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Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk

Chassang, S., Miquel, G. P. I. · 2010 · The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Cited by 109

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.

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Crossref · 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821

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Metadata

Authors
Chassang, S., & Miquel, G. P. I.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2010-11-01
Volume
125
Issue
4
Pages
1821-1858
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2109977182
Cited by
109
References
6
FWCI
14.83
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821
The paper
Chassang, S., & Miquel, G. P. I. (2010). Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.