ability to recognize oneself in voluntary action is called the sense of agency and refers to the experience of causing one's own actions and their sensory consequences. This form of self-awareness is important not only for motor control but also for social interactions and the ascription of causal responsibility. Here, we examined the sense of agency at early and prereflective stages of action perception using ERPs. Subjects performed a visual forced-choice response task in which action effects were either caused by the subject or by the computer. In addition, to modulate the conscious experience of agency, action effects were subliminally primed by the presentation of congruent, incongruent, or neutral effect stimuli before the action. First, we observed sensorimotor attenuation in the visual ERP selectively for self-generated action effects. That is, the N1 component, a negative deflection around 100 msec after a visual stimulus, was smaller in amplitude for visual effects caused by the subject as compared with effects caused by the computer. Second, congruent effect priming enhanced the explicit judgment of agency and further reduced the N1 amplitude for self-generated effects, although effect primes were not consciously processed. Taken together, these results provide evidence of a top–down modulation of sensory processing of action effects by prior effect information and support the neurophysiological mechanism of sensorimotor attenuation as underlying self-registration in action. Our findings suggest that both efferent information and prior thoughts about the action consequence provide important cues for a prereflective form of the experience of being an agent.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 2×
“In contrast, the feeling of agency, being part of the “minimal” or “embodied” self ( Jeannerod, 2007; Gallagher, 2000), is not based on conscious reflection but is assumed to depend on automatic processing of central and peripheral signals generated by the action itself.”
BackgroundDas Reafferenzprinzip: Wechselwirkungen zwischen Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie
von Holst, E., & Mittelstaedt, H. (1950) · Naturwissenschaften · doi:10.1007/bf00622503 · Cited by 2,655
Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual inversion
Sperry, R. W. (1950) · Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0055479 · Cited by 1,789 · cited 1×
“It has been suggested that sensory attenuation reflects a reduction in the perceptual prediction error depending on forward model predictions based on efference copy (Blakemore et al., 2000; Sperry, 1950; von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950).”
Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (1998) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/2870 · Cited by 1,467
Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition priming
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Cohen, L., Bihan, D. L., Mangin, J.-F., Poline, J.-B., & Rivière, D. (2001) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/89551 · Cited by 1,305
Is the cerebellum a Smith predictor?
Miall, R. C., Weir, D. J., Wolpert, D. M., & Stein, J. F. (1993) · Journal of Motor Behavior · doi:10.1080/00222895.1993.9942050 · Cited by 1,071 · cited 1×
“The cerebellum and parietal cortex have been shown to play a central role in the processing of prediction error (Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003 ; Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998 ; Miall, Weir, Wolpert, & Stein, 1993 ).”
BackgroundAbnormalities in the awareness of action.
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01907-1 · Cited by 947
Why canʼt you tickle yourself?
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D., & Frith, C. (2000) · NeuroReport · doi:10.1097/00001756-200008030-00002 · Cited by 904
Spatio-Temporal Prediction Modulates the Perception of Self-Produced Stimuli
Blakemore, S.-J., Frith, C. D., & Wolpert, D. M. (1999) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/089892999563607 · Cited by 829
Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: abnormalities in the awareness of action.
Frith, C. (2000) · Brain Research Reviews · doi:10.1016/s0165-0173(99)00052-1 · Cited by 782
Cited by
Sense of agency in the human brain
Haggard, P. (2017) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2017.14 · Cited by 1,107
Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions
Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 · Cited by 488
Hughes, G., Desantis, A., & Waszak, F. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0028566 · Cited by 365
Early puzzle play: A predictor of preschoolers' spatial transformation skill.
Levine, S. C., Ratliff, K. R., Huttenlocher, J., & Cannon, J. (2012) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0025913 · Cited by 369
Tapal, A., Oren, E., Dar, R., & Eitam, B. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01552 · Cited by 302
Metadata
- Authors
- Gentsch, A., & Schütz-Bosbach, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2011-12-01
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3817-3828
- ISSN
- 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
- 1530-8898
- OpenAlex
- W2104848209
- Cited by
- 151
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 6.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: I Did It: Unconscious Expectation of Sensory Consequences Modulates the Experience of Self-agency and Its Functional Signature. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/jocn_a_00012
- The paper
- Gentsch, A., & Schütz-Bosbach, S. (2011). I Did It: Unconscious Expectation of Sensory Consequences Modulates the Experience of Self-agency and Its Functional Signature. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00012
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.