Scarcity Frames Value
Abstract
Economic models of decision making assume that people have a stable way of thinking about value. In contrast, psychology has shown that people's preferences are often malleable and influenced by normatively irrelevant contextual features. Whereas economics derives its predictions from the assumption that people navigate a world of scarce resources, recent psychological work has shown that people often do not attend to scarcity. In this article, we show that when scarcity does influence cognition, it renders people less susceptible to classic context effects. Under conditions of scarcity, people focus on pressing needs and recognize the trade-offs that must be made against those needs. Those trade-offs frame perception more consistently than irrelevant contextual cues, which exert less influence. The results suggest that scarcity can align certain behaviors more closely with traditional economic predictions.
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The literature lacks an up-to-date, integrative, and critical review of all key aspects of scarcity theory.
“While the field is fast-growing, the literature lacks an up-to-date, integrative, and critical review of (the evidence for) all key aspects of scarcity theory.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. 2015
Lower-income participants were less sensitive to the proportional size of the discount.
“However, lower-income participants were less sensitive to the proportional size of the discount.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
The study designs of Shah et al. (2015) and Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) involved hypothetical decision scenarios and used existing income levels as the scarcity measure.
“Their study designs also involved hypothetical decision scenarios and they used existing income levels as scarcity measure.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
Shah et al. (2015) showed that low-income people were less susceptible to irrelevant features in valuing offers, items, and situations.
“In a series of experiments, Shah et al. (2015) showed that low-income people were less susceptible to irrelevant features in valuing offers, items, and situations.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
These methodological notes also apply to the studies of Shah et al. (2015) and Mullainathan and Shafir (2013).
“Importantly, these methodological notes also apply to the studies of Shah et al. (2015) and Mullainathan and Shafir (2013), discussed before.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
Some experiments conducted by Shah et al. (2015) did not reveal differences between higher- and lower-income participants.
“Some experiments conducted by Shah et al. (2015) did not reveal differences between higher- and lower-income participants.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
Shah et al. (2015) did not find significant differences between income groups for the mental budgeting effect in the lost ticket scenario.
“Similarly, they did not find significant differences between both income groups for the mental budgeting effect in the lost ticket scenario (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
Results of most studies underpin the proposition that low-income people report more trade-off thinking and value offers and products more consistently than higher-income individuals.
“Results of most studies underpin this proposition showing that low-income people report more trade-off thinking (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Shah et al. 2015) and value offers and products more consistently (Shah et al. 2015) than higher-income individuals.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. 2015
Shah et al. (2015) did not find that lower-income participants were less sensitive to the anchoring effect.
“Contrary to their expectations, they did not find that lower-income participants were less sensitive to the anchoring effect.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
Some experiments revealed that the poor are less susceptible to relativity bias.
“Some of these experiments revealed that the poor are less susceptible to relativity bias.”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. (2015)
The proposed underlying mechanism is that the poor naturally think about trade-offs because they face tight budgets.
“The proposed underlying mechanism is that the poor naturally think about trade-offs because they face tight budgets (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Shah et al. 2015).”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. 2015
Compared to higher-income people, lower-income individuals report more trade-off thinking in hypothetical purchases and in deciding about their willingness to pay for a product.
“Compared to higher-income people, lower-income individuals report more trade-off thinking in case of hypothetical purchases (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013) and deciding about their willingness to pay for a product (Shah et al. 2015).”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. 2015
Other studies found that high- and low-income groups are equally sensitive to opportunity cost neglect and the anchoring and mental budgeting effect.
“However, other studies found that highand low-income groups are equally sensitive to opportunity cost neglect (Plantinga et al. 2018) and the anchoring and mental budgeting effect (Shah et al. 2015).”
From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Shah et al. 2015
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“…Study 1c (N = 604, n = 578) Money Median split*, regression* Study 1d (N = 2,015, n = 1,898) Money Median split*, regression† Proportional thinking (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Hall, 2008): People value the same absolute quantity less if it seems like a smaller proportion of a larger amount.”
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Self-citationSocial norms and energy conservation
Allcott, H. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.03.003 · Cited by 2,715 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Policymakers often use framing and subtle contextual changes to nudge behavior in a number of domains, from energy (Allcott, 2012) to health (Banks et al., 1995) to voting (Bryan, Walton, Rogers, & Dweck, 2011).”
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“Whereas previous work has focused on how scarcity negatively affects cognition (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Mani et al., 2013), here we document that under specific circumstances, scarcity brings decision making closer to normative predictions, which suggests that scarcity has more nuanced effects.”
Some Consequences of Having Too Little
Shah, A. K., Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2012) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1222426 · Cited by 1,567 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Various forms of scarcity bring trade-offs to the top of the mind (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013; Shah et al., 2012; Spiller, 2011), and when these trade-offs frame one’s valuation, one relies less on the external context.”
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A Self‐Regulatory Model of Resource Scarcity
Cannon, C., Goldsmith, K., & Roux, C. (2019) · Journal of Consumer Psychology · doi:10.1002/jcpy.1035 · Cited by 280 · see citing works
Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory
de Bruijn, E.-J., & Antonides, G. (2022) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-021-09802-7 · Cited by 277 · see citing works
“123 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3801150 scarcity serve to allocate one’s attention to scarcity-related issues, irrespective of the scarcity domain.12 This mechanism can be translated into the real-world environment of poverty (Shah 2015; Shah et al. 2012).”
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An exercise in self-replication: Replicating Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2012)
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Poverty, Seasonal Scarcity and Exchange Asymmetries
Fehr, D., Fink, G., & Jack, K. (2019) · doi:10.3386/w26357 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
- Authors
- Shah, A. K., Shafir, E., & Mullainathan, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-02-12
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 402-412
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2130478903
- Cited by
- 433
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 48 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 43 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 2
- FWCI
- 16.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
- Canadian Institutes of Health Research
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion
- Keywords
- scarcity, context effects, framing effects, decision-making, economic forecasting
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Cognition, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Male, Models, Economic
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