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How Does It Work?: The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms

Bunge, Mario · 2004 · Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Cited by 501

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This article addresses the following problems: What is a mechanism, how can it be discovered, and what is the role of the knowledge of mechanisms in scientific explanation and technological control? The proposed answers are these. A mechanism is one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is — for example, metabolism in cells, interneuronal connections in brains, work in factories and offices, research in laboratories, and litigation in courts of law. Because mechanisms are largely or totally imperceptible, they must be conjectured. Once hypothesized they help explain, because a deep scientific explanation is an answer to a question of the form, “How does it work, that is, what makes it tick—what are its mechanisms?” Thus, by contrast with the subsumption of particulars under a generalization, an explanation proper consists in unveiling some lawful mechanism, as when political stability is explained by either coercion, public opinion manipulation, or democratic participation. Finding mechanisms satisfies not only the yearning for understanding, but also the need for control.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 21

  1. Ashby, W. Ross. 1963. An introduction to cybernetics. New York: John Wiley.
  2. Athearn, Daniel. 1994. Scientific nihilism: On the loss and recovery of physical explanation. Albany: State University of New York Press.
  3. Bunge, Mario. 1959. Causality: The place of the causal principle in modern science. Cambrige, MA: Harvard University Press. Repr., New York: Dover, 1979.
  4. Bunge, Mario. 1964. Phenomenological theories. In The critical approach: Essays in honor of Karl Popper, edited by Mario Bunge, 234–254. New York: Free Press. · doi:10.4324/9781351313087-16
  5. Bunge, Mario. 1967. Scientific research. 2 vols. Berlin: Springer–Verlag. Rev. ed., Philosophy of science, 2 vols., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998.
  6. Bunge, Mario. 1979b. Treatise on basic philosophy. Vol. 4, Aworld of systems. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer/Reidel.
  7. Bunge, Mario. 1983. Treatise on basic philosophy. Vol. 6, Understanding the world. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer/Reidel.
  8. Bunge, Mario. 1996. Finding philosophy in social science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  9. Bunge, Mario. 1998. Social science under debate. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press. · doi:10.3138/9781442680036
  10. 10.1007/BF00144167 · doi:10.1007/bf00144167
  11. Collins, Randall. 1998. The sociology of philosophies: A global theory of intellectual change. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
  12. Elias, Norbert. [1939] 2000. The civilizing process: Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
  13. Keynes, John Maynard. [1936] 1973. The general theory of employment, interest and money. Vol. VII of Collected writings. London: Macmillan/Cambridge University Press.
  14. Kitcher, Philip, and Wesley Salmon, eds. 1989. Scientific explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  15. Laszlo, Ervin. 1972. Introduction to systems philosophy. New York: Gordon and Breach. · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1972.tb00045.x
  16. Merton, Robert K. 1976. Social ambivalence and other essays. New York: Free Press.
  17. Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The sociological imagination. NewYork: Oxford University Press.
  18. Revonsuo, Antti. 2001. On the nature of explanation in the neurosciences. In Theory and method in the neurosciences, edited by P. K. Machamer, R. Grush, and P. McLaughlin, 45–69. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
  19. Schönwandt, Walter L. 2002. Planung in der Krise? Theoretische Orientierungen für Architektur, Stadt–und Raumplanung . Stuttgart, Germany: W. Kohlhammer · doi:10.1007/978-3-663-01234-4
  20. Sober, Elliott, and David Sloan Wilson. 1998. Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  21. Sztompka, Piotr. 1979. Sociological dilemmas: Toward a dialectic paradigm. New York: Academic Press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Bunge, M.
Venue
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Published
2004-06
Volume
34
Issue
2
Pages
182-210
ISSN
  • 0048-3931 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-7441
OpenAlex
W2015544292
Cited by
501
References
22
FWCI
160.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)

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