The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Robust Are Probabilistic Models of Higher-Level Cognition?
Abstract
An increasingly popular theory holds that the mind should be viewed as a near-optimal or rational engine of probabilistic inference, in domains as diverse as word learning, pragmatics, naive physics, and predictions of the future. We argue that this view, often identified with Bayesian models of inference, is markedly less promising than widely believed, and is undermined by post hoc practices that merit wholesale reevaluation. We also show that the common equation between probabilistic and rational or optimal is not justified.
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“The risk here is the unchecked proliferation of “just-so stories”—post hoc narratives crafted to explain observed phenomena without generating risky, testable predictions that could potentially disconfirm the theory (Gigerenzer 1998; Marcus and Davis 2013).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Marcus and Davis 2013
In the citing paper
“What appears to support the hypothesis may instead reflect the descriptive flexibility of the models rather than evidence of mechanistic reality (Marcus and Davis 2013; Rasmussen and Eliasmith 2013).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Marcus and Davis 2013
Citations
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ResultHumans Rapidly Estimate Expected Gain in Movement Planning
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Metadata
- Authors
- Marcus, G. F., & Davis, E.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Marcus, Gary F.
- ORCID
- Davis, Ernest
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-10-01
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 2351-2360
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2106478918
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 15
- FWCI
- 16.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- Bayesian models of cognition, probabilistic inference, rationality, optimal inference, higher-level cognition, post hoc reasoning, word learning, pragmatics, naive physics, prediction
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Humans, Models, Psychological, Models, Statistical, Executive Function
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