Cited by 194Political Conflict and GovernanceNatural Resources and Economic DevelopmentDefense, Military, and Policy Studies

Economic Shocks and Civil War

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Chassang, Sylvain, Miquel, Gerard Padrό i·2009·Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Abstract

This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We begin by documenting that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negative income shocks. In a formal model we examine an explanation often suggested in the informal literature: civil wars occur in poor countries because the opportunity cost of fighting is small. We show that while this explanation fails to make sense of the first empirical pattern, it provides a coherent theoretical basis for the second. We then enrich the model to allow for private imperfect information about the state of the economy and show that mutual fears exacerbate the problem caused by negative income shocks.

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Crossref · 10.1561/100.00008072

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  • Participation in conflict is more attractive when individuals expect to earn more from criminal or insurgent activities than from lawful and peaceful ones.

    “In such situations, participation in conflict is rated more attractive when individuals (especially low-income groups) expect to earn more from criminal or insurgent activities than from lawful and peaceful ones (Chassang and Padro i Miquel 2009, Koubi et al 2012).”

    From The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways (2024) · cites this paper as Chassang and Padro i Miquel 2009

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Authors
Chassang, S., & Miquel, G. P. I.
Affiliations
  • Princeton University (US)
  • LSE, BREAD and NBER
Corresponding author
Chassang, Sylvain
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Emerald
Published
2009-10-20
Volume
4
Issue
3
Pages
211-228
ISSN
  • 1554-0626 (ISSN-L)
  • 1554-0634
OpenAlex
W2167880899
Cited by
194
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 9
FWCI
34.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Quarterly Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
Funders
Economic and Social Research Council (ES/F041764/1)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
Keywords
civil war, economic shocks, per capita income, poverty, imperfect information, private information, civil conflict

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