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What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict

Narang, Vipin · 2013 · Journal of Conflict Resolution

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 70 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive “existential bias,” assuming that once a state merely possesses nuclear weapons, it should be able to deter armed conflict. The empirical literature expresses this bias by simply dichotomously coding a state based on whether it has nuclear weapons, thereby treating all nuclear states as equivalent. Thus, whether nuclear weapons deter conflict, and how much is required to do so, is unclear. This article shifts the unit of analysis away from nuclear weapons to postures, hypothesizing that different nuclear postures are distinct and generate differential deterrent power, particularly amongst the non-superpower states which comprise the lion’s share of nuclear powers. I find that an asymmetric escalation nuclear posture uniquely deters conflict initiation and escalation. Not only do small arsenals have little deterrence success, but I find that even assured retaliation postures fail to deter intense conventional conflict. This suggests that the deterrence dividend is distributed unequally across nuclear powers, and that states may need to do more than simply acquire nuclear weapons to successfully deter conventional attacks.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1177/0022002712448909

Cites

70 of 70 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. Cohen Avner., 2003, The New York Times
  2. Cohen Avner, 2005, Why Do States Want Nuclear Weapons: The Cases of Israel and South Africa
  3. Jervis Robert., 1989, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution
  4. Lavoy Peter, 2000, Planning the Unthinkable
  5. Lewis John, 1988, China
  6. Lieber Keir, 2009, Working Paper presented at Wisconsin International Relations Colloquium, University of Wisconsin-Madison, February 3, 2009
  7. Bundy McGeorge, 1984, The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, 3
  8. Narang Vipin, 2010, Posturing for Peace?: The Sources and Consequences of Regional Power Nuclear Postures
  9. Norris Robert, 2000, SIPRI Yearbook 2000
  10. Norris Robert S., 1994, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces
  11. Perkovich George., 1999, India’s Nuclear Bomb
  12. 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00203.x · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00203.x
  13. Snyder Glenn H., 1965, The Balance of Power, 185

Cited by

See all 58

Metadata

Authors
Narang, V.
Affiliations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
Corresponding author
Narang, Vipin
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
2012-07-09
Volume
57
Issue
3
Pages
478-508
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W2130791487
Cited by
58
References
70
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 5
FWCI
28.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Nuclear Issues and Defense
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
Keywords
nuclear deterrence, nuclear posture, conflict initiation, conflict escalation, nuclear arsenal

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Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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