The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Looking for Audience Costs
Abstract
The methodological issues that arise in testing Fearon's argument about domestic political audience costs and signaling in international crises are examined, in particular the difficulty of finding direct evidence (1) that escalating a crisis and then backing down jeopardizes a leader's tenure in office, and (2) that democratic leaders are more vulnerable to removal in this event than are nondemocratic leaders. Tests that seek to measure the existence and magnitude of audience costs encounter severe problems of partial observability and strategic selection: the effect of audience costs on a leader's political survival can only be detected by looking at cases in which the costs are actually incurred, but strategic choice implies that the probability of incurring audience costs is a function of their value. A formal model, brief case studies, and Monte Carlo simulations are used to show that these problems bias direct tests against supporting either of the audience cost propositions. Tests based on observed audience costs understate both the mean level of audience costs in the full population and the difference in means across regime types.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944796 · Cited by 2,360
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586113 · Cited by 1,044
Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War
Lake, D. A. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964013 · Cited by 739
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Schultz, K. A. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658 · Cited by 692
Self-citationde Mesquita, B. B., & Siverson, R. M. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082512 · Cited by 654
Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict
Dixon, W. J. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944879 · Cited by 643
Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates “Waltz Before a Blind Audience?”
Aldrich, J. H., Sullivan, J. L., & Borgida, E. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956437 · Cited by 601
Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security
Russett, B. (1990) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674422629 · Cited by 498
Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises
Schultz, K. A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586306 · Cited by 492
Self-citationde Mesquita, B. B., & Lalman, D. (1992) · Cited by 484
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Smith, A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585485 · Cited by 458
Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems
Smith, A. (1996) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600934 · Cited by 457
Schultz, K. A. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899550878 · Cited by 437
Self-citationStrategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict
Signorino, C. S. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585396 · Cited by 417
War and reason: domestic and international imperatives
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-2354 · Cited by 393
The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-Experiments.
Bollen, K. A., & Achen, C. H. (1988) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2069714 · Cited by 386
Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?
Morgan, T. C., & Campbell, S. H. (1991) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002791035002003 · Cited by 358
Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World
Russett, B. (1994) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt7rqf6 · Cited by 358
The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985
Bennett, D. S., & Stam, A. C. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082882 · Cited by 333
To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision
Smith, A. (1996) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002796040001003 · Cited by 316
Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory
Reiter, D., & Stam, A. C. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585670 · Cited by 283
Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies
Walt, S. M. (1999) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.23.4.5 · Cited by 278
A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation
Reed, W. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669294 · Cited by 275
War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis
de Mesquita, B. B., Siverson, R. M., & Woller, G. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964127 · Cited by 251
Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94
Gelpi, C. F., & Griesdorf, M. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401003148 · Cited by 209
The American Political Science Association
(1904) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1273558 · Cited by 204
Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises
GUISINGER, A., & SMITH, A. (2002) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002702046002001 · Cited by 199
Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War
Stam III, A. (1996) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.14373 · Cited by 171
Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes
Partell, P. J., & Palmer, G. (1999) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00125 · Cited by 154
Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation
Smith, A. M. (1999) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991827 · Cited by 152
Goemans, H. E. (2000) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002700044005001 · Cited by 136
Sartori, A. E. (2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400849444 · Cited by 132
The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-Experiments
Achen, C. H. (2023) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/jj.5233016 · Cited by 41
Win, lose, or draw: domestic politics and the crucible of war
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-5351 · Cited by 30
Cited by
Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve
Weeks, J. L. (2008) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818308080028 · Cited by 828
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
Tomz, M. (2007) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818307070282 · Cited by 699
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court
Simmons, B. A., & Danner, A. (2010) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818310000044 · Cited by 466
The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
Huth, P. K., & Allee, T. L. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491405 · Cited by 450
Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?
Marinov, N. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x · Cited by 444
Metadata
- Authors
- Schultz, K. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2001-02
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 32-60
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2169253034
- Cited by
- 294
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 73.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.