Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.
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Citations
Cites
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421174 · Cited by 2,460 · cited 1×
“Note in addition that unfavorable economic shocks are in fact a major driver of conflict (see Miguel et al (2004) or Ciccone (2008)).”
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy: (504012013-001)
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The security dilemma and ethnic conflict
Posen, B. R. (1993) · Survival · doi:10.1080/00396339308442672 · Cited by 1,420
Chassang, S., & Miquel, G. P. I. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00008072 · Cited by 194
Self-citation
Cited by
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · Cited by 1,187
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia
DellaVigna, S., Enikolopov, R., Mironova, V., Petrova, M., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.6.3.103 · Cited by 273
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change
Edmond, C. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17395 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Chassang, S., & Miquel, G. P. I.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-11-01
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1821-1858
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2109977182
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 14.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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