Cited by 21Social and Intergroup PsychologyPsychology of Social InfluenceSocial Power and Status Dynamics

Group Polarization Revisited: A Processing Effort Account

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Sieber, Janusch, Ziegler, René·2019·Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Abstract

Research has shown that processes of social comparison as well as persuasive argumentation are involved in group polarization. We propose a processing effort account according to which the role of these processes in determining group polarization is contingent on ability and motivation. The impact of information regarding others’ positions on group polarization should be higher given low (vs. high) ability or motivation. In contrast, the impact of persuasive argumentation should be higher given high (vs. low) ability and motivation. Results in line with these assumptions were obtained in two experiments in which individuals’ ability (Experiment 1) or motivation (Experiment 2), information regarding group average position, and argument persuasiveness were manipulated. Furthermore, consistent findings were also obtained in a third experiment testing the role of motivation in real group discussions. A processing effort account provides a novel perspective for investigating the development of group extremity.

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  • Group polarization is a dynamic property of a single social group, not strictly a property of individuals.

    “Thus, from a social psychological perspective, group polarization is a dynamic property of a single social group — a shifting of group behaviour over time in a more extreme direction, but in the same direction in which the group started. It is not, strictly speaking, a property of individuals”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [19]

    The Abstract (page not supplied) defines group polarization as a change in individual preferences from before to after group discussion, in the direction favored by the group's average prediscussion preferences. This supports the directional-shift aspect, but contradicts the claim that polarization is not, strictly speaking, a property of individuals. Experiment 3’s Results (page not supplied) also calculate polarization scores from individuals’ attitude changes. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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  • Group polarization is the tendency for members of a social group to arrive at a consensus through group discussion and other social interaction that is more extreme but in the same direction as the average of their initial opinions on a given issue.

    “It refers to the oft-observed tendency for members of a social group to arrive at a consensus (through group discussion and other forms of social interaction) that is more extreme but in the same direction as the average of their initial opinions on a given issue19.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [19]

    The paper’s Abstract (page unavailable) defines group polarization as a postdiscussion shift in individual preferences toward the direction favored by the group’s average prediscussion preferences. Experiment 3’s Method says participants were asked to reach a consensus, but the paper does not define polarization as arriving at an extreme consensus; it measures individuals’ attitude changes. The consensus element of the citing sentence is therefore not supported as part of the definition. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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  • Group polarization can be explained by persuasive argumentation: during group discussion, people are exposed to additional arguments in favour of the position that the average group member was already inclined to take.

    “The first has to do with persuasive argumentation: during group discussion, people are exposed to additional arguments in favour of the position that the average group member was already inclined to take19,20.”

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 29

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Authors
Sieber, J., & Ziegler, R.
Affiliations
  • Spraitbach, Germany
  • University of Tübingen (DE)
Corresponding author
Ziegler, René
Venue
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Published
2019-03-19
Volume
45
Issue
10
Pages
1482-1498
ISSN
  • 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-7433
OpenAlex
W2924019250
Cited by
21
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4
FWCI
3.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Psychology of Social Influence
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
group polarization, social comparison, persuasive argumentation, ability, motivation, argument persuasiveness, group discussion
MeSH terms
Cognition, Female, Group Processes, Humans, Male, Motivation, Persuasive Communication, Psychological Distance, Social Identification, Young Adult

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