The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Counterfactual Thinking and Victim Compensation: A Test of Norm Theory
Abstract
Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) identifies factors that determine the ease with which alternatives to reality can be imagined or constructed. One assumption of norm theory is that the greater the availability of imagined alternatives to an event, the stronger will be the affective reaction elicited by the event. The present two experiments explore this assumption in the context of observers' reactions to victims. It was predicted that negative outcomes that strongly evoked positive alternatives would elicit more sympathy from observers than negative outcomes that weakly evoked positive alternatives. The ease of counterfactual thought was manipulated in the first experiment by the spatial distance between the negative outcome and a positive alternative, and in the second experiment by the habitualness of the actions that precipitated the victimization. Consistent with norm theory, subjects recommended more compensation for victims of fates for which a positive alternative was highly available. Implications of the results for various types of reactions to victims are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Self-citationPsychological status of the script concept.
Abelson, R. P. (1981) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.36.7.715 · Cited by 1,743
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.015 · Cited by 1,476
Whatever Became of Consistency Theory?
Abelson, R. P. (1983) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167283091006 · Cited by 203
Naive conceptions of free will and the deterministic paradox.
Turnbull, W. W. (1981) · Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement · doi:10.1037/h0081115 · Cited by 82
Cited by
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Self-citationSlovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
“Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2648573 · Cited by 2,298
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, D. T., & McFarland, C.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1986-12
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 513-519
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2099619251
- Cited by
- 274
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 2.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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