The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Nothing Happens by Accident, or Does It? A Low Prior for Randomness Does Not Explain Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Abstract
Belief in conspiracy theories has often been associated with a biased perception of randomness, akin to a nothing-happens-by-accident heuristic. Indeed, a low prior for randomness (i.e., believing that randomness is a priori unlikely) could plausibly explain the tendency to believe that a planned deception lies behind many events, as well as the tendency to perceive meaningful information in scattered and irrelevant details; both of these tendencies are traits diagnostic of conspiracist ideation. In three studies, we investigated this hypothesis and failed to find the predicted association between low prior for randomness and conspiracist ideation, even when randomness was explicitly opposed to malevolent human intervention. Conspiracy believers' and nonbelievers' perceptions of randomness were not only indistinguishable from each other but also accurate compared with the normative view arising from the algorithmic information framework. Thus, the motto "nothing happens by accident," taken at face value, does not explain belief in conspiracy theories.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“It is also stronger among people who habitually seek meaning and patterns in the environment, including believers in paranormal phenomena (e.g., Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; but see Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015).”
From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“they might be especially drawn to conspiracy theories and related movements that are both unpopular and identify the”
From The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories (2020) · cites this paper as [60]
Citations
Cites
An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications
Li, M., & Vitányi, P. (2019) · Texts in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11298-1 · Cited by 3,681
The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks
Braman, D., Kahan, D. M., Peters, E. M., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L. L., & Mandel, G. N. (2012) · Scholarly Commons - George Washington University Law School (George Washington University) · Cited by 2,439
Three approaches to the quantitative definition of information*
Kolmogorov, A. N. (1968) · International Journal of Computer Mathematics · doi:10.1080/00207166808803030 · Cited by 2,031
The definition of random sequences
Martin-Löf, P. (1966) · Information and Control · doi:10.1016/s0019-9958(66)80018-9 · Cited by 1,220
Lacking control increases illusory pattern perception
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1159845 · Cited by 1,119
Goertzel, T. (1994) · Political Psychology · doi:10.2307/3791630 · Cited by 1,094 · cited 5×
“…theories were correlated with each other, thus replicating the now standard finding that conspiracy-theory beliefs involve a monological belief system (Goertzel, 1994; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Swami et al., 2011; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialMeasuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale
Brotherton, R., French, C. C., & Pickering, A. D. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279 · Cited by 925
On the Length of Programs for Computing Finite Binary Sequences: statistical considerations
Chaitin, G. J. (1969) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/321495.321506 · Cited by 918
Algorithmic Randomness and Complexity
Downey, R. G., & Hirschfeldt, D. R. (2010) · Theory and Applications of Computability · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-68441-3 · Cited by 917
Dead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories
Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550611434786 · Cited by 660
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Campion-Vincent V., 2005, La société parano. Théories du complot, menaces et incertitudes
- 10.1038/nclimate1547 · DOI · Paper page
- Taguieff P.-A., 2013, Court traité de complotologie
- Wagner-Egger P., 2007, Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 20, 31
Cited by
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511
“, 2018), but other studies have found no relationship (Dieguez et al., 2015).”
BackgroundThe Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721417718261 · Cited by 1,316
van Prooijen, J., Douglas, K. M., & De Inocencio, C. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2331 · Cited by 355
“At first blush, the present findings seem inconsistent with a study that did not find significant correlations between pattern perception in binary outcomes and conspiracy beliefs (Dieguez et al., 2015).”
ResultConspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries
Imhoff, R., Zimmer, F., Klein, O., António, J. H. C., Babinska, M., Bangerter, A., Bilewicz, M., Blanuša, N., Bovan, K., Bužarovska, R., et al. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01258-7 · Cited by 346
Self-citationConspiracy Theories: Evolved Functions and Psychological Mechanisms
van Prooijen, J.-W., & van Vugt, M. (2018) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691618774270 · Cited by 414
Metadata
- Authors
- Dieguez, S., Wagner-Egger, P., & Gauvrit, N.
- Affiliations
- Laboratory for Cognitive and Neurological Sciences, Department of Medicine, University of Fribourg
- Department of Psychology, University of Fribourg
- École Pratique des Hautes Études (FR)
- ORCID
- Gauvrit, Nicolas
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-09-21
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 1762-1770
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2173290003
- Cited by
- 87
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 26.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, conspiracist ideation, randomness perception, algorithmic information theory
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Culture, Delusions, Female, Humans, Deception, Male, Middle Aged, Politics, Thinking, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Nothing Happens by Accident, or Does It? A Low Prior for Randomness Does Not Explain Belief in Conspiracy Theories. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0956797615598740
- The paper
- Dieguez, S., Wagner-Egger, P., & Gauvrit, N. (2015). Nothing Happens by Accident, or Does It? A Low Prior for Randomness Does Not Explain Belief in Conspiracy Theories. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615598740
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.