Organizational Control Systems and Pay-for-Performance in the Public Service
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Under certain conditions, output related performance measurement and pay-for-performance produce negative outcomes. We argue that in public service, these negative effects are stronger than in the private sector. We combine Behavioural Economics and Management Control Theory to determine under which conditions this is the case. We suggest as alternatives to the dominant output related pay-for-performance systems selection and socialization, exploratory use of output performance measures, and awards.
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Citations
Cites
The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1207/s15327965pli1104_01 · Cited by 34,210
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services
Lipsky, M. (1981) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1288305 · Cited by 8,981
Self‐determination theory and work motivation
Gagné, M., & Deci, E. L. (2005) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.322 · Cited by 7,757 · cited 2×
“The most cited one is selfdetermination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000a, 2000b; Gagné & Deci, 2005).”
BackgroundDeci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176 · cited 1×
“…and economists have empirically analysed the crowding-out effect in hundreds of laboratory experiments (e.g. Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001; Deci et al., 1999; Weibel et al., 2010), as well as in econometric studies of real-life events (e.g., Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, & Bohnet, 1997; Gneezy &…”
BackgroundMultitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Towards an understanding of inequity
Adams, J. S. (1963) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0040968 · Cited by 5,146 · cited 1×
“Many studies have found that, in contrast to the equity theory of Adams (1963), people accept a perceived unfair distribution of the cake as long as the process that has led to the distribution is perceived as fair (Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000).”
ResultIntrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913 · cited 1×
“Under certain conditions, extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Frey, 1997; Lindenberg, 2001; Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Weibel, 2007), an effect called ‘the corruption effect of extrinsic motivation’ (Deci, 1975; Deci & Flaste, 1995;…”
BackgroundDeci, E. L. (1975) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-4446-9 · Cited by 2,911
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175 · cited 3×
“Also, with certain tasks the price-effect (increase of performance induced by extrinsic rewards) may compensate the crowding-out effect, as has been experimentally shown in fields other than public service (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Weibel et al., 2010).”
BackgroundResult
Cited by
Wijen, F. (2014) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2012.0218 · Cited by 459
Quan (2017) · doi:10.1108/ajim-01-2017-0014 · Cited by 306
“2001; Thursby & Thursby, 2002) and the individual levels (Frey et al., 2013; Osterloh & Frey, 2014).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Frey, B. S., Homberg, F., & Osterloh, M.
- Venue
- Organization Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-05-23
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 949-972
- ISSN
- 0170-8406 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-3044
- OpenAlex
- W2128825842
- Cited by
- 236
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 66.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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