The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder?: A Political Economy of Extraction Framework
Open accessAbstract
This article proposes a political economy of extraction framework that explains political order and state collapse as alternative outcomes in the face of lootable wealth. Different types of institutions of extraction can be built on lootable resources—with divergent effects on political stability. If rulers are able to forge institutions of extraction that give them control of revenues generated by lootable resources, then these resources can contribute to political order by providing the income with which to govern. Conversely, the breakdown or absence of such institutions increases the risk of civil war by making it easier for rebels to organize. The framework is used to explain two puzzling cases that experienced sharply contrasting political trajectories in the face of lootable resources: Sierra Leone and Burma. A focus on institutions of extraction provides a stronger understanding of the wide range of political outcomes—from chaos, to dictatorship, to democracy—in resource-rich countries.
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Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
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Cited by
What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?
Ross, M. L. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043773 · Cited by 1,358
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · Cited by 1,187
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546
Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices
Bazzi, S., & Blattman, C. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.6.4.1 · Cited by 437
Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets
Snyder, R., & Duran-Martinez, A. (2009) · Crime, Law and Social Change · doi:10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z · Cited by 419
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Snyder, R.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 943-968
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W2125491572
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 24.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
