Cited by 97Asian Industrial and Economic DevelopmentState Capitalism and Financial GovernanceChina's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance

What Is “Authoritarian” About Authoritarian Capitalism? The Dual Erosion of the Private–Public Divide in State-Dominated Business Systems

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Sallai, Dorottya, Schnyder, Gerhard·2021·Business & Society

Abstract

The “return of the state” as an economic actor has left scholars at a lack of theoretical tools to capture the characteristics of state-dominated business systems. This is reflected in the fact that any type of state intervention in the economy is too easily qualified as a sign of “authoritarian capitalism,” which has led scholars to lump together countries as diverse as China, Singapore, and Norway under that heading. Rather than considering any type of state intervention in the economy as authoritarian, we propose a more sophisticated conceptualization, which distinguishes two boundaries between the public and the private domains and conceives of the “return of the state” as the erosion of one or both of them. This conceptualization allows us to clearly distinguish a shift from an ideal-typical market-based “regulatory capitalism” to “state capitalism” or “authoritarian capitalism,” respectively. We use interview data with business leaders in an extreme case of the return of the state to identify the nature of the mechanisms by which an authoritarian government erodes these private-public divides. We argue that a focus on these constitutive mechanisms of the erosion of private-public divides allows us to define “authoritarian capitalism” in a way that makes it a useful tool to understand contexts beyond the Chinese case in which it first emerged.

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  • Foreign investors prefer to invest in democratic countries.

    “studies provide overwhelming evidence that foreign investors prefer to invest in democratic countries, 90”

    From Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as [90]

    The Data and Method section describes democratic backsliding in East Central Europe, while Data and analysis describes interviews with foreign firms in Hungary (page numbers unavailable). Neither passage addresses whether foreign investors prefer democratic countries. Searches for investor preferences, investment decisions, and foreign direct investment found no passage making that comparison. (LLM, conf=0.76)

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Authors
Sallai, D., & Schnyder, G.
Affiliations
  • London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
  • Loughborough University (GB)
Corresponding author
Sallai, Dorottya
Venue
Business & Society
Published
2020-01-15
Volume
60
Issue
6
Pages
1312-1348
ISSN
  • 0007-6503 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-4205
OpenAlex
W2995822815
Cited by
97
References
71
Citations by year
2026: 18 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1
FWCI
34.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Business & Society (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
  • King's College London
  • Deakin University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Asian Industrial and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › State Capitalism and Financial Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
Keywords
authoritarian capitalism, state capitalism, regulatory capitalism, return of the state, public and private spheres, state intervention in the economy, business systems, state-business relations, China, business executives

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